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SPECIMENS

OF

FOREIGN STANDARD LITERATURE.

VOL. I.

SPECIMENS

OF

FOREIGN STANDARD LITERATURE.

EDITED

BY GEORGE RIPLEY.

VOL. I.

CONTAINING

PHILOSOPHICAL MISCELLANIES,

FROM THE FRENCH

OF

COUSIN, JOUFFROY, AND BENJAMIN CONSTANT.

BOSTON:

HILLIARD, GRAY, AND COMPANY.

M.DCCC.XXXVIII.

As wine and oil are imported to us from abroad, so must ripe understanding, and many civil virtues, be imported into our minds from foreign writings;—we shall else miscarry still, and come short in the attempts of any great enterprise.

MILTON, *History of Britain, Book III.*

PHILOSOPHICAL MISCELLANIES,

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

OF

COUSIN, JOUFFROY, AND B. CONSTANT.

WITH

INTRODUCTORY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

By GEORGE RIPLEY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

BOSTON:
HILLIARD, GRAY, AND COMPANY.

M.DCCC.XXXVIII.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE design of issuing a series of translations from the works of several of the most celebrated authors in the higher departments of modern German and French Literature, has already been announced by the Editor of these volumes.

The publication, of which they are intended to form the commencement, has special reference to the three leading divisions of Philosophy, History, and Theology; but its plan also includes writings of a popular character, selected from the most finished specimens of elegant literature, and adapted to interest the great mass of intelligent readers.

Among the writers, from whom it is proposed to give translations, are Cousin, Jouffroy, Guizot, and Benjamin Constant, in French; and Herder, Schiller, Goethe, Wieland, Lessing, Jacobi,

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Fichte, Schelling, Richter, Novalis, Uhland, Körner, Hölty, Menzel, Neander, Schleiermacher, DeWette, Olshausen, Ammon, Hase, and Twesten, in German.

The following works, which are either already in preparation, or whose translation is engaged, it is expected, will compose a part of the series.

Select Minor Poems of Goethe and Schiller.
Menzel's History of German Literature.
Benjamin Constant on Religion.
Benjamin Constant's Roman Polytheism.
Cousin's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. First Volume.
De Wette's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.
Goethe's Correspondence with Schiller, Zelter, &c.
Life of Goethe, (in preparation for this Work, from original documents).
Goethe's Conversations with Eckermann.
Lyric Poems from Körner, Novalis, Uhland, &c.
Jouffroy's Moral Philosophy.
Fichte's Destiny of Man; and Character of the True Scholar.

Life of Jean Paul Richter; with Selections from his Works.

Herder's Select Religious Writings.

Schelling on the Philosophy of Art; and Miscellanies.

Selections from Lessing.

De Wette's Theodore, or the Consecration of a Doubter.

Ammon's Progressive Developement of Christianity.

Guizot's History of Civilization.

The enterprise, in which the Editor has engaged in conjunction with a number of his fellow-students, in different parts of our country, is of a very unambitious character. They are content with the humble task of representing the views of other minds, if thereby they may give any fresh impulses to thought; enlarge the treasures of our youthful literature; or contribute, though in a small degree, to the gratification of a liberal curiosity. The claims, which their undertaking presents to the favor of the public, must rest solely on the ground of its general utility. The Editor believes, that it has been called for by the wishes of many, whose opinions are entitled to respectful

attention; and that, if successfully accomplished, it will tend to satisfy a want which has often been uttered, and which is extensively felt.

The interest, with which the study of the continental writers has been pursued by a portion of our scholars, is well known to all who are acquainted with the present state of American literature. It has been thought desirable that the fruits of their labors should be thrown into the common stock; and that, if any advantage were to be gained from their industry and zeal, the opportunity for making use of it should be given to the public.

"We earnestly recommend to our educated men," it has been said by a writer of eminent authority, "a more extensive acquaintance with the intellectual labors of continental Europe. Our reading is confined too much to English books, and especially to the more recent publications of Great Britain. In this we err. We ought to know the different modes of viewing and discussing great subjects in different nations. We should be able to compare the writings of the highest minds in a great variety of circumstances.

Nothing can favor more our own intellectual independence and activity. Let English literature be ever so fruitful and profound, we shall still impoverish ourselves by making it our sole nutriment. If our scholars would improve our literature, they should cultivate an intimacy not only with that of England, but of continental Europe."

It is important, for the same reasons, that a knowledge of the best productions of foreign genius and study, should not be confined to the few who have access to the original languages, but should be diffused among enlightened readers of every class and condition. The same circumstances which diminish the number of scholars, and increase that of thinkers, in this country, present an urgent motive for the reproduction of the noblest creations of thought, in a form that shall be accessible to all.

The labor, however, of translating the writings of a favorite author in a foreign literature into our own language is, on many accounts, such an ungrateful task, that, with a few brilliant exceptions, most competent persons are found reluctant to engage in it. There is so much more

pleasure in the quiet study of a congenial subject, and so much more excitement in the work of original composition, that the less inviting business of translation is not likely to be sought for by those who are best qualified to perform it with success. They must be prompted by the influence of peculiarly favorable circumstances, or of a sincere and almost enthusiastic zeal to communicate to others that which has greatly interested themselves.

The present design originated in a wish to furnish an immediate motive to those who possessed the power, but who were called upon by no specific occasion, to enrich our literature with the fruits they had gathered in a foreign field. The Editor was well aware, that there was a sufficient degree of ability and culture among the students of European literature in our own country, to sustain a work which should have the merit of novelty, of thorough preparation, and of adaptation to the condition of public opinion and feeling. He was desirous to combine in a common endeavor, the resources for this object, which, on account of their insulated position, have hitherto failed to produce the highest effects of which

they are capable. He has found his views in this respect promptly seconded by those individuals whose coöperation he was anxious to secure.

The Editor would add, that he is certainly not blind to the difficulties which lie in the way of the further realization of his plan. If the experiment should prove, that the time for a publication like this has not yet arrived, he will acquiesce in the result without disappointment or complaint.

Should the encouragement of the public equal the extent of his proposal, the volumes now presented will be speedily followed by others, which are in the course of translation; but if these should be the last as well as the first, the Editor is already rewarded for his not unpleasant labors in maturing the enterprise, by the approbation of his fellow-students, on whose judgment he relies, and with whose sympathy he has been honored.

He would here record his grateful recognition of the kindness of those literary friends who have entered into his plan with as much interest as if it had been their own; and his assurance, that,

whether their labors see the light in this form or some other, they will not be lost.

As this work, if continued, will be composed of the contributions of different translators, entirely independent of each other, it is proper here to state, that it is devoted to the advocacy of no exclusive opinions; that it is designed to include works and authors of the most opposite character, without favor or prejudice; and that no individual is responsible for any sentiment or expression that it may contain, which does not proceed from his own pen.

Boston, *February* 22, 1838.

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PHILOSOPHICAL MISCELLANIES.

Non ambitione, non φιλονεικίᾳ, non æmulatione, non ut sererem rixas, hæc et institui et collegi, sed primum ut me ipsum erudirem, deinde ut aliquorum, qui hæc legebant, honesta et pia studia adjuvarem.

MELANCHTHON, *Præf. in Loc. Theol.*

VICTOR COUSIN.

VICTOR COUSIN.

INTRODUCTORY NOTICE.

THE philosophy of VICTOR COUSIN forms an important epoch in the history of metaphysical science in France. It marks the period of transition from the skeptical and sensual theories of the eighteenth century, to the more elevated and spiritual views of the nature of man, which are the cheering result of the philosophical investigations of the present age.

The very name of French philosophy has been identified, to a great extent, with Materialism and infidelity. The labors of Cousin have been directed, from the commencement of his career, not to clearing it from the accusation, but to placing it in a new path, and impressing it with a higher character. The design of his teachings, in fact, has been to restore philosophy to the eminence which it held in the golden days of English literature, and to revive the lofty spirit of Hooker, Cudworth, and Milton, in the midst of modern unbelief and selfishness.

This has been the great problem of philosophical speculation since the appearance of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* by Immanuel Kant. That remarkable

thinker clearly comprehended the magnitude of the work, and though he did not complete it himself, he has furnished materials for future inquiry, the value and importance of which will always be more highly appreciated, in proportion as the soundness and depth of his thoughts are perceived through the obscurity of his language. His writings form an admirable preparation for a philosophy which reconciles the holiest instincts of man with the rigid precision of science; which beats down the pretensions of skepticism by a skilful use of its own weapons; and which establishes the sublime convictions of the spiritual leaders of humanity on the basis of a thorough observation and analysis of facts.

Among the promoters of this philosophical developement in France, Victor Cousin holds the most conspicuous place. The influence which he has exerted on the condition of thought in his own country is such as rarely falls to the lot of an individual, and the splendor of his intellectual endowments has won for him a distinguished reputation, in almost every cultivated nation in Europe. The essential characteristics of his philosophy are opposition to all partial and exclusive theories, and the endeavor to comprehend every element of human nature, in a broad and universal system, which reposes on the foundation of actual inquiry and induction.

The prevailing philosophy in France during the greater part of the eighteenth century was precisely the reverse of this. It was founded on an inadequate examination of the nature of man, and failed of doing justice to some of its most important elements. The

results, at which it arrived in the regular course of logical deduction, were inconsistent with many obvious tendencies, many incontestable attributes of humanity. It placed itself in opposition to the universal sentiments of our race. It attacked the foundation of the religious hopes and the moral convictions, which no force has ever been able to wrest from the great mass of mankind. The history of the world and the consciousness of individuals were equally at war with the conclusions which it obtained, and the spirit which it breathed. Its doctrines produced a harsh dissonance with the whispers of that voice which is uttered, clearly though faintly, in the heart of every living man. Such a system could not gain a permanent footing, as the philosophy of an enlightened and reflecting nation. It was doomed, sooner or later, to meet the fate of all error. It bore the seeds of corruption within itself, and from its very nature, could not avoid coming to a more or less speedy end. It was inevitable that whenever the attention of free and original minds should be turned to the examination of this philosophy, its popularity should be unable to save it from destruction. Its defective representations of human nature must be perceived, as soon as they were compared with the original reality; the weakness of its foundation must be brought to light; and the authority which it had usurped over the minds of men must be called in question and for ever set aside.

Such is the character of the work in which Cousin has been called upon to engage. The errors of the dominant system had been long suspected; a portion

of its fallacies had been pointed out; a new movement had been commenced in the opposite direction; but a reformer was needed who should examine its pretensions to the bottom, exhibit the defects of the foundation on which it reposed, and invalidate its claims to universal reception, by the introduction of a purer and sounder philosophy. The appearance of Cousin as a public teacher was at the appropriate moment. Every thing was ready for his reception. He announced an order of ideas which met with a loud and sincere response. He raised the standard for which many eyes were looking, and around which a host of youthful disciples at once gathered with congenial enthusiasm and love. Cousin has felt the importance of his mission; he comprehends the work which is demanded of him by his age; and has devoted himself to its accomplishment with a calm zeal, a wise and modest energy, such as nothing but strong convictions and disinterested purposes can inspire. The purity of sentiment which distinguishes his writings, the vigor and justness of his intellect, the wealth of erudition which he brings to the illustration of truth, the clearness of his style, and the force of his eloquence give him singular qualifications for the task with which he is occupied; and the brilliant success of his career, the glowing interest which he has excited in the abstractions of speculative philosophy, the dignity with which he has filled a wide and honorable sphere of action as well as of thought, display a beautiful example of fruitful intellectual effort, to which there are few parallels in modern times.

In order to present a complete idea of the philosophical position and merits of Cousin, we must review the circumstances which led to his undertaking. A brief sketch of the history of opinion in France, prior to the new developement of which he is at the head, will enable the reader to appreciate, with justice, the character of his reform, and the tendency of his speculations.

The philosophy which prevailed in France during the eighteenth century has received the name of the Sensual system. This name, it should be observed, is not given to it, in any invidious application, but as expressing with more precision than any other term, the exact idea which it is intended to convey. It is used not to denote its character or consequences, in a moral point of view, but to designate the principle which forms the basis of its theory, and with which it attempts to explain all the phenomena of human nature. The Sensual system, accordingly, admits the reality of no ideas but those which can be traced to sensation. It maintains that the materials of our knowledge are all obtained from the impressions which are made on our senses by the action of external objects. The only legitimate certainty is founded on the notices presented by the material organs; and as soon as we leave this sphere, we abandon the natural use of our faculties, and are lost in the regions of imagination and fiction.

It is not difficult to account for the origin of this system, in the infancy of our scientific knowledge of the human mind. Like every system which has extensively prevailed among sincere and intelligent seek-

ers of truth, it is not altogether destitute of foundation in reality. It proceeds from the actual observation of incontestable facts; else it could never have met with such a general reception; but it loses sight of another order of facts, no less important, no less incontestable, no less capable of being submitted to observation; or it would never have been so earnestly and perseveringly called in question. If it can be shown that its establishment was the result of an hasty and imperfect analysis; of the error so common with incautious and impatient thinkers, in the ardor of discovery, of a precipitate generalization; we shall not be surprised at the wide influence which it has obtained, and while we gain an insight into its narrow and superficial character, we may learn a lesson of philosophical toleration for its defenders and friends.

The Sensual system is founded on a few simple principles, which as Cousin has clearly demonstrated,[1] are of the utmost importance in the science of human nature, so long as they are limited to their legitimate sphere, and are not perverted to the support of bold and extravagant inductions.

We find, upon a slight examination of consciousness, a certain number of phenomena which are distinguished by the fact that they are altogether beyond our control. We can neither produce them, nor destroy them. They come and go, without our coöperation, with no reference to our will. Such, for instance, are our emotions of every kind, our desires,

[1] See *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, par V. Cousin. Tom. I. p. 139.

our passions, our appetites, the feeling of pleasure and of pain. These phenomena are occasioned by an external impression which has been experienced, that is, by a sensation. They are of unquestionable reality; they occupy an extensive sphere; they compose no small proportion of the motives of human action. It is true, moreover, that many of our most general ideas may be resolved, by a delicate analysis, into ideas that are less general; and that these, in their turn, by repeated decompositions, may be resolved into ideas that proceed from sensation. Now these sensible phenomena are the first to attract the attention. They are submitted the most easily to observation. They are found, not in the interior, but, as it were, on the surface of the soul. For this reason, they are the favorite subjects of reflection, in its early imperfect and feeble efforts. They afford it a useful exercise, and contribute to its growth and improvement. The analysis which it undertakes, is not confined entirely to the phenomena of consciousness. It refers the sensation which it has received to the impression made on the organ; and this impression again to external objects, which thus become the root of our sensations, and consequently, of our ideas. Hence the importance of the study of nature. Hence the desire and the ability to observe its phenomena and to ascertain its laws. The results which are obtained in this manner, enlarged and developed in the progress of ages, compose, together with physical science, a certain science of humanity,—a philosophy, which is not without a portion of truth, of grandeur, and of utility.

Now if this philosophy pretended only to explain a large number of the phenomena of consciousness on the principle of sensation, there would be no cause of objection to it. Such an explanation would be perfectly admissible. The conclusion would not go beyond the premises which have been furnished by a cautious induction; and no error could be charged upon the system. But the case, in fact, is very different from this. Reflection is obliged to divide the subject of its inquiries, and, for the sake of a more distinct view, to look at but one thing at a time. As it is feeble, when it commences its task, it is natural that it should stop with the part which it first studies, that it should regard this as the whole of reality; and that after having discovered an unquestionable order of facts, it should be so struck with their truth, their importance, their variety, their beauty, as to take notice of nothing else, and to believe that they are the only phenomena contained in the consciousness. Reflection goes through with a process like the following. A certain number of our ideas are derived from sensation; sensation accordingly explains and constitutes an important order of phenomena; therefore, all our ideas are derived from sensation; and there are no phenomena in the consciousness which are not reducible to this source. Such is the foundation of the Sensual philosophy.

The fundamental error of this system is no less obvious, than the manner in which it originated. It is essential to its truth, that there be no element in consciousness which cannot be explained by sensation. But a slight analysis will show that this condition does

not hold. For instance, we find in consciousness certain acts of volition, free determinations. We know that we often resist passion and desire. But is it passion and desire which combat passion and desire? Is it sensation by which we overcome the force of sensation? If sensation be the only principle of all the phenomena of activity,—as it is the essential characteristic of sensation and consequently of all the products of sensation to be passive,—the free and voluntary activity is destroyed. The philosophy of sensation is thus reduced to Fatalism. Sensation, moreover, not only bears the stamp of necessity, but of variety. Our sensations, emotions, passions, desires are constantly changing, assuming new forms. But this perpetual transformation does not include all the reality of which we are conscious. We believe and cannot but believe in our own personal identity, that we are the same to-day that we were yesterday, that we shall be the same to-morrow that we are to-day. The identity, the unity of our being is in truth the principal fact of consciousness, or rather the very foundation of all consciousness. But how is identity to be obtained from variety? How is the unity of our personal being to be derived from the multiplicity of sensible phenomena? This is clearly impossible. The philosophy of sensation has no means of arriving at the unity which combines, compares, and judges the variety of sensations. We have just seen that this philosophy destroys liberty. We now see that it destroys personality itself. It has just led us to Fatalism; it now leads us to Materialism. Finally, as this system regards the soul of man as the result and

the combination of our sensations, it is also compelled to regard the Deity only as the possible result, the combination, the last generalization of all the phenomena of nature. God is a kind of soul of the world, which sustains the same relation to the world, as the soul that is admitted by the Sensual philosophy, does to the body. The human soul, as it is regarded by this philosophy, is an abstract, general, collective idea, which represents, in the last analysis, the diversity of our sensations. The Creator of the world, as he is regarded by this philosophy, is an abstraction of the same character, which may be successively decomposed into the different portions of the world which alone possess reality, actual existence. But such a being is not the God of the human race. He is not a God distinct from the world. Now the negation of a God distinct from the world has a well-known name in every language, as well as in philosophy.

Such is the character of the system, considered in its elementary principles, against which the philosophy of Cousin is a declared revolt. The analysis that has been now given, presents it as a process of abstract thought. The next step is to inquire into its historical developement, with special reference to its position and consequences in the philosophy of France. I have only to follow in the path of Cousin, as I have hitherto done, to make this clear to every reader.[1]

In the age of Bacon, the doctrines of a spiritual philosophy were generally prevalent, although mingled

[1] *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, Tom. I. p. 443.

with singular exaggerations, and destitute of the support of scientific observation which they have since received from the profound and accurate researches of modern times. It was a matter of course for the broad and comprehensive intellect of Bacon to perceive the absurdity of those subtile speculations which were connected with the higher philosophy of his day; and to oppose to their airy texture, the substantial results of outward experience and observation. The tendency of his principles is to withdraw the attention from the contemplation of the mind, and to direct it exclusively to the study of the facts presented by external nature. He may accordingly be considered the father of the modern Sensual philosophy, although he was far from admitting its logical consequences, and occasionally advances principles which are in direct opposition to its procedure and results.

The doctrines of Bacon which regard experience as the sole foundation of our knowledge of reality, were adopted by the eminent English philosophers, Hobbes and Locke, and applied by them to the investigation of human nature. The fundamental idea of Hobbes was the exclusive certainty of the senses. We can rely upon no testimony but that which they present. There is not a single idea in the mind excepting those which we obtain through their medium. Every conviction which we cherish must be supported by their authority, or it rests on an insecure foundation. But the senses give us only the knowledge of material bodies. Therefore, only material bodies exist. Therefore, philosophy is only the science of material bodies. As all our ideas come from the

senses; all the phenomena of consciousness have their source in organization; and consciousness itself is only the result of organization. To think is to calculate; intelligence is nothing but arithmetic. Contingent ideas are all that exist; the Finite alone can be conceived of by man; the Infinite is merely the negation of the Finite; beyond this it is a mere word, invented to honor a Being of whom we can know nothing. The idea of good and evil is founded on agreeable or disagreeable sensations; the only law of conduct is to pursue the one and to avoid the other; hence the whole moral system of Hobbes. This system is the foundation of his politics. Man is capable of enjoyment and suffering. His only law is to enjoy as much, and to suffer as little as possible; as he has no other law he has all the rights that are conferred by this law; he may do whatever he pleases for his preservation and happiness; he is absolutely and completely selfish; he has a right to sacrifice every thing to himself. Such is the condition in which we are placed on the earth. We are provided with scanty means of enjoyment, to which all have a common right, by virtue of their capacity for enjoyment. This is the state of nature. It is always a state of war. It is disturbed by the anarchy of the passions, the combat of all with one another. But this state is contrary to the happiness of the majority of the individuals who compose it. Utility, the offspring of selfishness, requires it to be changed into the social state. The social state is the institution of a public authority superior to the power of individuals. But the passions of individuals constantly revolt

against this new authority. Hence this authority cannot be too strong. Hence again the only alternative is between a complete anarchy and a despotism which is excellent in proportion as it is arbitrary. Hence, finally, in the opinion of Hobbes, absolute monarchy as the ideal of true government. According to his opinion, therefore, the Sensual philosophy is inconsistent with popular liberty.

If Hobbes is the moralist and politician of this philosophy, Locke may be regarded as its metaphysician. He is the first who endeavored to exhibit it in a regular and systematic form. The signal merits of this philosopher can never be forgotten by the lover of truth and independent inquiry. Neither should he be mentioned without the profound respect which is due to great abilities united with rare moral worth. But in judging of a system, we do not judge of a man. The character of Locke is one before which we may bow in reverence. His doctrines are the proper object of critical examination and discussion.

The peculiar excellence of the system of Locke consists in its distinct exhibition of the purpose of philosophical investigation. This is to obtain a knowledge of the human mind, by the actual observation of its laws, its operations, and its effects. This is the idea, at once simple and grand, which lies at the bottom of all his inquiries. This constitutes his best claim to originality; and by this he has rendered an essential and lasting service to mental philosophy. But the greatest man is not exempt from inconsistency and error. While Locke opened the way which leads to true philosophy, he faltered in it himself; and

was insensibly betrayed into the path of an exclusive and unfounded hypothesis.

Locke institutes an inquiry with regard to the sources of human knowledge. He finds that these are two, namely, sensation and reflection; reflection applied to the operations of the understanding, that is, in the last analysis, sensation and the operations of the understanding; for reflection applied to these operations is limited to informing us concerning their number and their character. These operations are comparison, reasoning, abstraction, composition, association,—all of them faculties which separate or combine the elements that are derived from the other source of knowledge, sensation, but which add nothing to them. Not one of these faculties has the power of introducing into the mind any portion of knowledge, any idea whatever peculiar to itself. The operations of the understanding therefore add nothing fundamental or essential to the ideas derived from sensation; all our knowledge therefore has its beginning and end in sensation. Such is the theory of Locke presented in its lowest terms. Thus reduced, it is already judged; it clearly belongs to the great Sensual school. The principle once established, it is easy to foresee the consequences. The native wisdom of Locke could not keep them back; they every where escape from his system; and connect him with that chain of Sensual philosophers of which Hobbes formed the last link. Locke, in fact, is Hobbes, with such differences as the case requires. He hardly ever quotes him, but he constantly reproduces him. Thus his chapter on the influence of

language closely resembles the chapter of Hobbes on the same subject; Hobbes was professedly a Nominalist; Locke should have been one in accordance with his system; but although he did not openly avow Nominalism, he contributed to give it currency. Hobbes and the whole Sensual school assimilate the soul, to a greater or less degree, to the body, as is very well known. Locke does not go so far as that; but with Occam and Scotus he maintains that it is difficult to prove, except by revelation, that the subject of the operations of the understanding is spirit and not matter; and he suspects that God, in his omnipotence, might have endowed matter with the faculty of thought.

Such is the character of the Sensual philosophy, in the earlier stages of its progress. It was reserved for the acute and intrepid thinkers of the French nation to carry it to its utmost logical consequences, and to present it in a form which may justly be said to bear the ghastliness of death.

The principles of Locke were greatly aided in their reception in France by the authority of Voltaire. During his residence in England, he became acquainted with the system, and at a subsequent period, devoted the brilliant resources of his imagination and wit to its defence. It soon became the property of the saloons; imperceptibly it took posesssion of the excited mind of the nation; its adoption was deemed the standard of culture and taste; and, at last, it obtained an able expounder in the clear-minded and sagacious Condillac. This fertile writer not only

illustrated the system of his predecessor by his luminous exhibition of its principles, but enriched it with numerous observations of his own, reduced many of its scattered ideas to a compact form, and presented it in a style at once scientific and popular. The leading aim of his philosophy is to deduce the complete developement of the human mind from the single principle of sensation. His writings contain a more able and ingenious defence of this doctrine, than is to be found in the English successors of Locke; and, with the simplicity and good faith with which he always sets it forth, it is by no means surprising that he should have gained such a wide-spread influence over the national mind. "We should also do Condillac the justice, as a man," it is well remarked by a late French writer, "to remember that he did not follow out his system to its ultimate disastrous consequences; perhaps, he did not even perceive them; for this is not unfrequently the case. If Locke, religious before his philosophy, continued religious after it, it would be inadmissible to conclude from it, that the philosophy of Locke is a religious philosophy. Materialism, in the form in which it has been seen in our own days, is only the necessary result of the philosophy of Locke, as interpreted among us by Condillac." It was not long after the establishment of this philosophy in France, that its legitimate conclusions began to be perceived. We have already seen the principles which it involves, when considered merely as an abstract but connected process of thought. The correctness of that analysis is verified by the actual manifestation of those principles in the progress of French

philosophy. It has been shown that the sensual system leads to Materialism. In the hands of Cabanis, we find this doctrine fully developed. His great work on the *Physical and Moral Relations of Man*,[1] supports the theory that the soul is not a separate principle in our nature, a real existence, but merely the product of the nervous system. Sensibility is the property of the nerves; and sensibility explains the moral faculties, the intelligence, the will, the whole inward nature of man. Man is a moral being because he is capable of sensation; he is capable of sensation, because he has nerves; the nerves make the man. The brain secretes thought, as the liver secretes bile.[2] In justice to Cabanis, however, it should be added, that he modified his system before his death; but not till it firmly established the doctrines of Materialism among the most intelligent thinkers of his country.

The physiological theories of Cabanis were adopted by Destutt de Tracy, and applied by him to the more complete explanation of the intellectual faculties. In his opinion, thought is nothing but sensation or rather sensibility, of which sensation is the exercise. Thought is modified according to the nature of the impressions which are made on the sensibility. It becomes, in different cases, perception, memory, judgment, will, as the external organs are acted on in a different manner. The will, therefore, is merely an affection of the sensibility; that is to say, the will is

[1] *Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme*, Paris, 2 Vols. 1824.

[2] See DAMIRON, *Histoire de la Philosophie en France au dix-neuvième siècle.*

passive; that is to say again, the will is not will; man is deprived of liberty; the Sensual philosophy is Fatalism.

The moral results of this system were exhibited by Volney. His leading doctrine is, that man should act only for the sake of self-preservation. This is the great law of human nature. Accordingly, good is every thing which tends to the preservation of man; evil every thing which tends to his injury and destruction. The greatest good is life; the greatest evil is death; nothing is better than physical happiness; nothing worse than bodily suffering; the main object is health; virtue and vice, therefore, are the voluntary habits which are in accordance with or contrary to the law of self-preservation. Every thing is right which contributes to enjoyment; every thing is wrong which interferes with enjoyment. This is the moral philosophy of the Sensual school. Finally, in the logical order, as the ultimate result of this school, we have the author of the *System of Nature*. His theory of the Universe resolves every thing into matter and motion. These exist from Eternity, and are the causes of all the phenomena which take place. Matter can neither be created, nor destroyed; and the existence of a cause on which it depends cannot be demonstrated. The idea of a God is a fiction; the hope of Immortality a dream; and all the religious convictions of man are founded on self-flattery or fear. This is the limit of the Sensual philosophy. Its principles had been discussed in every point of view; its consequences drawn forth with no common logical power; and its foundation strengthened with all the

aids that could be derived from skill in reasoning, and courage in examining. The question now arose, whether this philosophy was to continue to be the prevailing system in France during the nineteenth century, as it had been, in its primary elements, during the eighteenth.

The first symptom of a decided philosophical reaction was exhibited in the lectures of Laromiguiere as Professor in the Faculty of Literature. These were delivered in the years 1811, 1812, and 1813, and were subsequently published in several editions. Soon after their appearance, it was observed by Cousin, in a Review inserted in the *Philosophical Fragments* that "the favorable reception given to this work was a proof, in the first place, that a philosophical revolution was secretly going on in individual minds; and secondly, that public opinion was already prepared for this revolution."

Laromiguiere had been formed in the school of Condillac, and hardly considered himself to have abandoned the system of his master. The struggle between his early associations and his new convictions is every where visible in his writings; but he is compelled to admit the defects of the popular views, and advances principles of his own which contain the germs of reform. After a long examination, Laromiguiere comes to the conclusion, that sensation is not the only principle of thought, of understanding, and of will. He maintains that there is a broad chasm between sensation and the faculties of our mind. These faculties, both of the understanding and the

will, are referred to attention as their ultimate foundation. This is an important departure from the fundamental principles of Condillac. The influence exerted by Laromiguiere in the philosophical culture of Cousin himself will be found alluded to by the latter in another part of this volume. A more important element, however, in the formation of his opinions, was derived from the teachings of Maine de Biran,—a philosopher whose name has gained its principal celebrity from the grateful commemoration of his eloquent pupil; but whose uncommon ability in analytical investigation, as manifested in the few writings which he gave to the public, entitle him to the praise of being one of the most profound and original thinkers, in his peculiar department of study, which France has produced.

Maine de Biran was one of those fortunate individuals who find the highest gratification of taste in the indulgence of severe meditation. He was far more desirous to ascertain the truth, for the satisfaction of his own mind, than to obtain the glory of communicating it to the world. He habitually fed on those rigid abstractions, which, though seemingly remote from all popular interests, are at the foundation of social improvement, and the progress of man. His love of philosophy was pure and single-hearted. He cultivated it, not for emolument or renown, for the sake of office or of fashion, but for the light it threw on the laws and destiny of our being. On this account, he took little pains to make his ideas known to others. Content in the calm pursuit of truth, he seems to have had no ambition of acting on the

opinions of philosophers; but the progress which has since been made in France is indebted for some of its earliest and strongest impulses to his solitary reflections.

The principle, to the exposition of which Maine de Biran devoted almost exclusively his philosophical labors, was the activity of the human mind.[1] The prevailing philosophy, as we have seen, referred all our faculties, as well as all our ideas to sensation, which it explained by the excitement of the brain produced by the impressions of outward objects upon the organs. Maine de Biran demonstrated that this was a merely hypothetical assumption, without the slightest foundation in truth. He pointed out among the elements that are essential to a complete science of man, a fact as certain as any which have been observed, which, though connected with sensation, cannot be explained by it, and which, though subject to organic conditions, is independent of organization. This fact is activity. Maine de Biran separates this from all the circumstances in which it is found, analyzes its character, ascends to its original source, follows it to its ultimate developements, restores it to its rank in the intellectual life, and presents a theory of it which must hereafter hold an important place in every sound philosophy. This theory which will be found developed at length in the writings of Cousin, and applied with admirable success to some of the most difficult

[1] See *Nouvelles Considérations sur les Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme.* Ouvrage posthume de M. MAINE DE BIRAN, publié par M. COUSIN, Paris, 1834. Preface, p. ix.

and important topics of philosophical inquiry, consists of the following elementary principles. 1. True activity is in the will. 2. The will is the essence of personality. It constitutes the whole of what we call ME or SELF. 3. To will is to exercise causation. The first cause which we become acquainted with is ourselves. This may be proved by the phenomena of muscular effort. In every act of this kind, two things are to be taken into consideration. 1. A muscular sensation more or less lively. 2. The effort which produces it. Muscular sensation is not merely subsequent to the effort; it is produced by it; the relation which connects them is not that of simple succession, but of cause and effect. This is attested by consciousness, and no proof of it is necessary, but the performance of the act. Now every effort implies volition. There is no such thing as an involuntary effort. Hence the will is the foundation of the effort in question, and the cause which operates is a voluntary cause. But on the other hand, it is WE who make the effort; we certainly impute it to ourselves; the will which is the cause of it is our own will. Will, cause, personality are therefore identical. I arrive at the consciousness of myself, by acting as a cause; and I act as a cause, when I will, when I exercise a volition. Take away volition, that is, effort, and nothing remains; the whole fact disappears.

This demonstration gives us the most fruitful consequences. For instance, as the will is the type of personality, and as the very essence of the will is liberty, it follows that the liberty of what we call SELF is identical with its existence, and immediately perceived

by consciousness. Liberty is thus placed beyond the reach of every sophism; since it is not revealed by a process of reasoning, but by the direct testimony of consciousness.

The case is the same with regard to the spiritual nature of our being. That which every man considers as his true and proper self, that which he refers to when he says ME, is spiritual. This is not proved by a course of argumentation. The question can never be decided in this way. Hence the interminable controversies respecting it. The proof of the spirituality of our inward nature is to be found in the immediate perceptions of consciousness. It is made known to us in the unity and identity, of which we are conscious in every act of volition. These are not the properties of matter. In the continuity of effort, we feel that we always will, that we always act; we feel also that we are the same will, the same cause, even when the effects which we will and produce are various. Now this SELF, conscious of unity and identity, distinct from its variable effects, does not come within the sphere of the senses or the imagination; it perceives itself directly in the continuity of its activity, which it regards in fact as the continuity of its existence; it therefore exists incontestably in its own view, with an existence which escapes both the senses and the imagination; and this is precisely what we mean by a spiritual existence. No reasoning can produce this certainty, and no reasoning can destroy or weaken it; for it depends on one of the first principles which are perceived prior to reasoning, without which no reasoning can be carried on.

In this manner, Spiritualism is reinstated in philosophy on the basis of experience. Not that extravagant Spiritualism however which has no connexion with the world we inhabit; for the spirit which we are, the being which we call SELF is manifested to us in a relation of which it forms the first term, but of which the second term is a sensation, and a sensation which can be referred to a specific part of the body. The spirit, accordingly, is revealed to us together with its opposite, the inward and the outward world, man and nature at once.

It was not, however, until the Lectures of Royer-Collard were commenced in the University of Paris, that a public and uncompromising attack was made on the philosophy of sensation. These were delivered in three courses, from 1811 to 1814; and since that time the reform of the prevailing philosophy has been in constant progress. Royer-Collard was singularly fitted by his character and talents for the work which he undertook. His personal qualities enabled him to speak with no common authority, and preserved him from the unthinking opposition to which the herald of new ideas is usually exposed. The vigor of his intellect was every where acknowledged; he was understood to have mastered his subject by profound reflection; no one could doubt that his convictions were the result of inquiry; his sincerity was above suspicion. He was free from the charge of a love of innovation; a tendency to idle and extravagant speculations was incompatible with the whole structure of his mind; and it was evident to all, that the objections which he brought against the theories of the day proceeded from meditation, and not from caprice.

The teachings of Royer-Collard were immediately connected with the philosophical inquiries of Reid. He was led by the study of Dr. Reid's writings, to perceive the radical error of the Sensual philosophy, and to adopt a method founded on the natural laws of thought, and in accordance with the processes of enlightened physical investigation. He could not fail to perceive that the arguments of the Scottish philosopher against the doctrines of Locke and of Hume were equally valid against those of Condillac. The principal subject to which Royer-Collard directed his attention was the same with that which chiefly occupied the inquiries of Dr. Reid,—the perception of external objects by the organs of sensation. But the influence which he exerted was not confined to any specific branch of philosophy; it extended through the whole sphere of reflection; it presented new aspects of familiar truths, and revived ideas that had passed away; it inspired the youthful students of the nature of man, with a fresh and vigorous life; and thus gave birth to a movement of thought which forms one of the most important elements in the character of the nineteenth century.

Victor Cousin was the favorite pupil, and soon became the intimate friend of Royer-Collard. They were united by similarity of tastes, devotion to the pursuits of science, zeal for the improvement of the age, and faith in a higher order of ideas than had been recognised in the popular philosophy of France. The wide fame which has since been acquired by the accomplished pupil should not make us forget the signal merits of the sound and clear-sighted instructer.

Cousin himself seems to lose no occasion of expressing the deepest gratitude and admiration towards his distinguished master, and, with a modesty which is no less beautiful than it is rare, he always refers the commencement of his brilliant successes in philosophy, to the masculine and impressive wisdom of Royer-Collard.

The advancement which has been given by the labors of Cousin to the philosophical reform, thus happily begun, will appear from the selections from his writings that are contained in the present work. They consist of the Preface to his Translation of Tennemann, his two celebrated Prefaces to the "Philosophical Fragments," and several of the most important shorter articles of that volume. The student of Cousin's philosophy will find his knowledge refreshed by those compact, though luminous summaries of his principal ideas; while those who desire to obtain a just insight into the character and spirit of his peculiar system will be able to gratify their wishes, without the labor of perusing a multitude of voluminous works. The Prefaces, in particular, have excited an extraordinary interest among the philosophical readers of Europe; and it is not too much to hope that they may be made the subject of an earnest and enlightened study by the reflecting lovers of truth and science in our own country.

The philosophical merits of Cousin will probably not be new to the majority of the readers of these volumes. The translations which have been already made of two of his most important works, have con-

tributed to give currency to his ideas, and in many cases, to awaken a lively zeal for the study of the original.[1] I may venture to say that there is no living philosopher who has a greater number of readers in this country, and none, whose works have met with a more genuine sympathy, a more cordial recognition. He is destined, in my opinion, to exert an important influence on the developement of thought, and the condition of philosophy in our youthful land.

I do not mean that Cousin will ever be regarded as the founder of a philosophical sect among the thinkers of this nation. This is forbidden by the whole character of his system. It does not contain a single element which can lead to the establishment of an exclusive school. The happiest effect which he produces on the minds of his disciples is to lead them to think no less independently of him, than of others; to accept the fruits of his inquiries, as contributions to philosophy, rather than as a complete and ultimate philosophy; to appreciate, with a wise and tolerant discrimination, the merits of every laborer in this boundless field; and to comprehend and value the forgotten speculations of the past, as well as the splendid discoveries of modern times. The aim of his philosophy is to furnish a criterion, taken from the actual observation of human nature, by which to estimate both the phenomena of daily experience, and the

[1] *Introduction to the History of Philosophy.* Translated by Henning Gotfried Linberg, Boston, 1832. *Elements of Psychology; included in a Critical Examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding.* Translated by C. S. Henry. With an Introduction, Notes, and Additions. Hartford, 1834.

speculative systems which have been constructed for their explanation in every age of the world. For these reasons, his followers can never be linked together in the strong bands of an exclusive party. They will possess in common the admirable logical method of their teacher; they will start with him from the rigorous analysis of the facts of consciousness; and they will search like him for the elements of truth in every system, through all ages. But they will not be bound to adopt any of his specific doctrines, except in so far as they can verify them for themselves; nor, on any pretence, will they be restrained through deference to his authority from ulterior inquiry and independent thought. This is the genuine spirit of the teachings of Cousin. He wishes to make students, rather than disciples; sound and liberal thinkers, rather than adherents to his system; philosophers, rather than sectarians.

This characteristic is adapted to give his philosophy a favorable reception among ourselves. The reign of authoritative, dogmatic systems has never been firmly established over the mind of this nation; every exclusive faith has called forth a host in dissent; and the time appears to have arrived when no opinions can gain a general reception, unless they appeal to the spirit of inquiry, and disdain the aid of prescription or restraint. This tendency of thought will find a congenial object in the philosophy of Cousin. It will be nourished by his calm and lucid expositions of truth; it will be supplied with materials for the loftiest contemplation; while no shackles will be placed upon its freedom, no system forced upon its reception, no sacrifice called for of its independence.

The writings of Cousin are no less distinguished by their clearness and beauty of expression, than by their freedom from every thing like an exclusive and sectarian spirit. In this respect, he may be compared advantageously with the best authors of his own or any other nation. It is not pretended, indeed, that he possesses the talent of making a profound subject intelligible without profound study. He is not to be ranked with those writers who are always clear, because they are never deep; always popular, because they are always superficial. He cannot present the results of an exquisite analysis of thought in a form which shall be palpable at once to the coarsest intellect; but it is certain that whatever illustration can be given to the subtile researches of the philosopher by a skilful use of language is to be found in his copious and expressive style. It would be saying little, to remark that he never affects mystery, and always aims at being understood by the general reader. This would do no justice to his mode of expression. It would be more correct to say that he represents the most abstract ideas in such transparent diction that they cannot fail to impress themselves on the understanding of all who desire to be instructed. In point of orderly arrangement, of continuous and systematic reasoning, and of admirable taste in the selection of terms, Cousin presents a favorable contrast to the móst eminent philosophers of Germany. With the exception of Reinhold and Fries, to whom perhaps Jacobi should be added, I know of no modern German writers on philosophy to whose style we are not obliged to pardon much, through respect for the

depth of their thoughts, and the completeness of their investigations. They are compelled to suffer the severe penalty of addressing themselves to scholars and thinkers by profession instead of the great mass of an intelligent population.[1] There is nothing more dangerous to correctness of thought or to clearness of expression, than for the literary men of a nation to withdraw from the sympathies of the common mind, and thus to lose the benefit of comparing the abstractions of speculation with the natural good sense of the body of the people. The most sublime contemplations of the philosopher can be translated into the language of the market; and unless they find a response in the native feelings of humanity, there is probably some error in the doctrine, or some defect in its exposition. This source of difficulty has been avoided by Cousin. Called upon to exhibit the reasonings and conclusions of the German philosophy to a promiscuous audience in the metropolis of France, he has addressed the popular mind with singular success, and solved the cardinal problem of presenting the highest truths of speculation in a form adapted to the average intelligence of enlightened society. He has put the general reader in possession of the most valuable results of a profound philosophy; this is all that can be demanded of a teacher; more than this is beyond the reach of any style, however clear; and in order to comprehend the entire significance and fulness of the truth which is thus obtained, nothing will suffice but the voluntary exertion of our own in-

[1] See Note B.

tellect, the free reproduction in our consciousness of the ideas we have received from the instruction of another.

The characteristic which has now been alluded to, in the writings of Cousin presents an additional claim upon the attention of our countrymen. Our national taste—as far as it is formed,—may certainly be said to repudiate all mystery and concealment. We have even less patience with obscurity of style than with shallowness of thought. We are often tempted to slight or discard truths of unutterable consequence both to society and to individuals, on account of the unusual, it may be, the repulsive phraseology in which they are conveyed. The first condition of popularity among us is the clear expression of distinct thoughts. We forgive any thing sooner than those entanglements of words which leave us to guess at the meaning of the writer, and at last to remain doubtful whether we have read his riddle aright. For this reason, the German philosophers, in their native costume, will never become extensively popular in this country. The fruits of their inquiries will one day pass into general circulation among us; but not till they have been refined and clarified by successive operations in different minds. Their writings will be studied by all who love philosophy for its own sake; the true-hearted scholar who fears no toil, nor pain, in the pursuit of science, will descend with them to the darkest caverns of abstraction, so he may return with the pure ore of truth; and the lover of literary history will never cease to ponder with thoughtful admiration, that great intellectual movement, in which even the political and material

interests of a mighty nation have been comparatively forgotten. But they cannot be made the direct foundation of philosophical culture in a country like our own. We must start with the freer, more popular, more concrete, and more finished productions of the great French writers who have been formed in the German school; who retain its vigor and depth and combine with it the graceful ease of their own beautiful literature.

Intimately connected with its distinctness of expression, is another essential characteristic of the philosophy of Cousin, which will serve to facilitate its advancement among the intelligent thinkers of this nation. I allude to the substantial basis which it gives to the instinctive convictions of the human mind. This is the ultimate aim of all genuine philosophy. No system can be of any permanent utility which does not reproduce and legitimate the indestructible faith, that is cherished by the common sense of the mass of humanity. A philosopher who makes war upon this is guilty of the same absurdity with the artist who should make war on natural beauty. Of this fact, Cousin is not only fully aware himself; but he takes unwearied pains to explain its origin, to justify its importance, and to urge its consequences upon the attention of the reader. Every primitive belief of humanity is invested in his eyes with a character of peculiar, I may say indeed, of awful sanctity. In following the process of his investigations concerning the essential elements of reason, the absolute foundation of faith, the instinctive convictions of our race which are found, to a certain extent, in every mind, and mani-

fested, in a certain form, in every epoch of the world, we are led to forget the impulses of merely intellectual curiosity, and to yield ourselves up,—if I may so express it without temerity,—to a solemn emotion of religious reverence. He gives us the true key to the meaning of those remarkable expressions, which in almost every language, indicate the conviction that the voice of God is uttered in the heart of man, that the light of the soul is a light from Heaven.

The scientific interpretation and proof of these popular phrases are unfolded at length in the writings of Cousin. They form the substance of the doctrine which he exhibits in a great variety of forms, as the spontaneous and reflective developement of reason. There is no portion of his philosophy, it appears to me, more original, or more truly valuable than this. Its importance is, certainly, not obvious to the inattentive reader; but it will be found upon examination, if I mistake not, to throw the brightest light on many of the darkest questions; to contribute some essential elements towards the solution of the great problem of our age,—the reconcilement of faith and reason, authority and free conviction.

The respect which is every where testified in the system of Cousin for the spontaneous belief of humanity, presents a bond of sympathy between the highly educated and the masses, which is strikingly adapted to the condition of society among ourselves. The office of the true scholar in our republic is to connect himself in the most intimate and congenial relations with the energetic and busy population of which he is too often merely an insignificant unit.

He is never to stand aloof from the concerns of the people; he is never to view them in the pride of superior culture or station as belonging to a distinct order from himself; he is never to set himself above them as their condescending instructer from whom they are to receive wisdom and light, according to his estimate of their capacity; but he is called upon to honor the common mind, to commune with the instinctive expressions of the mighty heart of a free nation, and to bring the aid of learning and philosophy to the endeavor of the people to comprehend their destiny, and to secure its accomplishment. The direct tendency of the system of Cousin is to produce this effect. It abases the proud and exalts the humble. It destroys the arrogance of mere scholarship, and teaches us to listen to the voice of humanity, though uttered from the lowliest shrine. At the same time, it substantiates the principle of social progress, and inspires a serene and patient faith in the promised fortunes of our race.

I have already alluded to the religious character of the philosophy in question. I will add that it seems to me to contain more fully than any other system which is likely to gain adherents in this country, the principles which lie at the foundation of an elevated and spiritual philosophy of religion. Its accordance with Christianity, in the view of its author, is probably too well known to the reader, for me to enlarge upon it in this place. It may be remarked, however, that it tends to justify no sectarian views of Christianity, whether manifested in the form of attachment to traditionary ideas, or of love to extravagant innovations;

but it serves to confirm those broad and indestructible elements of spiritual life, which in the estimation of all believers, form the essence of Christianity, and the reception of which is deemed necessary to the salvation of the soul.

It is with reference to another department of theology, that I have referred to the religious influence of the philosophy of Cousin. In the opinion of many individuals,—and I own myself to be one of the number,—the prevailing philosophical theories in this country are not completely adequate, to say the least, to the scientific grounding of a spiritual religion. The wedded union of philosophy and religion, so essential to the peace of the meditative mind, has not yet been consummated in the sanctuary of our holiest thoughts. This is the true cause of the ominous fact that an open dread of philosophy and a secret doubt of religion are not unfrequent in the midst of us. This is the most candid, and probably the most just, explanation that can be given of the strange aversion to inquiry, the morbid sensitiveness to new manifestations of truth which is sometimes exhibited by well-meaning and excellent individuals. If we felt the ground firm beneath us, we should not fear the consequences of the most searching scrutiny into the foundation on which we stand. There is a repose, a quietness, a cheerful trust, a blessed assurance in the mind which has passed from unreflecting dogmatism to enlightened faith, in the enjoyment of which it looks calmly on every free and earnest working of the intellect in pursuit of truth,—confident that truth is always consistent with itself, and that no genuine ex-

pression of the Deity or of the human soul can be set aside by any new discovery. But this state of mind can be produced only by establishing an unbroken harmony between feeling and speculation, between the spontaneous impulses of the heart and the profound results of reflection. I should be glad to believe that we have a philosophy among us which is capable of doing this. The experience of several years, with some opportunities for observation, has convinced me however that this is not the case. There is an interruption in the continuity of our thought. We are believers in a spiritual religion; but we are not masters of a spiritual philosophy. There is little danger in this condition of things to those, with whom piety is such a strong natural sentiment, that no force can pluck it out of their hearts. They will never feel the burden of doubt, or need the aid of philosophy to explain the mysteries of their being. On those virgin souls no blight can fall; their robes are always white; and they will pass upward unstained by the breath of unbelief. But our world, in this country, at the present age, is not composed of such beautiful spirits as these. There are few who have not been called to test the validity of their dearest convictions, either by the assaults of skepticism from without, or the course of their own reflections. It must be a mind of extraordinary construction which has not felt the need of comprehending its own instincts more clearly; of looking into the foundation of the primitive truths on which the well-being of man reposes; and of settling the lofty spiritual faith in which it has grown up on the firm ground of a broad and clear philosophy. A

sense of this want is widely spread in almost every circle of society, into which we enter. A deep conviction of the reality of spiritual truth, and, at the same time, a strong desire for a philosophical system which shall explain and legitimate it, are every where found among contemplative individuals. Too often, however, the clearness and strength of the former are impaired, by failing to meet with the latter. More than one young man has told me, in sadness of spirit, of the struggle which was going on in the very depths of his being, between reflection and faith, between the convictions to which he clung, and the theories by which they were sustained. The same testimony is given by writers of the most opposite opinions and experience. One of the ablest metaphysicians in this country, in a masterly essay on the present state of philosophical speculation, thus speaks of the effect which is produced, within the sphere of his observation, by the usual mode of presenting the argument for the foundation of religion. "Is it not indeed a fact, notwithstanding the abundant commendation bestowed upon the work of Dr. Paley, the dependence placed upon it in our systems of instruction, and the assertion that a mind unsatisfied with this argument is not to be satisfied at all,—is it not a fact, I say, that many young men of ingenuous minds, but at the same time logical and critical in their inquiries, are left unsatisfied with the results of the work? I fear there are many who, having been taught that this is the great and triumphant argument, the sure ground, on which a belief in the existence of God depends, find their faith rather weakened by it than confirmed, or at

best lose more in regard to their views of his character, than they gain in their belief of his existence.—How do we know, or how can we learn by this process of arguing, that the unknown cause of those effects, which Dr. Paley has exhibited, that the mysterious and dread ground of being in all, that exists and that we call nature, is not a necessitated as well as a necessary Being, or that it is even self-conscious and intelligent? If now, as I trust will be the case, the reader shrinks with a conscious feeling of dread and abhorrence from such a conclusion, as impious, I would earnestly beg of him not to charge it upon me, and at the same time warn him not to ascribe the feeling which such a conclusion would awaken, to any convictions of the being and attributes of a personal God which the supposed strength and influence of Paley's argument may have been thought to produce. That faith in the Being of God and that reverence for his holy and perfect character, in virtue of which we shrink from atheism, as a violation of our moral being, as absurd and impious, lie far deeper, than those convictions of the mere understanding, 'the faculty judging according to sense,' which may have been derived from the argument in question." [1]

The same train of thought is presented, with singular ability and strength, in an article in a recent peri-

[1] President Marsh's *Note to Coleridge's Aids to Reflection*, p. 292. See also the whole of his Preliminary Essay to the same work,—a production which has deservedly attracted great attention, and which may be reckoned, for the depth of its reasoning and the force of its style, one of the finest pieces of philosophical composition which has appeared in our language for many years.

odical publication,[1] which may perhaps be considered as representing the views of a large class of thinking men, whose studies and habits entitle their opinion on a subject of metaphysical inquiry to be listened to with peculiar respect.[2] It is a distinct avowal that the philosophy of our day is inadequate to the support of the holiest religious convictions. From these and similar facts, I am led to conclude, that the want of a higher system is more and more generally felt, "and that the interests of a sound philosophy and a true religion cannot much longer be separated from each other."

It is by the prevalence of this feeling that I account for the remarkable popularity of Mr. Coleridge as a philosophical writer, with a great number of individuals who cannot be insensible to his signal defects and imperfections. The works of Mr. Coleridge, in my opinion, are exceedingly valuable to two classes of persons. To those, in the first place, on whom the light of spiritual truth is beginning to dawn; who are just awakened to the consciousness of the inward powers of their nature, and who need to have the sentiment of religion quickened into more vital activity; and, secondly, to those, who have obtained as the fruit of their own reflections, a living system of spiritual faith. The former will find the elements of congenial truth profusely scattered over his pages; the latter will be able, from their own experience, to construct a systematic whole with the massive fragments which are almost buried beneath the magnificent confusion of his style. But Mr. Coleridge cannot satisfy the mind

[1] *American Quarterly Observer*, No. II, Boston, 1833.

[2] See Note C.

whose primary want is that of philosophical clearness and precision. He is the inspired poet, the enthusiastic prophet of a spiritual philosophy; but the practical architect, by whose skill the temple of faith is to be restored, cannot be looked for in him.

The objects at which Mr. Coleridge aims, it seems to me, are in a great measure accomplished by the philosophy of Cousin. This philosophy demolishes, by one of the most beautiful specimens of scientific analysis that is any where to be met with, the system of sensation, against which Mr. Coleridge utters such eloquent and pathetic denunciations. It establishes on a rock the truth of the everlasting sentiments of the human heart. It exhibits to the speculative inquirer, in the rigorous forms of science, the reality of our instinctive faith in God, in Virtue, in the Human Soul, in the Beauty of Holiness, and in the Immortality of Man.

Such a philosophy, I cannot but believe, will ultimately find a cherished abode in the youthful affections of this nation, in whose history, from the beginning, the love of freedom, the love of philosophical inquiry, and the love of religion have been combined in a thrice holy bond. We need a philosophy like this to purify and enlighten our politics, to consecrate our industry, to cheer and elevate society. We need it for our own use in the hours of mental misgiving and gloom; when the mystery of the universe presses heavily upon our souls; when the fountains of the great deep are broken up, and the

> "Intellectual Power
> Goes sounding on, a dim and perilous way,"

over the troubled waters of the stormy sea. We need it for the use of our practical men, who, surrounded on every side with the objects of sense; engrossed with the competitions of business, the rivalries of public life, or the cares of professional duty; and accustomed to look at the immediate and obvious utility of every thing which appeals to their notice, often acquire a distaste for all moral and religious inquiries, and as an almost inevitable consequence, lose their interest, and often their belief, in the moral and religious faculties of their nature. We need it for the use of our young men, who are engaged in the active pursuits of life, or devoted to the cultivation of literature. How many on the very threshold of manly responsibility, by the influence of a few unhappy mistakes, which an acquaintance with their higher nature, as unfolded by a sound religious philosophy would have prevented, have consigned themselves to disgrace, remorse, and all the evils of a violated conscience! How many have become the dupes of the sophists' eloquence, or the victims of the fanatic's terrors, for whom the spirit of a true philosophy—a philosophy "baptized in the pure fountain of eternal love," would have preserved the charm and beauty of life.

The elements of a philosophy of this character, I venture to think, are contained in the doctrines of Cousin and his distinguished pupil Jouffroy, as exhibited in the present volumes. They do not profess to offer a complete exposition of the views of the authors, from whose writings, translations are given. Their aim is a more humble one. If they shall increase the interest which is already felt in the works of those eminent

philosophers, and contribute in any degree, to the better understanding of their ideas, their purpose will be accomplished. They are commended, with diffidence in my own share of the work, but with confidence in the merits of the original writers, to the free spirit and candid judgment of the reader.

I.

ON THE DESTINY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

[FROM THE PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION OF "TENNEMANN'S OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY."]

1829.

PHILOSOPHY, at the present day, can do only one of these three things;

Either abdicate, renounce its independence, submit again to the ancient authority, return to the Middle Ages;

Or continue its troubled motion in the circle of worn-out systems which mutually destroy each other;

Or finally disengage what is true in each of these systems, and thus construct a philosophy superior to all systems, which shall govern them all by being above them all, which shall be no longer this or that philosophy, but philosophy itself in its essence and in its unity.

The first course is impossible. For philosophy is only an effect and not a cause. The independence, and, so to speak, the secularization of thought are produced by the general progress of the spirit of independence and of secularization in every thing, in the State, in science, in art, in industry. This being laid down, the question is easily resolved. What wind could now root up that tree which has put forth in the midst of storms, and which has grown up moistened with the

tears and blood of so many generations? Modern civilization cannot go back, nor consequently the philosophy which represents it. Here is the vanity of the Theocratic school. Theocracy is the legitimate cradle of infant societies, but it does not accompany them in the progress of their developement,—that necessary progress which is derived from the nature of things; and as the nature of things cannot be separated from the designs of Providence, it follows that every struggle against the nature of things is in fact directed against Providence itself; and that accordingly the attempt to arrest the course of civilization and to extinguish philosophy is an enterprise against God himself, in which all the strength of the world must fail of success. And besides, what is the foundation of the arrogant quarrel of theocracy against philosophy? Every body knows at the present day; a paralogism. It is with reason that they attack reason, thus appealing to the very authority which they combat and which they undertake to convict of impotence. A certain degree of rigor and consistency has led the Theocratic school to reject, not this or that philosophical system, but the common spirit of all systems, namely, free reflection, that is to say, philosophy itself. A greater degree of rigor and consistency would have driven it to absolute skepticism, or restored it to philosophy. Without doubt, after the great movements of these modern times, which have produced such various and such profound agitations in society and in human thought, without satisfying the restless hope of those who wish to sow and reap in a single day, the appeal to the Middle Ages and to blind faith would naturally

seduce the wearied mind, by the allurement of novelty and the false appearance of a perfect consistency. Hence those philosophical abjurations, the offspring of discouragement and despair, which appeared to unpractised eyes the signal for the defeat of philosophy and for return to the ancient authority. But the secret is now divulged. The innocence and peace of the Middle Ages are well understood; and the appeal to blind faith against reason by reason itself is convicted of being only a miserable paralogism. The manifestation of this truth alone henceforth protects philosophy, and will arrest its deserters.

On the other hand, to leave philosophy in the state, in which the nineteenth century received it from the preceding centuries, would be to make a use of reason that is by no means reasonable. It would be to consent to the decrial of philosophy by itself, and to place the most formidable weapons in the hands of the theocracy, and of its enemies, who observe the spectacle. It would not be to combat the spirit of the age, but to remain behind it. In fact, the quality which most distinguishes us, which we seek with the greatest ardor, and cherish with the greatest pride, is universality. In every department, in politics, in the arts, in literature, we aspire to completeness; we refuse to be dazzled by a single aspect of things, however brilliant it may be; we wish to contemplate every aspect in succession, in order to form a true and perfect idea of the object in question. Here is the favorable side. The evil consists in the weakening or the absence of enthusiasm, and of great originality; of great originality, I say, for of small originality, there

is more than enough. In this state of the general mind, what can be the attraction of those aged systems, which modern philosophy produced at its birth, and which it has reproduced a hundred times within the last two centuries, without one of them having been able to sustain itself? It is evident that no one of the systems which we have inherited from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is absolutely false, since they were all able to exist; but it is equally evident also, that no one of these systems is absolutely true, since they have all ceased to exist,—the contrary of absolute truth, which if it should appear, would at once enlighten, rally and subject the understandings of all. There is no one of these systems which has not been made the object of an overwhelming attack. There is no one which has not in some sort been pierced through and through, arraigned and convicted of intolerable extravagances. Let one of those principles be presented which in its day has seduced so many excellent minds; there is not a man who will not at once charge upon this principle the long array of consequences which it has successively produced, and which have betrayed and disgraced it. Do you propose to explain intelligence by the celebrated principle of sensation, which formerly, in the hands of Locke and Condillac, exercised such an irresistible charm? At the present day, without any great outlay of sagacity or of logic, a little reading will suffice to point out behind this attractive principle its terrible consequences; by the side of Locke, Mandeville and Collins; by the side of Condillac, d'Holbach and Lamétrie, and all the Saturnalia of Materialism and of

Atheism. Do you propose to explain all human knowledge by the mere force of the soul, of thought, and of its laws,—a very natural procedure. This noble Spiritualism has against it the equivocal reputation of the sublime and chimerical abstractions, to which, so wise at its starting-point, it has ended by conducting more than one illustrious school. Are you disposed to make trial of doubt? The phantom of skepticism is there. Are you tempted to seek refuge in sentiment? But who will not announce to you beforehand the tendency which precipitates you towards mysticism? Thus, principles and consequences, there is nothing now unforeseen; hence, nothing which can deceive; for, it cannot be denied, reason like the imagination, hardly wings its flight except after the Unknown and the Infinite. Now what system yet possesses this charm? It is the glory of human reason, that it submits only, I will not say to absolute truth, but to what it believes to be absolute truth; and, at the present day, there is no mind of tolerable cultivation, which does not know very well, that all the systems presented by modern philosophy, are nothing, in the last analysis, but particular systems, which may indeed contain a greater or less degree of truth, but which it would be ludicrous to propose or to receive as the complete and absolute truth.

The third course then remains. In the absence of fanaticism for this or that specific system, which a tendency to enthusiasm and an incomplete view of things would perhaps produce, and of which we must almost despair with our present characteristics, both good and bad, I see no resource left to philosophy,

if it is unwilling to pass under the yoke of theocracy, but equity, moderation, impartiality, wisdom. It is, I confess, somewhat of a desperate resource, but for myself, I see no other. It would be strange if there were no longer any thing but common sense which could produce an effect on the imagination of men. But it is certain that every other charm appears to be worn out. All the parts of fanaticism in philosophy, all the parts which have been performed at once by injustice and by folly, that is to say again, all the inferior parts have been taken from the nineteenth century by the preceding centuries; it is condemned to a new part, the most humble in appearance, but the most elevated and important in reality,—that of being just towards all systems and the dupe of none of them; of making them all the object of study, and instead of following in the train of any one, whatever it may be, of enrolling them all under its own banner, and thus marching at their head to the discovery and the conquest of truth. This procedure,—to reject no system and to accept none entirely, to neglect this element and to take that, to select in all what appears to be true and good, and consequently everlasting,—this, in a single word, is Eclecticism.

I am not ignorant that this name alone arouses all the exclusive doctrines. But is it suprising that an opinion which appears a little novel should meet with lively opposition? Especially an opinion like Eclecticism. Propose then to the different parties, I beg of you, to lay aside their tyrannical pretensions, in the service of their common country. Every party will accuse you of being a bad citizen. Exclusive

doctrines are in philosophy what parties are in the State. Eclecticism tends to substitute for their violent and irregular action a firm and moderate direction, which shall call every force into operation, but shall sacrifice to none the interests of order, or the public good. Suppose, once more, that among those opinions which all aspire to exclusive dominion, there was one, which, for more than half a century, had been in possession of universal and undisputed authority, accustomed to receive nothing but homage, and treated almost as if it were divine. Attempt to call in question the sovereignty of this proud idol; propose to it, as gently as possible, to come down from its throne, to enter the ring, to assert its rights for itself, in fine, to be only an opinion, like every other opinion, containing, like others, both what is true and what is false; accepted by some and rejected by others; in a word, propose to it to submit to the right of inquiry, and you will soon hear a fine storm bursting about your ears. I had accordingly counted on a warm controversy; but, I had hoped, a serious and earnest one. Instead of objections, I have met only with declamations, with calumnies. In truth, I had believed that the Sensual school was stronger. Far from wishing to weaken it, if it were in my power, I would rather fortify it, I would give it a serious representative, one worthy of it; for it comprises great truths; it ought to hold an elevated rank in science; and I sincerely regard the deplorable state into which it has fallen among us as a real calamity. I heartily regret that M. de Tracy, disarmed by age, cannot enter the lists with the new philosophy. It is not

from the arsenal of Jesuitism that an adversary like him would borrow his weapons. He would find them in the profound study of philosophical subjects, in the talent for analysis and the severe logic of which he has given so many proofs ; and thus a truly honest and scientific controversy would be instituted. We are the first to demand this, for the general interests of science. Meanwhile, neither my friends nor myself have hearts so feeble as to be retarded by the obstacles which are thrown in our path. We did not enter our present career for the sake of frivolous applause, but to serve the cause of philosophy. For my own part, it is a long time since,—having studied and gone through with many different schools, attempting to explain the attraction which by turns I found in each, and the credit of widely opposite systems, that of Condillac and that of Reid for example, with the most enlightened minds and with the distinguished men, of whom I had been a pupil, M. Laromiguière and M. Royer-Collard,—I discovered that the authority of these different systems proceeded from the fact that they all contain something which is true and good ; I suspected that in reality they were not all so completely at war with each other as they pretended ; I was convinced by degrees that, on certain conditions, they could all go very well with each other ; and I proposed to them a treaty of peace on the basis of mutual concessions. Since that time I have used the word Eclecticism. If any are startled by it, I will gladly take back the word, provided they will allow me the thing. This word, however,—exact in itself, already employed by those who, in the course of ages,

have had nearly the same idea, generally accepted in the language of the history of philosophy,—appears to me as good as any conventional expression can be, and I see no reason why it should be abandoned. As to the essential purpose of the enterprise itself, reflection and study have attached me to it more strongly than ever. Even the view of the fanaticism, to which an exclusive opinion may conduct, recommends moderation and wisdom more than ever in my eyes; and it is my deliberate wish, if not my hope, that Eclecticism may serve as a guide to the French philosophy of the nineteenth century.

If this philosophy is to be Eclectic, it must also be sustained by the history of philosophy. In fact, it is evident that every Eclectic philosophy must necessarily have its foundation in a profound knowledge of all the systems, of which it professes to combine the true and essential elements. Besides, what is the whole history of philosophy, but a perpetual lesson of Eclecticism? What is taught by the history of philosophy, except that all systems are as old as itself and inherent in the human mind, which produces them from the first moment and reproduces them without end; that the wish to establish the dominion of any one exclusively is a vain attempt, which, if it should succeed, would prove the tomb of philosophy; that consequently there is nothing to do, but to honor the human mind, to respect its liberty, to determine the laws which regulate it and the fundamental systems which grow out of these laws; to improve continually these different systems by means of each other, without attempting to destroy any of them, by investigating

and disengaging the everlasting portion of truth which each of them contains, and by which each of them is made the brother of every other and the legitimate offspring of the human mind. The history of philosophy would have been sufficient by itself to produce Eclecticism, that is to say, philosophical toleration; and as soon as this toleration is brought to light, after the long reign of fanaticism, it necessarily calls forth the desire and the taste for a profound study of every system.

II.

EXPOSITION OF ECLECTICISM.

[PREFACE TO "PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS," SECOND EDITION.]

1833.

THESE *Fragments* are now reprinted just as they appeared in 1826, with some corrections which it is not important to indicate. It seemed to me proper that this work, if I may give the name to a collection of detached pieces, should preserve its original character, the defects and the merits with which it was at first presented to the public.

The Preface to these *Fragments* was all that deserved any considerable attention. It has met with it far beyond my expectation. Received in Germany with indulgence, it found an able interpreter in that country.[1] A translation possessing an exactness which discovers a mind familiar with such subjects, made it known in the North of Italy.[2] It even excited some interest in England; and I was quite surprised to find that it had attracted the attention of transatlantic

[1] *Religion und Philosophie in Frankreich*, von F. W. CAROVÉ, Dr. der Philosophie. Göttingen, 1827. See an account of this translation and of the notes in the *Globe*, 9 March, 1830.

[2] *Manuale di Filosofia*, di A. MATHIÆ, traduzione di tedesco, con un saggio della nuovo Filosofia francese del signor Cousin. Lugano, 1829.

criticism.[1] In France, it has been made the subject of a controversy which was not without use to the cause of philosophy. I do not now propose, after the lapse of six years, to revive this controversy, of which the details are deservedly forgotten; I would merely say a few words in regard to it, which may not be out of place in the present state of things.

The Preface to these *Fragments* was intended to give an idea of the general system, to which they relate; it could only indicate the system, but it at least described all its elements in their connexion and their harmony. The four points in this rapid sketch to which all the others may be referred are as follows;

I. Method.

II. Application of method to that part of philosophy, which method itself places at the head of the others, namely, psychology.

III. Passage from psychology to ontology and to the higher metaphysics.

IV. General views on the history of philosophy.

I. METHOD.

I. Here, as elsewhere, as every where, as always, I declare for that method, which places the point of departure for all sound philosophy in the study of human nature, and consequently in observation, and which then appeals to induction and to reasoning, in order to obtain from observation all the consequences which

[1] *North American Review*, No. LXIV. July, 1829. This article is by Mr. EVERETT, ex-minister of the United States in Spain.

it involves. We are deceived when we say that true philosophy is a science of facts, unless we add that it is also a science of reasoning. It rests on observation; but it has no other limits than those of reason itself, just as physical science starts from observation, but does not stop with it, and rises by calculation to the general laws of nature and to the system of the world. Now reasoning is in philosophy what calculation is in physical science; for after all, calculation is nothing but reasoning in its most simple form. Calculation is not a mysterious power; it is the power of human reason itself; its peculiar character consists entirely in its language.

Philosophy abdicates, it renounces its true end, which is the understanding and the explanation of all things by the legitimate employment of our faculties, when it renounces the unlimited employment of reason; and on the other hand, it falls into error and leads reason itself into error, when it employs it at random, instead of placing it at the service of facts, which have been scrupulously observed and rigorously classed. It is thus exposed to two perils; first, an ill-regulated flight, which disdaining observation or going through it too rapidly, shoots into adventurous inductions; and secondly, a pusillanimous wisdom, which in spite of our deepest cravings and our most imperious instincts, chains itself down to the poverty of a barren observation. To limit philosophy to observation is, whether we know it or not, to place it in the path to skepticism; to neglect observation, is to throw it into the ways of hypothesis. Skepticism and hypothesis,—these are the two rocks to which philosophy

is exposed. The true method avoids them both. It does not begin at the end, it does not end at the beginning. It recognises no limits to reasoning, but it supports it on sufficient observation; for precisely in proportion to the value of observation, will be the subsequent value of all our science. Thus, while it preserves the right to an ulterior employment of the resources of intelligence, philosophy cannot attach itself to observation with too much care, and like true physical science, it cannot too loudly proclaim observation, as its necessary point of departure.

In that case, it is distinguished from physical science only by the nature of the phenomena which it observes. The peculiar phenomena of physical science are those of external nature, of that vast world of which man forms so small a part. The peculiar phenomena of philosophy are those of that other world, which every man bears within himself, and which he perceives by the aid of the inward light which is called consciousness, as he perceives the former by the senses. The phenomena of the inward world appear and disappear so rapidly, that consciousness perceives them, and loses sight of them almost at the same time. It is not then sufficient to observe them transiently, and while they are passing over that changing scene; we must retain them as long as possible by attention. We may do even still more. We may call up a phenomenon from the bosom of the night into which it has vanished, summon it again to memory, and reproduce it in our minds for the sake of contemplating it at our ease; we may recall one part of it rather than another, leave the latter in the shade, so as to bring the former into

view, vary the aspects in order to go through them all and to embrace every side of the object; this is the office of reflection.

Reflection is to consciousness what artificial instruments are to the senses. It is not sufficient to listen to nature, we must interrogate it; it is not enough to observe, we must experiment. Experience has always the same conditions and the same rules, to whatever object it be applied; and it is by following these rules, that we arrive at exact classifications, no less in the science of man than in that of nature. These classifications contain all the primary part of philosophy, that which is at the head of all the other parts, and which,—on account of its peculiar subject, humanity, the human soul,—is called, in the schools, psychology. The science of man, psychology, is assuredly not the whole of philosophy, but it is the foundation of it. This point is one of the highest importance, for it is decisive of all the rest, and of the character of the entire system. It is to establish this point that I have consumed, not I hope without some fruit, the first years of my teaching. I have brought it forward on every occasion, and have built upon it, as upon a demonstrated fact, as upon a truth which is henceforth placed beyond the need of discussion. It has been believed that it should yet be insisted on after me; and very justly, for in philosophy we cannot too much insist on the true method, provided that we do not at length make a common-place of it, in which we rest ourselves and confine others.

I repeat it then, if psychology is not the limit of philosophy, it is the basis of it; and by this principle

which comprises so many others, the general character of my philosophical undertaking is strongly marked with the spirit of modern philosophy, which, since Descartes and Locke, admits no method but that of experience, and places the science of human nature at the head of philosophical science; it connects itself still more closely with the philosophy of the eighteenth century, which it continues, while it modifies it; and separates itself, on the contrary, from the new German philosophy.

This philosophy, aspiring to reproduce in its conception the very order of things, commences with the Being of beings, so that it may afterwards descend through all degrees of existence till it comes to man and to the various faculties with which he is endowed; it arrives at psychology, by ontology, by metaphysics and physics combined. And certainly for my own part also, I am convinced that in the universal order, man is nothing but a result, the summary of all that precedes, and that the root of psychology is to be found, at the bottom, in ontology. But how do I know this? How have I learned it? Because, having made a study of man, having distinguished certain elements in his nature, I discover the same elements, in different forms and under different conditions, in external nature; and because, proceeding from induction to induction, from reasoning to reasoning, I am compelled to refer these elements, those of humanity, and those of nature, to the invisible principle of both. But I did not begin with this principle, I did not ascribe to it certain powers, certain attributes; for by what means could I have done so? This would not

have been an induction, for as yet, I knew neither man nor nature. It would then have been what is called in Germany a *construction*, and with us an hypothesis. If this hypothesis were a truth, as I have no doubt it is, it were nevertheless no scientific truth. The first thing on which I necessarily fall, in attempting to know, is myself; it is I who am the instrument with which I know every thing; I must then rightly appreciate this instrument before I employ it, without which, properly speaking, I know neither what I do, nor by what right I do it. Undoubtedly I know at this moment that the little world of humanity is only the reflection of a larger world; but it is by this little world that I have arrived at the large one; I have comprehended the one only by the aid of the other. I am now on the summit of the mountain, from which a vast horizon is displayed before my eyes, but I come from the depth of an obscure valley, and can still perceive and point out to others the way which has led me to the point on which I stand, so as to aid and encourage them to rise to the same eminence with myself, instead of letting them believe and of persuading myself that I have fallen upon it from the height of the clouds. In a word, I wish that the same course should be pursued in the exposition of ideas as in their discovery. I prefer analysis to synthesis, because it reproduces the order of discovery which is true, while synthesis, in pretending to reproduce the necessary order of things, runs the risk of engendering only hypothetical abstractions. Where, I ask, should we be, if the author himself had not more or less exercised this humble method which he dissembles, or which he is ashamed

of after he has followed it; if in hearing or reading him, we did not silently verify his assertions with regard to the knowledge which has been obtained by a different process; and if, finally, we did not arrive at a part of the system, namely, psychology, the light of which is reflected on every other part, and the truth of which we adopt as the measure for the truth of the whole system? Is synthesis only employed as a method of exposition for the use of the author and of a few adepts? Very well. It then becomes merely a question of art. But if we make it a question of philosophy, if we elevate synthesis to a philosophical method, and from the height of this method look down with pity on the psychological method, as incapable of attaining to any great result, the affair then becomes more serious, and I abandon genius itself for fear of being led astray in its path.

II. APPLICATION OF METHOD TO PSYCHOLOGY.

But if in regard to method I depart from the new German philosophy and connect myself with the old French philosophy of the eighteenth century, I remain with this scarcely beyond the first application of the method which we hold in common. This philosophy observes, it is true, but it observes only the facts which suit it, and from the beginning corrupts the experimental method by systematic views.

It is certain that upon the first examination of consciousness, we perceive a succession of phenomena which, decomposed into their elements, may be traced

back to sensation. These phenomena are both incontestable and numerous; their action, though sufficiently complicated, may easily be detected; and they have the advantage of resting on a primitive fact, which by connecting the science of man with the physical sciences, gives it the appearance of more certain evidence; this fact is the impression produced on the organs and reproduced by the brain in our consciousness. We are led then by a very natural illusion to believe that this order of phenomena comprises all the phenomena of which we can be conscious. Now if there be in fact but a single order of phenomena in our consciousness, we can refer these phenomena only to a single faculty, which in its transformations produces all the others. This faculty is sensibility. But if sensibility be the root of all our intellectual faculties, it cannot but be the root of our moral faculties; if every thing in man be reduced to sensation, every thing is reduced to enjoyment and suffering; to avoid pain, to pursue pleasure is the sole rule of our conduct; hence, in a word, a whole system, the consequences of which have been drawn out and are perfectly well known at the present day. This system is that of the Sensual school, so called from the only principle which it recognises. An impartial observation destroys both the principle and the whole system, by showing that there are phenomena in consciousness which no effort can legitimately trace back to that of sensation, that there are numerous ideas, of indisputable reality, which hold an important rank both in language and in life, and which sensation by no means explains. After having been impressed with the relations of the human

faculties, we are also impressed with their differences, and a rigid method enlarges the field of psychology.

I have divided all the phenomena of consciousness into three classes, connected with three great elementary faculties, which, in their combinations, comprise and explain all the others; these faculties are sensibility, activity, reason. This is not the place to give an account of this classification. I will merely remark that it has met with some success, for I find it reproduced in almost every work on psychology which has appeared for some time past. It is unnecessary to show how a psychology of this character overthrows the philosophy of sensation, and leads to a philosophy the reverse of it in every department; in metaphysics, morals, theology, politics, history. This philosophy is represented in the philosophy of the nineteenth century by the Scottish school; and especially by the school of Kant, which, professing the same method, applies it with far more rigor and completeness, which has enriched psychology with so many ingenious and profound observations, and which, above all, by the grandeur and beauty of its morality will always be one of the most admirable schools of philosophy, of which the human mind can boast.

Consider the importance of psychology. It was a single psychological error that seduced Kant into a path which led to an abyss. Kant has made an admirable analysis of human reason. It is impossible to describe, with more clearness and precision, the conditions and the laws of its developement; but not having analyzed, with the same care, the free and voluntary activity, this great man did not perceive that it is

particularly to this class of phenomena that personality is attached; and that reason, although connected with personality, is essentially distinct from it. Now, if reason be personal, like attention and will, it follows that all the conceptions which it suggests are personal also; that all the truths which it reveals to us are merely relative to our mode of conceiving; and that the objects, the things, the beings, the substances, which claim to be real, whose existence is made known to us by reason, as they rest only on this equivocal testimony, can have only a subjective value, that is to say, relative to the subject which perceives them, and no objective value, that is to say, actual and independent of the subject. We may indeed continue to believe in the reality of these objects, if our reason be so constituted that it cannot but believe in them, and because it is so constituted; but in that case there is an abyss between believing and knowing; and all our knowledge then consists only in recognising the internal and psychological conditions of the necessity of believing,—which in itself is barren of all real and absolute knowledge. From this proceeds a new and original skepticism, which not calling in question the existence of reason as a faculty distinct from sensibility, admits that, in its regular developement, reason in fact suggests to us the idea of the soul, of God, and of the world,—a skepticism, entirely distinct from that of the Sensual school, which takes its stand in psychology even with dogmatism, and begins to doubt only when ontology is concerned; but as soon as that is brought up, disputes the legitimacy of every passage from psychology to ontology, on the principle that

reason being a faculty peculiar to the subject, can have no validity beyond the limits of the subject, and that accordingly all the objective and ontological truths which it reveals are only the subject itself, transported away from its sphere by a force which belongs to it and which itself is subjective.

Would you know the last result of this system? Go from the principle to the consequence, from the circumspect master to the daring pupil. Go from Kant to Fichte; and you will see reason already subjective in Kant, confounded by Fichte with personality itself. Hence his formula, the ME[1] supposes itself, it supposes the world, it supposes God; it supposes itself as the primitive and permanent cause with which every thing commences, to which every thing is referred, as at once the circle and the circumference; it supposes the world as a simple negation of itself; it supposes God as itself again taken absolutely. The absolute ME,—this is the last degree of all subjectivity, the extreme and necessary term of the system of Kant, and, at the same time, its refutation. Good sense cannot fail to do justice to this extravagant consequence; but it belongs to philosophy to destroy this consequence in its principle, and this principle is the subjectivity and personality of reason. This is the radical error, the psychological error, which a rigid psychology should dissipate. All my efforts have been given therefore to demonstrating that personality, the me is eminently the free and voluntary activity; that this is the true subject, and that reason is no less

[1] See Note D.

distinct from this subject than sensation and organic impressions.

Reason, certainly, is developed only on condition that the me already exists, just as the me is not manifested in consciousness except on condition of previous sensations and organic movements. Reason is intimately connected with personality and with sensibility, but it is neither the one nor the other; and it is because it is neither the one nor the other, because it is in us without being ourselves, that it reveals to us that which is not ourselves, objects beside the subject itself and which lie beyond its sphere. The human race, moreover, has never doubted for a moment, I will not only say of the existence of the objects which reason reveals to it, of the existence of the outward world for example, but of the absolute truth of th[illegible] existence. No abuse of language has ever gone far as to ascribe to ourselves the revelations of my We say, my action and consequently my[illegible]onsible crime; we impute them to ourselves; we a[illegible]e feel[illegible]at for them and we feel that we are so, beca[illegible]his is merely we are their cause. We say, my reason, [illegible] conscious- to express the relation of reason to [illegible]; for our errors ness. We say, my error, and very [illegible]ust[illegible] us sometimes re- are often our own acts, and this [illegible]al[illegible] ask, who has ever proach ourselves with them. B[illegible]ery body feels, every presumed to say, my truth, [illegible]t belong to him, nor to body knows that truth doe[illegible] remarkable inconsistency. any body else. Here is[illegible]ence of reason, when it trans- We dispute the indep[illegible]here of consciousness, but within ports us beyond th[illegible] never disputed. Who doubts, for that sphere, it

instance, of the truth of the immediate perceptions of consciousness, perceptions on which the knowledge of our personal existence is founded? Not a skeptic in the world doubts of it. For no skeptic doubts at least that he doubts. Now not to doubt that he doubts is to know that he doubts, is to know something, is in short to know. But what is it that knows, that perceives, that understands to such or such an extent? Is it not, I ask, reason itself? If then the knowledge given by reason within these limits and to this degree be incontestable, why should other kinds of knowledge given by the same reason be more uncertain? Why should we admit the independence of reason in one case and not admit it in another? Reason is one in all its degrees. We have no right arbitrarily to contract or to extend its authority, and to say to it at 'easure,—thus far shalt thou go and no farther.

PASSAGE FROM PSYCHOLOGY TO ONTOLOGY.

As soo

ture and i reason is reëstablished in its true nanise the legitimtful independence, we easily recoghaving been conf its applications, even when, after ness, they regularly within the sphere of consciousson accordingly arri nd beyond that sphere. Reamena; it reveals to us t beings as well as phenomuch authority as our own world and God with as its modifications; and ontolo xistence or the least of than psychology, since it is psy ology, which, by enlightening us as to the nature of eason, conducts us itself to ontology.

Ontology is the science of Being. It is the knowledge of our own personal existence, that of the external world, and that of God. It is reason which gives us this threefold knowledge on the same authority with that of the smallest knowledge which we possess; reason, the sole faculty of all knowing, the only principle of certainty, the exclusive standard of the True and the False, of good and evil, which alone can perceive its own mistakes, correct itself when it is deceived, restore itself when it is in error, call itself to account, and pronounce upon itself the sentence of acquittal or of condemnation. And we must not imagine that reason waits for slow developements before it presents to man this threefold knowledge of himself, of the world, and of God; on the contrary, this threefold knowledge is given to us entirely in each of its parts, and even in every fact of consciousness, in the first as well as in the last. It is still psychology which here explains ontology, but a psychology to which only profound reflection can attain.

Can there be a single fact of consciousness without a certain degree of attention? Let attention be weakened or entirely destroyed, and our thoughts become confused, they are gradually dissipated in obscure reveries which soon vanish of themselves, and are for us as if they were not. Even the perceptions of the senses are blunted by want of attention, and degenerate into merely organic impressions. The organ is struck, often perhaps with force; but the mind being elsewhere does not perceive the impression; there is no sensation; there is no consciousness. Attention therefore is the condition of all consciousness.

Now is not every act of attention more or less voluntary? And is not every voluntary act characterized by the circumstance that we consider ourselves as the cause of it? And is it not this cause whose effects vary while it remains the same itself,—is it not this power which is revealed to us only by its acts, but which is distinguished from its acts and which its acts do not exhaust,—is it not, I say, this cause, this force, which we call I, me, our individuality, our personality,—that personality of which we never doubt, which we never confound with any other, because we never refer to any other those voluntary acts which give us the inward feeling, the immovable conviction of its reality?

The me is then revealed to us in the character of cause, of force. But can this force, this cause which we are, do every thing which it wishes? Does it meet with no obstacles? It meets with them of all kinds, at every moment. A sense of our feebleness is constantly united with that of our power. A thousand impressions are at all times made upon us; take away attention and they do not come to our consciousness; let attention be applied to them, the phenomenon of sensation begins. Here then, at the same time that I refer the act of attention to myself, as its cause, I cannot, for the same reason, refer to myself the sensation to which attention has been applied; I cannot do this, but I cannot avoid referring it to some cause, to a cause necessarily other than myself, that is to say, to an external cause, and to an external cause whose existence is no less certain to me than my own existence, since the phenomenon which sug-

gests it to me is no less certain than the phenomenon which suggested my own, and both the phenomena are presented to me with each other.

We have here then two kinds of distinct causes. The one personal, placed in the very centre of consciousness, the other external and beyond the sphere of consciousness. The cause which we are is evidently limited, imperfect, finite, since it constantly meets with bounds and obstacles among the variety of causes to which we necessarily refer the phenomena that we do not produce,—the phenomena purely affective, and not voluntary. On the other hand, these causes themselves are limited and finite, since we resist them to a certain degree as they resist us, we limit their action as they limit ours, and they also mutually limit each other. It is reason which reveals to us these two kinds of causes. It is reason, which, developing itself in our consciousness and perceiving there at the same time attention and sensation, as soon as these two simultaneous phenomena are perceived, suggests to us immediately two kinds of distinct causes, but correlative and mutually limited, to which they must be referred. But does reason stop with this? By no means. It is a fact, moreover, that as soon as the notion of finite and limited causes is given, we cannot but conceive of a superior cause, infinite and absolute, which is itself the first and last cause of all others. The internal and personal cause and external causes are incontestably causes in relation to their own effects; but the same reason which reveals them to us as causes, reveals them as limited and relative causes, and thus prevents us from stop-

ping with them as causes sufficient to themselves, and compels us to refer them to a supreme cause, which has made them and which sustains them; which is in relation to them what they are in relation to the phenomena that are peculiar to them; and which as it is the Cause of all causes, and the Being of all beings, is sufficient in itself, and sufficient to reason, which seeks and which finds nothing beyond.

Let this fundamental point be well considered. Its consequences are of the utmost importance. As the notion of the me is that of the cause to which we refer the phenomena of volition, so the notion of the not-me is contained entirely in that of the cause of the sensible and involuntary phenomena. Now, as the being which we are and the external world are nothing but causes, it follows that the Being of beings to which we refer them is equally revealed to us in the character of cause. God exists for us only in the relation of cause; without this, reason would not refer to him either humanity or the world. He is absolute substance only inasmuch as he is absolute cause, and his essence consists precisely in his creative power. I should here require a volume in order to describe completely and to place in a clear light the manner in which reason elevates us to the absolute cause, after having revealed to us the duality of the personal cause and of external causes. I merely sum up in a few lines the long researches, of which the remains are to be seen in these *Fragments*, and the course in the Preface. It is only this course which I have wished to recall.

Here is no hypothesis. We need only enter within

our consciousness,—to a considerable depth it is true,—in order to find every thing which has been stated; for once more to sum up this summary, there is not a single fact of consciousness possible without the me; on the other hand, the me cannot know itself without knowing the not-me; neither the one nor the other can be known with the reciprocal limitation which characterizes them, without the conception more or less distinct of an infinite and absolute Being, to which they must be referred. These three ideas of the me or of the free personality, of the not-me or of nature, of their absolute cause, of their substance, or of God, are intimately connected with each other, and compose one and the same fact of consciousness, the elements of which are inseparable. There is not a man in the world who does not bear this fact, in all its parts, within his consciousness. Hence the natural and permanent faith of the human race. But every man does not give an account to himself of what he knows. To know, without giving an account of our knowledge to ourselves; to know, and to give an account of our knowledge to ourselves,—this is the only possible difference between man and man, between the people and the philosopher. In the one, reason is altogether spontaneous; it seizes at first upon its objects; but without returning upon itself and demanding an account of its procedure; in the other, reflection is added to reason; but this reflection, in its most profound investigations, cannot add to natural reason, a single element which it does not already possess; it can add to it nothing but the knowledge of itself. Again, I say, reflection well-

directed; for if it be ill-directed, it does not comprehend natural reason in all its parts; it leaves out some element, and repairs its mutilations only by arbitrary inventions. First, to omit, then to invent; this is the common vice of almost all systems of philosophy. The office of philosophy is to reproduce in its scientific formulas the pure faith of the human race; nothing less than this faith; nothing more than this faith; this faith alone, but this faith in all its parts. Its peculiar characteristic is to build ontology on psychology, to pass from one to the other by the aid of a faculty, which is both psychological and ontological, subjective and objective at once; which appears in us without properly belonging to us; which enlightens the shepherd as well as the philosopher; which is wanting to no one and is sufficient for all. This faculty is reason, which from the bosom of consciousness extends to the Infinite and reaches at length to the Being of beings.

A system so simple in its processes and its results, which, starting with the popular method of the age, discovers with it all the great elements of the eternal faith of the human race, and reconstructs positive doctrines with no other instrument than reason, could not fail to shock each of the two schools, into which, with us, philosophy is divided, like every thing else; I mean the Sensual school and the Theological school, one of which chains down the reason within the limits of the phenomena of sense, while the other proscribes it altogether, and declares it incapable of attaining the truth.

From the controversy of the Sensual school against

the *Fragments*, I will take the two or three following arguments, because they have since been loudly repeated, and have become in relation to me as the common-place of Sensualism.

1. There is a contradiction between the method of observation and of induction announced in the Preface and its systematic applications; for when we start from consciousness, we cannot legitimately arrive at ontology.

In reply to this, I observe that if we find in consciousness a faculty, the characteristic of which is that it is universal and absolute, the authority of this faculty is not confined to the limits of consciousness, because it falls within its sphere; otherwise Sensualism could not pass beyond those limits; for that also starts from a fact given by consciousness, namely, sensation; and it is by means of this fact, that it knows by consciousness, that it arrives by reasoning, the use of which again is attested to it by consciousness, at the knowledge of outward existence, that is to say, at ontology. But the objection is not valid either against Sensualism or against myself. In fact, consciousness is merely a witness. The faculties of which it testifies do not cease, on that account, to have their peculiar validity and their legitimate extent, which it is requisite to measure and ascertain; now sensation by itself is destitute of all light, and does not even know itself, while reason knows itself and knows all the rest, and goes beyond the sphere of the me, because it does not belong to the me.

2. This system which pretends to restore Spiritualism by establishing it on the basis of experience, is

nothing, after all, in its last conclusions, but the celebrated system of Spinoza and the Eleatics, Pantheism, which completely destroys the received notion of God and of Providence.

It is in reply to this accusation, which has found so many echoes even beyond the Sensual school, that I have written a special dissertation on the Eleatic school, in which I fully explain myself, on the subject of Pantheism, its philosophical and historical origin, the principle of its errors, and also on that element in it which may be called good and even useful.

Pantheism, properly speaking, is the ascribing of Divinity to the All, the grand Whole considered as God, the Universe-God of the greater part of my adversaries, of Saint Simon, for example. It is in its essence a kind of genuine Atheism, but with which may be combined, as has been done, if not by Saint Simon, at least by his school, a certain religious vein, by applying to the world, without the slightest authority, those ideas of the Good and the Beautiful, of the Infinite and of Unity, which belong only to the Supreme Cause and are not to be met with in the world, except in so far as, like every effect, it is the manifestation of all the powers contained in the cause. The system opposed to Pantheism is that of absolute Unity, so far superior and prior to the world, as to be foreign to it, and to make it impossible to comprehend how this unity could ever depart from itself, and how from a principle like this, the vast Universe, with the variety of its forces and phenomena, could proceed. This latter system is the abuse of meta-

physical abstraction, as the former is the abuse of an enthusiastic contemplation of nature, retained, sometimes unconsciously, in the bonds of the senses and the imagination. These two systems are more natural than one would suppose, who was ignorant of the history of philosophy, or who had not himself passed through the different states of mind which produce them both. As a general rule, every naturalist ought to guard against the former, and every metaphysician against the latter. The perfection, but at the same time, the difficulty, is not to lose the sense of nature in the meditations of the school, and, in the presence of nature, to ascend, in spirit and in truth, to the invisible principle, which is at once manifested and concealed by the imposing harmony of the Universe. Would it be thought possible that it is the Sensual school which brings against any one the accusation of Pantheism, which brings it against myself? To accuse me of Pantheism, is to accuse me of confounding the First, Absolute, Infinite Cause with the Universe, that is to say, with the two relative and finite causes of the me and the not-me, of which the limits and the evident insufficiency are the foundation from which I rise to the knowledge of God. In truth, I did not suspect that I should ever be called upon to defend myself from a charge like this. But if I have not confounded God and the world; if my God is not the Univérse-God of Pantheism, neither is he, I confess, the abstraction of Absolute Unity, the lifeless God of the scholastic theology. As God is made known only in so far as he is absolute cause, on this account, in my opinion, he cannot but produce, so

that the creation ceases to be unintelligible, and God is no more without a world than a world without God. This last point has appeared to me of such great importance that I have not shrunk from expressing it with all the strength that I possessed. "The God of consciousness is not an abstract God; a solitary monarch exiled beyond the limits of creation on the desert throne of a silent Eternity and of an absolute existence which resembles even the negation of existence. He is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only in so far as he is cause, that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end and centre, at the summit of Being and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together." It is not a little surprising, that it is this passage from which it has been inferred that my system was identical with that of Spinoza and the Eleatics. There is only one difficulty in that inference, namely, that this passage is immediately directed against all metaphysical speculation in the spirit of Spinoza and the Eleatics. I beg pardon of my adversaries, but I must remind them that the God of Spinoza and the Eleatics is a pure substance and not a cause. In the system of Spinoza, creation is impossible; in mine it is necessary. As to the Eleatics, they admit neither the testimony of the senses, nor the existence of diversity, nor that of any phenomenon; and they absorb the entire Universe in the abyss of Absolute Unity. But let this pass. My adversaries have so often repeated that I

was a Pantheist and an Eleatic,—a contradictory assertion,—that for some time it was taken for granted by a large part of the public, and I was compelled to give a history of the Eleatic school, to show that I did not belong to it myself.[1]

3. But here is the grand, the overwhelming objection. All this is only an importation from the German philosophy. This idea alone raises as many patriotic scruples as if I had introduced the stranger into the heart of my country. I will distinctly reply that in philosophy there is no native land but truth, and that it is not the question, whether the philosophy which I teach be German, or English, or French, but whether it be true. Who ever heard of a French geometry, of a French science of physics? And philosophy, by the very nature of its objects,—has it not, or at least, does it not seek after that character of universality in which all national distinctions shall disappear? And besides, have we not borrowed for the arts from Italy? Do we not still borrow every day from England for the understanding and the practice of Representative Government, for political economy, for every thing which relates to the external life? Why should we not also then borrow from Germany, for what relates to the internal life, the art of education and philosophy? In fine, have our adversaries forgotten whence they obtained their own philosophy? Is not that philosophy an importation of the philosophy of Locke, that is to say an English philosophy, a foreign philosophy? And yet it reigned in France during all the

[1] See Note E.

latter part of the eighteenth century with an almost unlimited authority; it became national as far as a philosophy can be so. That of Descartes also reigned in France in the seventeenth century; it was thoroughly national, since all the best minds in the nation, from the time of Pascal to that of Madame de Sévigné, experienced its ascendency. And yet these two philosophies, which, at the interval of half a century, have been almost equally national in France, are diametrically opposite to each other. Whence then is their common nationality, in the profound differences which separate them? In my opinion, the secret of the common nationality of these two opposite philosophies, is to be found entirely in the common spirit which presides over both, and which controls all their differences; that spirit of method and of analysis, that aiming after perfect clearness, precision, and connexion, which is eminently the French spirit. This is our true nationality in philosophy. It is this by which it becomes us to rise; and which nothing should tempt us to abandon. If I have sinned against this, I acknowledge myself guilty, but guilty in spite of myself. But the French spirit is not condemned to remain ignorant of every thing else, in order to be faithful to itself. It has nothing to fear from contact with the philosophical schools which flourish in the other parts of the great European family; and it will be able, with its ordinary sagacity and firmness, to distinguish the good and the evil which they contain, to render to the winds that which is merely vapor and chimera, and to make use of that which is substantial and true. It was not then a bad enterprise, to engage in the depths of the Ger-

man philosophy, though somewhat dark, to seek out the treasures of thought which it conceals, and to make them known to France. If there be any evil in this, I must confess, that I was the first to give the fatal example; I have opened the path; from every quarter others have followed upon my steps; and I venture to believe that I have performed a valuable service for my country, and one which, sooner or later, will be recognised. The question of originality remains then in what concerns myself. But where have my adversaries found that I pretend to originality? In the *Republic*, when the sophist Thrasymachus brings almost the same charge against Socrates, the latter replies to him; "You are right, Thrasymachus, in saying that I go every where to learn of others; but you are wrong in adding that I do not thank them for it; on the contrary, I testify my gratitude by every means in my power."[1] This is Socrates, it is Plato himself, it is Aristotle, it is Leibnitz, it is every man, who has had the happiness to be born with any elevation of soul, with a mind of any expansion and with the love of truth in an age of light, rich in noble examples and in brilliant genius. And for myself, I also have always been grateful to Providence for giving me birth at a period, in which I have found so many sources of instruction, so many books and so many men, from whose influence I have gained advantage. Far from pretending that I have not had masters, I avow that I have had many, both in the past and in the present, both in France and out of France. For the

[1] *République*, Tom. ix. of my Translation, p. 27.

sake of brevity, I will speak here only of contemporaries.

The day,—in which for the first time in 1811, a pupil of the Normal School, destined to teach in the department of Literature, I heard M. Laromiguière,—remains and always will remain in my memory, with grateful emotions. That day decided my whole life. It took me from my former studies which promised me tranquil success, to throw me into a career in which I have not failed to meet with opposition and storms. I am not Malebranche; but I experienced in hearing M. Laromiguière what Malebranche is said to have experienced in accidentally opening a treatise of Descartes. M. Laromiguière taught the philosophy of Locke and of Condillac, happily modified on some points, with a clearness, and grace which removed every appearance of difficulty, and with the charm of an intellectual benevolence which won all hearts. The Normal School was entirely under his direction. The following year, a new course of instruction came to dispute the first in our regards; and M. Royer-Collard, by the severity of his logic, by the gravity and weight of his discourse, gradually turned us, and not without resistance, from the beaten way of Condillac, to the path which has since become so easy, but then rugged and solitary, of the Scottish philosophy. At the side of these two eminent professors, I had the advantage of finding still another man, without an equal in France, for the talent of internal observation, for refinement and depth in psychological research,—I mean M. Maine de Biran. Here then I have given an account of three masters in France. I shall never

say how much I owe to them. M. Laromiguière initiated me into the art of decomposing thought. He exercised me in the habit of descending from the most abstract and the most general ideas that we possess at present, to the most common sensations which are their primary origin, and of explaining the action of the faculties, elementary or compound, which successively intervene in the formation of these ideas. M. Royer-Collard instructed me that if these faculties must be solicited by sensation, as a condition of their developement and of the production of the least idea, they are submitted also in their action to certain interior conditions, to certain laws, certain principles, which sensation does not explain, which resist all analysis, and which form as it were the natural patrimony of the human mind. With M. Maine de Biran, I studied particularly the phenomena of the will. That admirable observer taught me to disengage in all our knowledge, and even in the most simple facts of consciousness, the element of voluntary activity, of that activity in which our personality is manifested.

It is by this threefold discipline that I have been formed. It was with this preparation that I entered in 1815 upon the public teaching of philosophy, in the Normal School and in the Faculty of Literature.

I had soon exhausted, as I thought, the teaching of my first masters and began to seek for new ones. After France and Scotland, my eyes were naturally turned towards Germany. I therefore learned German, and undertook, with infinite pains, to decipher the principal monuments of the philosophy of Kant, with no other assistance than the barbarous Latin

translation of Born. I thus lived, for two whole years, buried, as it were, in the caverns of the Kantian psychology, and exclusively occupied with the passage from psychology to ontology. I have already said how I was taught this by psychology itself; and how I passed through the philosophy of Kant. That of Fichte could not detain me long; and at the end of the year 1817, I had left the first German School behind me. At that time, I made a tour in Germany. I may say that at this epoch of my life, I was precisely in the state, in which Germany itself was found at the commencement of the nineteenth century, after Kant and Fichte, and at the appearance of the *Philosophy of Nature*. My method, my direction, my psychology, my general views were fixed; and they conducted me to the Philosophy of Nature. I saw nothing else in Germany. Undoubtedly, I met with men of incontestable merit, in the enjoyment of a just renown, usefully employed in supplying the defects of the philosophy of Kant, in correcting its imperfections, and placing it in a condition to resist the new philosophy. I did justice to their talents, but without espousing their cause. I met also with the school of Jacobi, almost united with that of Kant, against the common enemy, laboring in concert to elevate faith above reason, and placing faith in enthusiasm. And enthusiasm, in fact, is one of the most legitimate sources of faith; for enthusiasm is nothing but the spontaneous intuition of truth, spontaneous intuition more natural, more general and more certain than reflection, and which is no less real and no less visible in the eye of conciousness.[1] But the error of the school of Jacobi is

[1] See Note F.

that it fails to perceive, that this trustworthy enthusiasm, this illumination which resembles a prophecy, belongs to reason itself, and is only a higher and purer application of it; so that faith still has its root in reason. Jacobi, on the contrary, separates reason from faith, and thus, taking from faith its foundation and its rule, abandons it to all the errors of the heart and of the imagination, and leaves to philosophy no other asylum than a restless and dazzling mysticism, without true light or true repose.[1] A philosophy which starts precisely from the divorce of faith and reason was too much opposed to the results I had arrived at, to detain me long, or even to interest me, and I was, accordingly, strongly impressed only by the new philosophy. It yet divided and excited Germany, as at the time of its original appearance. Every school rung with the name of Schelling; it was here celebrated, there almost calumniated, every where arousing that passionate interest, that concert of glowing panegyrics and stormy attacks, which we call glory. I did not see Schelling at that time; but in his place, I accidentally and without seeking it met with Hegel at Heidleberg. I began with him, and with him I also ended in Germany.

At that time, Hegel was far from being the celebrated man that I have since found at Berlin, drawing all eyes upon himself and at the head of a large and enthusiastic school. Hegel as yet had no reputation but that of a distinguished disciple of Schelling. He had published some books which were little read; and

[1] See Note G.

his teaching had hardly begun to make him better known. *The Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences* appeared just then, and I had one of the first copies. It was a book all bristling with formulas of a sufficiently scholastic appearance, and written in a style by no means lucid, particularly for me. Hegel knew but little more French than I did German; and, buried in his studies, as yet uncertain of himself and of his reputation, he scarcely saw any body, and, to tell the truth, his personal qualities were not uncommonly attractive. I cannot understand how an obscure young man should have succeeded in interesting him, but at the end of an hour, we were on the best possible terms; and to the last moment, our friendship, though often tried, was never impaired. From our first conversation, I divined what he was, I comprehended his whole reach, I felt that I was in the presence of a superior man; and when I continued my journey from Heidleberg into other parts of Germany, I proclaimed him wherever I went, I prophesied him, as it were; and upon my return to France, I said to my friends; gentlemen, I have seen a man of genius. The impression which Hegel left upon me was profound, but indistinct. The following year I went to Munich to seek out the author of the system himself. No two men can resemble each other less than did the disciple and the master. Hegel scarcely let drop some rare and profound words, a little enigmatical; his diction strong, but embarrassed; his countenance immovable; his brow covered with clouds, seemed the image of thought returning on itself. Schelling, on the other hand, is thought in developement; his language, like his look, is full of fire and animation;

he is naturally eloquent; I passed a whole month with him and Jacobi at Munich, in 1818, and there for the first time began to see a little more clearly into the Philosophy of Nature.

What then is this philosophy? Can I describe it here in a few words? Is it possible to give even the slightest intelligible idea of it to those who have not passed through all the antecedents of this philosophy, through all the degrees of the school of Kant? The last result of the philosophy of Kant was the system of Fichte, and the last result of the system of Fichte was the ME supposed, or rather supposing itself, as the sole principle. Having arrived at this extremity, it was necessary that the German philosophy should either depart from it or perish. Schelling is the man who took it from the labyrinth of a psychology, at once ideal and skeptical, in order to restore it to reality and life. Especially he vindicated the rights of the external world, of nature; and it is from this circumstance, that his philosophy derives its name. In the system of Kant and of Fichte, all absolute and substantial existence is merely an hypothesis, with no other foundation than the want of the subjective me, which admits it in order to satisfy itself. Schelling, in order to depart from the Relative and Subjective, takes his stand at once in the Objective. In his opinion, philosophy, if it wishes for substantial ground, must leave psychology and dialectics, the me as well as the not-me, and without embarrassing itself with the objections of skepticism, rise at first even to the Absolute Being, the common substance and the common ideal of the me and the not-me, which does not

relate exclusively either to the one or the other, but which comprehends them both and forms their identity. This absolute identity of the me and the not-me, of man and nature, is God. It follows from this that God is in nature, as well as in man. It follows moreover that this nature possesses in itself no less value than man, that it has its own truth no less than he, since it exists on the same ground, and that it must needs resemble him, since it is derived from the same principle; their only difference being that of consciousness and non-consciousness. On the other hand, God cannot be less in humanity than in nature; if nature, in some sense, is as rational as the spirit of man, the spirit of man must have laws as necessary as those of nature; so that the world of humanity is as regularly constructed as the external world. Now the world of humanity is manifested in history; history then has its laws; it forms then, in its different epochs, and in its apparent aberrations, an harmonious system, just as the external world is one in the diversity of its phenomena. From these twofold consequences and from their common principle proceeds the high importance of historical studies and of the physical sciences. Hence, for the first time, Idealism introduced into the physical sciences, and Realism into history; the two departments of philosophy hitherto enemies, psychology and physics, at length reconciled; an admirable sentiment composed at once of reason and of life, a sublime spirit of poetry spread through the whole sphere of philosophy; and crowning all, the idea of God every where present, and forming, for the entire system, its principle and its light.

The first years of the nineteenth century saw the appearance of this great system. Europe owes it to Germany, and Germany to Schelling. This system is the truth; for it is the most complete expression of entire reality, of universal existence. Schelling brought this system into the world; but he left it filled with all manner of imperfections and defects. Hegel, coming after Schelling, belongs to his school. He is entitled to a separate place in it, not only for developing and enriching the system, but for giving it in many respects a new aspect. The admirers of Hegel consider him as the Aristotle of a second Plato; the exclusive partisans of Schelling see in him only the Wolf of another Leibnitz. However it may be with these rather arrogant comparisons, no one can deny that the master is gifted with the talent of powerful invention, and the disciple with that of profound reflection. Hegel has borrowed much from Schelling. I, far more feeble than either, have borrowed from both. It is folly to reproach me with it; and certainly, no wonderful humility in me to acknowledge it. It is more than twelve years since, in the dedication of my edition of the Commentary of Proclus on the *Parmenides*, to Schelling and Hegel, I publicly called them both *my masters and my friends, and the leaders of the philosophy of the present age.* It is delightful to me to renew this homage here; and I can never repeat it enough to do justice to my sincere admiration and my heart-felt friendship. I thank God, my soul is not so constituted as ever to be embarrassed by gratitude. But while I love to announce the resemblance which connects the philosophy I profess, with that of these

two great masters, I owe it also to truth to avow that I am separated from them by fundamental differences, even in spite of myself. A Scottish critic, whose erudition equals his sagacity, and who will certainly not be accused of flattery towards me, has set forth these differences.[1] I should blush to insist upon them here. But I cannot help alluding to the first and the most fruitful of all, that of method. As I have already said, my two illustrious friends take their stand at once on the height of speculation; while I commence with experience. In order to avoid the subjective character of the inductions which proceed from an imperfect psychology, they begin with ontology, which is then merely an hypothesis; I begin with psychology; and it is psychology itself which conducts me to ontology, and saves me at once from skepticism and from hypothesis. Confident that truth bears with it its own evidence, and that it belongs moreover to the whole to justify its parts, Hegel starts with abstractions which in his view are the foundation and the type of all reality; but he nowhere indicates or describes the process by which he obtains these abstractions. Schelling indeed speaks sometimes of intellectual intuition as the process which lays hold of being itself; but through fear of giving a subjective character to this intellectual intuition, he contends that it does not fall within the sphere of consciousness; and thus, to my mind, makes it absolutely incomprehensible. In my theory, on the contrary, intellectual intuition, without being personal and sub-

[1] Sir William Hamilton. *Edinburgh Review*, No. XCIX.

jective, attains to the knowledge of being from the bosom of consciousness; it is a fact of consciousness no less real than the notions of reflection, only more difficult to seize, but still not beyond our reach, for in that case it would be as if it were not. In fine, to what faculty does the intellectual intuition of Schelling belong? Is it a special faculty? Or is it not, as in my theory, merely a purer and more elevated degree of reason itself? We are not permitted, in my opinion, to slide over these points, nor many others, which I cannot even indicate. Far from it, I am strongly convinced, that we cannot illustrate with too much care the passage from psychology to ontology, in order to prevent the latter from being, or at least from appearing to be, at issue of hypotheses more or less artificially woven together. Here, as every where, is manifested the general difference which separates me from the new German school, namely, the psychological character which is impressed on all my views, and to which I scrupulously adhere as to a support for my weakness and a guarantee for my inductions.[1]

[1] See on the character of the Philosophy of Schelling, the excellent summary of Tennemann, *Manuel de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, French translation. Vol. 2. p. 294—312. For Hegel, it is sufficient to refer to the division of his *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, 3d Ed. Berlin, 1830. First Part; *Science of Logic*, taken in the sense of Plato as the science of ideas in themselves, that is to say, of the necessary essence of things. Second Part; *Philosophy of Nature*. Third Part; *Philosophy of Spirit*. This Third Part of philosophical science contains psychology. Also in the Logic; 1. Being. 2. Essence. 3. Notion. And in Being, three degrees, in the following order; *Seyn, Daseyn, Fursichseyn*

I ought perhaps to ask pardon for this apology, which seems more like a chapter of personal memoirs, than a discussion of philosophy. At present, certainly, the reader knows as well as myself all the influences which have acted on my mind and my ideas. As to my originality, I hold it at a very cheap rate. I have never sought, I still seek but one thing, that is, truth; first, to nourish and penetrate myself with it, then, to communicate it to my fellow-men. I have already had numerous masters; and I hope, even to my latest breath, to be always the disciple of any one who shall have new truth to communicate to my mind.

I now pass to other adversaries, to accusations of a quite different nature, proceeding from the Theological school.[1]

What can be the quarrel between the Theological school and myself? Am I then an enemy of Christianity and the Church? I have made many lectures and far too many books; can a word be found in one of them inconsistent with the reverence due to sacred things? Let a single light or doubtful expression be pointed out, and I will retract it; I will disclaim it as unworthy of a philosopher.

But, perhaps, without my knowledge or wish, the philosophy which I teach tends to weaken the Christian Faith. This would be more dangerous and at the same time less criminal; for he is not always orthodox who wishes to be so. Let us look at it. What is the dogma which my theory places in peril?

[1] See Note H.

Is it the dogma of the Word and of the Trinity? Be it that or some other, let it be declared, let it be proved, let the attempt be made to prove it; there will then at least be a serious and truly theological discussion. I accept it, in advance; I solicit it.

No. This is not the point. I am not accused of speaking ill or of thinking ill of Christianity. It is not in any specific place that my philosophy is impious. Its impiety lies far deeper; for it is in its very existence. Its whole crime is that it is a philosophy, and not merely, as in the twelfth century, a simple commentary on the decisions of the Church and on the Holy Scriptures.

Let us speak distinctly; the Theological school, in order to defend religion to better advantage, undertakes to destroy philosophy, all philosophy, the good as well as the bad, and perhaps the good still more than the bad. This is the ground of its skepticism with regard to philosophy. But it is a mere game; for all skepticism tends to the most outrageous dogmatism. The great argument of the Theological school, and, as it were, its war-cry, is the impotence of human reason.

Here is the well-known argumentation of this school. Reason is a faculty altogether personal. When therefore we affirm any thing in the name of reason, it is in the name of our own reason that we affirm it; certainty in that case has no other basis, no other criterion than our individual sentiment; but this is absurd. Reason then cannot give us genuine certainty. Now, reason once proved to be impotent, we must look for another authority. This authority is that of common

sense opposed to individual sentiment, common sense preserved by tradition, made visible by the Church, and promulgated by the Holy See.

This boasted scaffolding has been a hundred times overthrown. In the first place, we maintain, as philosophers, that what it pleases the Theological school to call individual reason is in fact the general and universal reason, which in every man is the epitome of the common sense of the human race. We maintain that if this common sense actually exists in the human race, it cannot be composed of the fragments of different individual reasons, compared and combined with each other; for there can be no more in the collection than in each of its elements, and a thousand impotent, individual reasons cannot receive infallibility from their union. Who, moreover, would effect this union? In a word, we maintain that the common sense of the human race exists, because every man is in possession of a reason, not individual, but general, which, being the same in all, because it is individual in none, constitutes the true fraternity of men, and the common patrimony of human nature. Otherwise common sense is a mere hypothesis. Suppose that this hypothesis were a truth; then for each one to submit his individual sentiment to the common sense of the race, it would at least be necessary that each could ascertain this common sense. But how would he ascertain it? With his individual sentiment? Evidently he would, according to the system in question, for man has nothing better. But, in that case, with this individual sentiment, how could the common sense be infallibly ascertained? It would be impossi-

ble, under the penalty of concluding from the Individual to the General, and of taking ourselves as the measure of certainty. We ought then to have a previous measure of certainty in ourselves, in order to ascertain that which is proposed to us. We ought to possess still another, in order to ascertain that the Church in fact represents the common sense of the human race; for it is this relation of conformity which alone constitutes the authority of the Church. It is apparently a reasonable submission that is demanded of us; but for this reasonable submission, the employment of reason is first necessary.

All the eloquence and all the sophistry in the world cannot conceal this perpetual paralogism. And yet this is the triumphant argument. Constantly overthrown, it is constantly reproduced. It has ascended from the journals of party to the mandates of bishops,[1] it is the foundation of teaching in seminaries, it fills the first Chair[2] in Christendom; and that no inconsistency may be wanting, the Protestants have found it so admirable that they have not hesitated to borrow it of Catholicism. Open any of the Methodist publications; except in ability, you would think that you were reading the Abbé de la Mennais.[3] The same principles, the same mode of reasoning, the same hatred of reason and philosophy; the only difference

[1] See among other pieces of the same kind, the Pastoral Instruction of the Bishop of Chartres, against my Course of Philosophy, *Quotidienne*, 16 Feb. 1828.

[2] *De Methodo Philosophandi*, *pars prima*, Rome, 1828, by PÉRE VENTURA, Professor in the *Collège de la Sapienza*.

[3] See *le Semeur*, the organ of the Methodist party.

is that the word of God is substituted for common sense and the Holy Scriptures for the Church. In every philosophy, they say, it is always a man who speaks; it is a single man who addresses himself to our reason with his own; but we wish for no man between us and truth; we wish to surrender our minds only to God himself and to his word. Assuredly our adversaries are not difficult; but, I ask, who is to teach them that word? Who will warrant them that it is the word of God? What ground have they for believing it? Who shall tell them that God has spoken? And by what sign shall they know it? The former propose to us, as proof, the researches of erudition and of historical criticism; the latter appeal to a sort of immediate illumination in the reading of the Holy Scriptures. But it is not a little strange to refer us to criticism through fear of philosophy; to send us back to history in order to avoid the intervention of men between truth and ourselves. As to immediate illumination, the intervention of reason in that is less evident, but quite as real. Indeed, which of our faculties is it that in the reading of the Holy Scriptures must receive this sudden light? It is not sensibility, we presume; it is not imagination; neither is it reasoning. Examine and you will find that it must be reason. It is reason which, endowed with the power of recognising the True, the Good, the Beautiful, the Grand, the Holy, the Divine, wherever it is, recognises it in the Holy Scriptures, as it recognises it in nature, as it recognises it in conscience and in the soul, which is also a Bible in its own way. You would reduce philosophy to a commentary on the

Holy Scriptures; you then trust to him who makes this commentary. The Scriptures have their obscure and difficult passages; their language is that of the symbolical East; it cannot be comprehended and interpreted without the aid of a practised and developed reason. It is reason, then, in the last analysis, to which we are compelled to return; it is the testimony of reason which measures all other testimonies; and the authority of reason on which repose all other authorities. If this authority be purely individual, as it is pretended, there is no certainty, no universal truth in the world. But if certainty is to be obtained, if there are universal truths, it is because reason, which teaches them to us, has in itself a sovereign and universal authority. Indeed, we cannot but smile to see a Protestant sect, after having separated from the Church in the name of the right of free inquiry, end with denying the authority of the faculty which inquires. Let it then return to the Church; it will there find at least a uniform rule, a general discipline which will give it a support and a refuge against the extravagances of mysticism.

I need not say that this question does not concern Christianity, nor the Church, nor the Holy Scriptures; but merely the presumptuous war which a blind zeal wages in their name against reason and philosophy. To separate faith from reason is doing a poor service to the faith of the nineteenth century. To reduce philosophy to theology is an intolerable anachronism. Philosophy is for ever emancipated. It is almost ludicrous to propose to it at this day to be nothing but the handmaid of theology. Let us yield to each

of them a becoming independence. They can exist together without difficulty. Their provinces are distinct; and each is vast enough to prevent the need of intruding on the other. Religion which addresses itself to all men, would fail of its end, if it were presented under a form which intelligence alone can reach; for in that case its teachings would be lost for three quarters of the human race. It speaks not only to intelligence, but also to the heart, to the senses, to the imagination, to the whole man. It is this which renders its utility incomparably superior to that of philosophy, by the multitude of human beings on whom it acts. But this immense advantage brings with it difficulties which gradually show themselves in the progress of time and of civilization. Strictly speaking, religions are the founders and nurses of the human race. To them belong temples, public places, all great influences, popularity, power. It is not so with philosophy. That speaks only to intelligence, and consequently to a very small number of men; but this small number is the select portion and the van-guard of the human race. The functions of philosophy and of religion being so different, why should they combat each other? They both serve the human race; each in its own way and according to its own forms. The wish of philosophy to destroy religion would be senseless and criminal; for it could not hope to supply its place with the masses, who are unable to attend courses of metaphysical instruction. On the other hand, religion cannot destroy philosophy; for philosophy represents the sacred right and the invincible craving of human reason to give

an account to itself of all things. A profound theology, which understands its true ground, will never be hostile to philosophy, with which, in reality, it cannot dispense; and at the same time, a philosophy which understands the nature of philosophy, its true object, its compass and its limits, will never be tempted to impose its processes upon theology. It is always a bad philosophy and a bad theology which quarrel with each other. Christianity is the cradle of modern philosophy; and I have myself set forth more than one lofty truth concealed under the veil of the Christian images. Let those holy and sublime images be early presented to the souls of our children, let them deposit there the germs of every truth; our country, humanity, philosophy itself will gain from it immense and priceless advantages;[1] but let it not be pretended that reason should never attempt to give an account to itself of the truth under another form. This would be to lose sight of the diversity and the riches of the human faculties, their distinct wants and the legitimate sphere of these wants; it would be to stand in opposition to the necessary march of events. But in the midst of these aberrations, it is for philosophy, attacked and calumniated, to render good for evil, and, while maintaining its independence with an immovable firmness, to maintain also, as far as in it lies, the natural alliance which connects it with religion.[2] It would moreover be a very superficial philosophy which should deem Christianity a burden. By that very fact, it would acknowledge itself con-

[1] See Note I. [2] See Note J.

victed of a manifest incompetency, since it would fail to comprehend, and could not explain the greatest event of the past, the most important institution of the present. This leads me to the last point on which it remains to say a few words, namely, the application of philosophy to history, and particularly to the history of philosophy, so as not to forget the purpose of these *Fragments*, or too much extend this Preface, already very long.

IV. GENERAL VIEWS ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The views of every system on the history of the science to which it relates, furnish the most certain estimate of that system, the exact measure of its principles. Is it incomplete? Does it contain only a single element of consciousness and of reality? Is it founded only on a single principle, however brilliant and imposing it may be? It is then compelled, in order to be consistent with itself, to perceive no truth in all the systems founded on a contrary principle, to discover no reason except in those which rest on the same principle. An historical conception like this is the final sentence of a system; for it is a melancholy wisdom which has universal folly for its condition; and to defend ourselves only by accusing every body else is to accuse and condemn ourselves. But suppose a system which, by a patient and profound observation, and an induction at once comprehensive and scrupulous, has succeeded in embracing all the elements of consciousness and of reality; when afterwards it shall

give its attention to history, to whatever side it turns, it will not find a single system of any considerable importance, in which there are not some of its own elements, and with which it agrees, at least, on certain points. In fact, it is no easy thing to wander so far from the common sense which is the gift of all men, as to fall into errors and remain in them, that are entirely destitute of truth; error gains admission into the understanding only in the mask of a truth which she disfigures. A truly complete system, therefore, can be applied with singular facility to history. It is not compelled to proscribe all systems, in order to justify itself; it is satisfied with disengaging the inevitable portion of error that is mixed with the portion of truth, which forms the life and strength of each of them; and by pursuing the same course with them all, enemies as they were by their contrary errors, it makes them friends and brothers, by the truths which they contain, and thus purified and reconciled, it composes with them a vast whole, adequate to the expression of complete and universal truth. Now this method, at once philosophical and historical, which, in possession of truth, is able to find it scattered here and there in all systems, is Eclecticism. We must distinguish three things in Eclecticism; its point of departure, its processes, and its end; its principle, its instruments, and its results. Eclecticism supposes a system which serves it as a point of departure and a principle in the labyrinth of history; it demands as an instrument a rigid criticism sustained on a solid and extensive erudition; it has for its primary result the decomposition of all systems by the fire and steel of criticism,

and for its definitive result their reconstruction in a new system which is the complete representation of consciousness in history. Eclecticism begins with a philosophy, and proceeds by means of history, to the living demonstration of that philosophy. For this reason I said at the close of the Preface to the *Fragments*, after giving an exposition of the system which I have now discussed; "I shall pursue the reform of philosophical studies in France, in illustrating the history of philosophy by this system, and in demonstrating this system by the whole history of philosophy." Would it be thought after this, that any one should see in Eclecticism only a blind Syncretism, which mingles together all systems, approves all, confounds the True and the False, good and evil; a new fatalism; the dream of a deceived mind, which unable to produce a system for itself demands one of history? All these objections will vanish of themselves before the slightest examination.

First Objection. Eclecticism is a Syncretism which mingles together all systems.

Answer. Eclecticism does not mingle together all systems; for it leaves no system entire; it decomposes every system into two parts, the one false, the other true; it destroys the first, and admits only the second in the work of reconstruction. It is the true portion of each system which it adds to the true portion of another system, that is to say, truth to truth, in order to form a true whole. It never mingles one entire system with another entire system; therefore it does not mingle all systems. Eclecticism, therefore, is not Syncretism; the one indeed is the opposite of

the other; philosophically and etymologically, they resemble each other like choice and mixture, discrimination and confusion.

Second Objection. Eclecticism approves every thing, confounds the True and the False, good and evil.

Answer. Eclecticism does not approve every thing; for it maintains that in every system there is a considerable portion of error. It does not confound the True and the False; on the contrary, it distinguishes them from each other, neglects the False, and makes use only of the True.

Third Objection. Eclecticism is fatalism.

Answer. It is not fatalism to say that man is so constituted as, with his noble intelligence, always to seize a portion of truth; and with the limits of his intelligence, above all, with his indolence, his superficialness, his presumption, to believe that he has attained the whole truth when he possesses only a part. Hence there is always a portion of the True and the False, of good and evil, in the works of man and particularly in philosophical systems. There is so much the less fatalism in this, as Eclecticism maintains that by great efforts with ourselves, by a double share of vigilance, attention, circumspection, we may succeed in diminishing the chances of error; and as this is the result to which it aspires.

Fourth Objection. Eclecticism is the absence of all system.

Answer. Eclecticism is not the absence of all system; for it is the application of a system; it supposes a system, it starts from a system. In fact, if we

would collect and combine the truths scattered in different systems, we must first separate them from the errors with which they are mingled; and in order to do this, we must know how to ascertain and distinguish them; but to ascertain whether a given opinion is true or false, we must know ourselves what is error and what is truth; we must therefore already be in possession, or at least think that we are in possession of truth; we must have a system in order to judge all systems. Eclecticism supposes a system already formed, which it continues to illustrate and enrich; it is not therefore the absence of all system.

I would now ask, if Eclecticism be a conception which belongs exclusively to myself? By no means. I should greatly distrust an idea which was entirely new in the world; which no one had ever thought of before. No, thank God, Eclecticism is not of yesterday. It was born the moment that a sound head and a feeling heart undertook to reconcile two passionate adversaries, by showing them that the opinions for which they combated were not irreconcilable in themselves, and that, with a few mutual sacrifices, they might be brought together. Eclecticism was long ago in the mind of Plato; it was the professed enterprise, whether legitimate or not, of the school of Alexandria. Among the moderns, it was not merely professed by Leibnitz, it was constantly practised by him; and it is every where presented in the rich historical views of the new German philosophy. The time has arrived at last to elevate it to the precision and the dignity of a principle. This is what I have attempted to do. This word, long since fallen into deep

oblivion, scarcely uttered by a single voice, has echoed from one end of Europe to the other, and the spirit of the nineteenth century has recognised itself in Eclecticism. They will know how to pursue their path together in spite of every obstacle.

In the midst of such success, when Eclecticism has already made so many unlooked for conquests, it were a singular weakness both of mind and character to be surprised or wounded by the violent attacks, of which it has been the object. It was inevitable that all exclusive systems should rise against a system which undertook to put an end to their quarrels, by crushing their opposite pretensions, and submitting them to a common discipline. All extreme parties therefore are leagued against Eclecticism, under the honorable flag of the support of discord. Heaven knows what war they have waged, and with what arms! I have had the benefit of holding against me, for many years, the Sensual school and the Theological school united. In 1830, both schools descended into the arena of politics. The Sensual school naturally produced the party of demagogues; and the Theological school quite as naturally took sides with Absolutism, except as from time to time it assumed the mask of the demagogues so as to sooner gain its ends, just as in philosophy, it undertook to restore theocracy by means of skepticism. The system, on the contrary, which combated every exclusive principle in science must needs have rejected also every exclusive principle in the State, and defended Representative Government. In 1828, I gave a theory of Representative Government and of the Charter, in

which I still persist.[1] Convictions which are founded not on temporary circumstances, but on a profound study of humanity and of history, are not swept away by the wind of the first tempest. Three days have not changed the nature of things and the state of French society. Yes, as the human soul in its natural developement contains many elements of which true philosophy is the harmonious expression, so every civilized society possesses many elements altogether distinct, which true government ought to recognise and represent; and the exclusive triumph of one of these elements in a simple government, under whatever name, could be nothing but a tyranny. A mixed government is the only one appropriate to a great nation like France. The Revolution of July is merely the English Revolution of 1688, but in France; that is to say, with far less aristocracy and a little more democracy and monarchy. The proportion of these elements may vary with circumstances; but these three elements are necessary. Let us leave republicanism to the youthful societies of America, and absolute monarchy to aged Asia. Placed between the old world and the new, at an equal distance from decrepitude and infancy, our Europe in its vigorous maturity contains all the elements of social life, brought to its complete developement; it is therefore doomed as it were to Representative Government. This admirable form of government is a happy necessity of our times; and without the folly of proselytism, will make the tour of Europe. For France, the question I fear not to say,

[1] See Note K.

is that of existing in this manner, or of ceasing to exist at all. With Representative Government, I see public liberty, union, and power at home, and consequently the certain prospect of greatness and glory abroad. Let Representative Government be destroyed; and I perceive nothing but barren convulsions, civil war with foreign war, a powerless imitation of a grand epoch for ever gone by, and as a complete novelty perhaps the dismemberment of France, and the fate of Poland and Italy. I turn my eyes from a result like this and desire nothing that can lead to it. My political faith is therefore in entire accordance with my philosophical faith, and both the one and the other are above the outrages of party.

III.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

[PREFACE TO "PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS," FIRST EDITION.]

1826.

THESE *Fragments* are articles inserted for the most part in the *Journal des Savans* and in the *Archives Philosophiques* from 1816 to 1819. Borrowed from my Lectures of that period, I cannot attempt to restore them to a certain degree of unity without saying a few words on the teaching to which they relate, and which they represent as far as insulated pieces can represent a whole. Called upon to speak of myself, I shall do so, without the precautions of modesty, which are of no value compared with simplicity and rectitude of intention; I will frankly relate every thing which I have done or wished to do, from the time of my appointment as Master of the Philosophical Conferences in the Normal School, and Professor of the History of Modern Philosophy in the Faculty of Literature, when I unreservedly and irrevocably devoted my whole life to the pursuit of the philosophical reform so honorably commenced by M. Royer-Collard.

In the position in which I was placed, my first attention was given to method. A system is scarcely any thing but the developement of a method applied to certain objects. Accordingly nothing is more impor-

tant than to ascertain and determine, in the first place, the method, which we wish to pursue; to give an account to ourselves of our good and our bad instincts, and of the direction in which they impel us, and to which we must know whether or not we mean to consent; for our philosophy, like our destiny, must needs be our own. Undoubtedly, we should borrow it from truth and the necessity of things; but we ought also to receive it freely, with a perfect comprehension of what we borrow and what we receive. Philosophy, whether speculative or practical, is the alliance of necessity and liberty in the mind of the man, who spontaneously places himself in harmony with the laws of universal existence. The end is in the Infinite, but the point of departure is in ourselves. Open the books of history; every philosopher who has respected his fellowmen, and who has not wished to offer them merely the indefinite results of certain dreams, has begun with the consideration of method. Every doctrine which has exercised any influence, has done so and could do so, only by the new direction which it has given to the mind, by the new point of view in which it has presented the subjects of inquiry, that is to say, by its method. Every philosophical reform has its avowed or secret principle in a change or in an advancement of method. My first effort therefore must needs have been to examine conscientiously the point from which I was to start, the direction which I was to take, the method which I was to employ, and which contained the results of every kind, yet unknown to me, to which its successive application would necessarily lead. Besides, as a public Professor, the Master of Confer-

ences in a school of Professors, who were destined by their teaching or their writings to influence the future condition of philosophy in France, I deemed it a sacred duty to inculcate upon them from the first the spirit of free and critical inquiry, by which, sooner or later, they might ascertain my errors, modify my teaching, or abandon it altogether. Conviction may be dangerous in proportion to its depth and sincerity; and the honorable man who feels it at the bottom of his heart with the perilous authority which it gives him, is solemnly bound to absolve himself in advance from the contagion of the errors which escape him, by arming his auditory against himself, by forming it to independence, by previously and constantly discussing the general spirit of his teaching, that is to say, by insisting on method.

This, then, was my first care. But what method have I taken up? That which was in accordance with the spirit of the times,—earnestly studied and freely accepted,—in accordance with the habits of the nation as well as my own. Let me explain myself.

It is an incontestable fact that in England and France in the eighteenth century, Locke and Condillac took the place of the great schools of a previous date, and have reigned without contradiction to the present day. Instead of being irritated at this fact, we should endeavor to comprehend it; for after all, facts do not create themselves; they have their laws which are connected with the general laws of the human race. If the philosophy of sensation actually gained credit in England and France, there must

have been some reason for this phenomenon. Now this reason, when we come to reflect upon it, does honor and not injury to the human mind. It was not its fault, if it could not remain in the shackles of Cartesianism; for it belonged to Cartesianism to protect it, to satisfy all the conditions which can perpetuate a system. In the general movement of affairs and the progress of time, the spirit of analysis and observation must also have its place; and this place it found in the eighteenth century. The spirit of the eighteenth century needs no apology. The apology for a century is the fact of its existence; for its existence is a decree and a judgment of God himself; or else history is nothing but an insignificant phantasmagoria. The modern spirit is often accused of incredulity and skepticism, but it is skeptical only with regard to what it does not understand, incredulous only concerning what it cannot believe, that is to say, the condition of understanding and of believing, at that epoch, as at many former epochs, having been changed for the human race, it was indispensable, on pain of surrendering its independence, that it should impose new conditions on every thing which aspired to govern its intelligence and its faith. Faith is neither exhausted nor diminished. The human race, like the individual, lives only by faith; but the conditions of faith, however, are constantly renewed. In the eighteenth century, the general condition of comprehending and of believing was that of having observed the object; from that time, all philosophy which aspired to authority must needs be founded on observation. Now, Cartesianism, especially with the

modifications which it had received from Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Wolf,—Cartesianism, which in the second stage of its progress, abandons observation and loses itself in ontological hypotheses and scholastic formulas, could not pretend to the character of experimental philosophy. Another system was presented in this character; and in this character, it was accepted. Such is the explanation of the fall of Cartesianism, and the unexampled success of the philosophy of Locke and Condillac. If we reflect for a moment on the subject, the success of this miserable philosophy still testifies to the dignity and independence of the human mind, which forsakes in its turn the systems which forsake it, and pursues its path even through the most deplorable errors, rather than not advance at all. It did not adopt the philosophy of sensation on account of its Materialism; but on account of its experimental character, which to a certain degree it actually possessed. The favor with which this philosophy was received did not come from its dogmas, but from its method; and this method was not its own, but that of the age. And it is true that the experimental method was the necessary fruit of time, and not the transient work of a sect in England and France; and that if we calmly examine the contemporary schools, the most opposed to that of sensasation, we shall find the same pretensions to observation and experience. Reid and Kant, in Scotland and in Germany, had fought to the death, had overthrown from top to bottom, the doctrine of Locke; but with what weapons? Why, with those of Locke himself; with the experimental method differently applied. Reid

starts from the human mind and its faculties, which he analyzes in their actual operation, and the laws of which he determines. Kant, separating reason from all its objects and considering, if I may so speak, only its interior, gives a profound and exquisite statistical account of it; his philosophy is a Critique; it is always that of observation and experience. Make the tour of Europe and of the world, you will every where find the same spirit, the same method; and this in fact constitutes the unity of the age, since this unity presents itself in the midst of the most striking diversities.

Let us now look at our own men, and especially, the French of the nineteenth century. The spirit of analysis has destroyed much around us. Born in the midst of ruins of every kind, we feel the need of reconstructing; this need is deep, pressing, imperious; there is no small peril for us in our present state; and yet if we are more just than our fathers towards the past, we can rest in it no more than they; we absolve our fathers and the age; and we also have no faith but in observation and experience. This is our condition. We must submit to it with resignation.

And is it after all such a great evil? Let us reflect upon it. To be limited to observation and experience is to be limited to human nature; for we observe only with ourselves, in proportion to our faculties and their laws. We are then limited to human nature. But what else would we have? If the observation which goes as far as human nature can go, does not suffice for the attainment of all truths and all convictions, and for the completion of the whole cir-

cle of science, the evil is certainly not in the method which limits us to our natural means of knowledge, but in the weakness of those means and of our nature from which we cannot escape. In fact, whatever method we may adopt, it is always ourselves who have made it or who employ it; it is always with ourselves that we act; it is always human nature which, appearing to forget itself, is always present, which does every thing that is done or attempted, even apparently beyond its power. Either we must despair of science, or human nature is competent to attain it. Observation, that is, human nature accepted as the sole instrument of discovery, is competent, when properly employed, or nothing is competent; for we have nothing else and our predecessors had no more. Let us study the systems on which time has passed sentence; what has it destroyed? What could it destroy? The hypothetical part of those systems. But what gave life and coherence to those hypotheses? Merely certain truths which had been discovered by observation, which observation now discovers, and which still possess, for that reason, the same certainty and the same novelty as heretofore. What has raised so high and yet sustains the *numbers* of Pythagoras, the *ideas* of Plato, the *categories* of Aristotle? A fact, no less real at this moment than it was in antiquity, namely, that there are real elements in intelligence which the acquisitions of the senses alone cannot explain. What has produced the vision in God of Malebranche, and the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz? Facts again,—the fact that there is not a single cognition which does not suggest to our minds

the notion of existence, that is to say, of God; the fact that our intelligence and our sensibility, though inseparable, are distinct, that each has its independent laws by which it is governed, but that these laws have their secret relations and harmony. If we thus examine the most celebrated hypotheses, we shall perceive that even when they are lost in the clouds, their root is here below in some fact, real in itself; and that it is by this fact, that they have been established and brought into credit among men. Every unmingled error is incomprehensible and inadmissible. It is only by its relation with the truth that it is sustained. It is impossible for the most extravagant systems not to have some reasonable aspects; and it is always the unperceived common sense which gives success to the hypothesis with which it is combined. At the bottom, every thing true and permanent in the systems that are scattered through the course of ages is the fruit of observation which often labors for philosophy without the knowledge of the philosopher; and, what is remarkable, there is nothing everlasting in the changing forms of human opinion but that which comes precisely from this experimental method, which at first appears competent to attain only that which is transitory.

The method of observation is good in itself. It is given to us by the spirit of the age, which itself is the product of the general spirit of the world. We have faith only in that method, we can do nothing except with that, and yet in England and in France, it has hitherto done nothing but destroy without building up. With us, its single work in philosophy is the system

of transformed sensation. And whose is the fault? Not of the method, but of men. The method is irreproachable; but it should be applied according to its true spirit. We must do nothing but observe; but we must observe every thing. Human nature is not impotent; but we must deprive it of no portion of its strength. We may arrive at a permanent system; but provided only that we are not stopped at the entrance of our course by a systematic prejudice. The philosophy of the eighteenth century did not proceed and could not proceed in this manner. The offspring of a struggle against the past, and wishing to gain by this struggle, it was experimental against the past, but systematic in relation to experience; fearful of going astray in the ancient darkness, finding evident facts under its hand in sensations, it was led to rest with them; at first through weakness, for every new method is weak; then by the enticement, at that time, almost irresistible, of the success of the physical sciences, which seduced the attention from every other order of phenomena; and finally, by the blindness of the spirit of revolution which could be enlightened only by its excesses, and which was destined to go on until it had obtained an absolute triumph. Its cradle had been England; it was necessary that its battle-field should be France. Bacon has been often celebrated as the father of the experimental method; but the truth is that Bacon marked out the rules and processes of the experimental method within the sphere of the physical sciences, but not beyond; and that he was the first to lead that method astray in a systematic path, by limiting it to the external world and to sensibility.

The language of Bacon is; "Mens humana si agat in materiam, naturam rerum et opera Dei contemplando, pro modo materiæ operatur atque ab eâdem determinatur; si ipsa in se vertatur, tanquam aranea texens telam, tunc demum indeterminata est; et parit telas quasdam doctrinæ tenuitate fili operisque mirabiles, sed quoad usum frivolas et inanes." As a general rule, observation with Bacon is applicable only to the phenomena of sense; but induction supported on this basis alone will carry us but a little way. The philosophy which must needs proceed from such an imperfect application of method could not but be imperfect itself, miserably imperfect. The system of transformed sensation was at the end of a procedure like this; and Bacon necessarily produced Condillac. Of so much consequence are the aberrations of method. Even the most trifling bring in their train the gravest errors, which cannot be destroyed but by going back to their principle. The first aberration from the true philosophical method comes from Bacon, its consequences stop only with Condillac, beyond whom there is no room for any further aberration, whether in point of method or of system. Is the imperfect method of Bacon admitted? Then all the defects of the system of Condillac must be adopted. It is only feebleness and inconsequence which can stop short of them. Does the system of Condillac, in its rigor, shock the least attentive observation and human nature itself? We must go back to Bacon and endeavor to put a stop to the evil at its source; we must borrow the experimental method from Bacon, but avoid corrupting observation at the outset by imposing on it a system.

We must employ only the method of observation, but apply it to all facts, whatever they may be, provided they exist; its accuracy depends on its impartiality, and impartiality is found only in universality. In this way, perhaps, may be established the long-sought alliance between the metaphysical and the physical sciences, not by the systematic sacrifice of the one to the other, but by the unity of their method applied to different phenomena. It might be possible, in this way, to satisfy the conditions of the spirit of the age, and of all that was legitimate and necessary in the revolution of the eighteenth century; and also perhaps to satisfy the most elevated wants of human nature, which are facts in themselves, facts no less incontestable and imperious than any others.

Such were the reflections which occurred to me at the commencement of my philosophical career. I have been impelled by the feeling of historical conscientiousness to reproduce them here, almost precisely as they were presented in my Lectures at that epoch. No method is brought to perfection except by its application; and if after eleven years of teaching and of study, I continue faithful to the method which guided my early endeavors, it is perhaps by reason of motives more profound and more inherent in the nature of things than those which I have now developed. But in 1815, I needed only these motives to adopt the method of observation and of induction as the philosophical method, with this law common to all observation; namely, that it must be complete, exhaust its subject, and stop only when the facts fail; otherwise induction can have no basis and the mind of man no

hold. Facts, therefore, are the point of departure, if not the limit of philosophy. Now facts, whatever they may be, exist for us only as they come to our consciousness. It is there alone that observation seizes them and describes them, before committing them to induction, which forces them to reveal the consequences which they contain in their bosom. The field of philosophical observation is consciousness; there is no other; but in this nothing is to be neglected; every thing is important, for every thing is connected; and if one part be wanting, complete unity is unattainable. To return within our consciousness, and scrupulously to study all the phenomena, their differences and their relations,—this is the primary study of philosophy. Its scientific name is psychology. Psychology is then the condition and as it were the vestibule of philosophy. The psychological method consists in completely retiring within the world of consciousness, in order to become familiar in that sphere where all is reality, but where the reality is so various and so delicate; and the psychological talent consists in placing ourselves at will within this interior world, in presenting the spectacle there displayed to ourselves; and in reproducing freely and distinctly all the facts which are accidentally and confusedly brought to our notice by the circumstances of life. I repeat it, the experience of years has made known to me many different degrees of profoundness in the psychological method; but in the end, in whatever degree it be considered, it constitutes the fundamental unity of my Lectures and of all these Fragments. This is the primary point of view in which perhaps they still merit the attention of the friends of philosophy.

I am now called upon to give an account of the results to which I have been successively led by the more and more rigorous application of the method of psychology.

The year 1816 was wholly employed in trying my own strength and the philosophical method upon particular questions, in which I had the advantage of often falling upon the traces of M. Royer-Collard and of the Scottish philosophers,—excellent guides for the commencement of my career. We shall never forget,—either my friends or myself,—that laborious year of 1816, distinguished by our first efforts, in which the philosophical reform was definitively established in the Normal school, on a foundation which was not shaken with the destruction of the school itself. That year put us in possession of the method which still presides over our labors. As to its positive results, they scarcely went beyond the limits of the Scottish philosophy and have no claim upon the public attention. Those of the year 1817 are already a little more important.

As soon as we return within our consciousness, and, free from every systematic view, observe the diversified phenomena which are there exhibited, with the actual characteristics which distinguish them, we are at first struck with the presence of a multitude of phenomena which it is impossible to confound with those of sensibility. Sensation and the notions which it furnishes or with which it is combined indeed constitute an actual order of phenomena in our consciousness; but it also presents other facts no less incontestable which we may reduce to two great classes,

voluntary facts and rational facts. The will is not sensation; for the will often combats sensation; and it is even in this opposition that it is most signally manifested. Neither is the reason identical with sensation; for among the notions which reason furnishes, there are some, the characteristics of which are irreconcilable with those of the sensible phenomena, for example, the notions of cause, of substance, of time, of space, of unity, and the like. Let sensation be tortured, as much as you please, you will never draw from it the characteristics of universality and necessity by which these notions and many others are incontestably distinguished. The case is the same with regard to the notion of the Good and that of the Beautiful; and, consequently, art and morality are enfranchised from the origin and the limits which have been imposed upon them by the exclusive philosophy of sensation, and placed, together with metaphysics, in a superior and independent sphere. But this sphere itself, in all its sublimity, composes a portion of our consciousness, and hence falls within the reach of observation. Observation disengages it from the clouds in which it is usually enveloped, and gives to the phenomena which it comprises the same authority with the other phenomena of which consciousness is the theatre. The method of observation, accordingly, in the limits within which it is at first held by a wise circumspection, presents to us already many attractive prospects. These we must follow and enlarge.

The first duty of the psychological method is to retire within the field of consciousness, where there is nothing

but phenomena, that are all capable of being perceived and judged by observation. Now as no substantial existence falls under the eye of consciousness, it follows that the first effect of a rigid application of method is to postpone the subject of ontology. It postpones it, I say, but does not destroy it. It is a fact, indeed, attested by observation that in this same consciousness, in which there is nothing but phenomena, there are found notions, whose regular developement passes the limits of consciousness and attains the knowledge of actual existences. Would you stop the developement of these notions? You would then arbitrarily limit the compass of a fact, you would attack this fact itself, and thus shake the authority of all other facts. We must either call in question the authority of consciousness in itself; or admit this authority without reserve for all the facts attested by consciousness. The reason is no less certain and real than the will or the sensibility; its certainty once admitted, we must follow it wherever it rigorously conducts, though it be even into the depths of ontology. For example, it is a rational fact attested by consciousness, that in the view of intelligence, every phenomenon which is presented supposes a cause. It is a fact moreover that this principle of causality is marked with the characteristics of universality and necessity. If it be universal and necessary, to limit it would be to destroy it. Now in the phenomenon of sensation, the principle of causality intervenes universally and necessarily, and refers this phenomenon to a cause; and our consciousness testifying that this cause is not the personal cause which the will repre-

sents, it follows that the principle of causality in its irresistible application conducts to an impersonal cause, that is to say, to an external cause, which subsequently, and always irresistibly, the principle of causality enriches with the characteristics and laws, of which the aggregate is the Universe. Here then is an existence; but an existence revealed by a principle which is itself attested by consciousness. Here is a primary step in ontology, but by the path of psychology, that is to say, of observation. We are led by similar processes to the Cause of all causes, to the substantial Cause; to God, and not only to a God of Power, but to a God of Justice, a God of Holiness; so that this experimental method, which applied to a single order of phenomena, incomplete and exclusive, destroyed ontology and the higher elements of consciousness, applied with fidelity, firmness, and completeness, to all the phenomena, builds up that which it had overthrown, and by itself furnishes ontology with a sure and legitimate instrument. Thus, having commenced with modesty, we can end with results whose certainty is equalled by their importance.

I have scarcely indicated these results, but the reader will find them explained at large, with the methodical processes by which they are obtained and verified, in the Programme of my Lectures of the year 1817, which is inserted among these Fragments.

In the year 1818, our labors were continued in the same path, and began to assume a character of greater profoundness and extent. The facts of consciousness having been reduced the preceding year to three great

classes, namely, sensible facts, voluntary facts, and rational facts, the time had come for a more complete analysis of each of them, and of the relations by which they are united in the indivisible unity of consciousness. My attention was particularly directed to the voluntary facts and to the rational facts, because these had been the most neglected in the French philosophy.

Sensible facts are necessary. We do not impute them to ourselves. Rational facts are also necessary; and reason is no less independent of the will than sensibility. Voluntary facts alone are marked in the view of consciousness with the characteristics of personality and responsibility. The will alone is the person or the me. The me is the centre of the intellectual sphere. So long as the me does not exist, the conditions of the existence of all the other phenomena might be in force, but, without relation to the me, they would not be reflected in the consciousness and would be for it as though they were not. On the other hand, the will creates none of the rational and sensible phenomena; it even supposes them, since it does not apprehend itself, except in distinction from them. We do not find ourselves, except in a foreign world, between two orders of phenomena which do not pertain to us, which we do not even perceive, except on condition of separating ourselves from them. Still further, we do not perceive at all, except by a light which does not come from ourselves, for our personality is the will and nothing more; all light comes from reason; and it is reason which perceives both itself, and the sensibility which envelopes it, and the

will which it obliges, without constraining. The element of knowledge is rational by its essence; and consciousness, although composed of three integrant and inseparable elements, borrows its most immediate foundation from reason, without which no knowledge would be possible, and consequently no consciousness. Sensibility is the external condition of consciousness; the will is its centre; and reason its light. A profound and thorough analysis of reason is one of the most delicate undertakings of psychology.

Reason is impersonal in its nature. It is not we who make it. It is so far from being individual, that its peculiar characteristics are the opposite of individuality, namely, universality and necessity; since it is to reason, that we owe the knowledge of universal and necessary truths, of principles which we all obey, and which we cannot but obey. The existence of these principles is then a preliminary fact which it was essential to establish in the first place upon the most complete evidence. It is a triumph of the method of observation, to which it must have been indebted for an incontestable basis. Then comes the question with regard to the precise number of these regulating principles of reason, which, as far as we are concerned, are reason itself. After having established the existence of such principles, it is the business of method to attempt a complete enumeration and a rigorous classification of them. Plato, who following Pythagoras, built his philosophy on these principles, neglected to count them; it seems as if he shrunk from permitting a profane analysis to touch

those divine wings on which he soared into the world of ideas. The methodical Aristotle, faithful to his master, but still more faithful to analysis, after having changed ideas into categories, submitted them to a severe examination and did not hesitate to give a list of them. This list, so much despised by frivolous minds as an arid nomenclature, is the boldest and the most hazardous effort of method. Is the list of Aristotle complete? I believe that it is. It exhausts the subject. Let this be its immortal glory. But if the enumeration is complete, is there nothing to be desired in the classification and the arrangement of the categories? Here commences the defect of the list of Aristotle. In my opinion, its order is arbitrary and does not correspond to the progressive developement of intelligence. Besides, does not this list contain repetitions? Would it not be possible to reduce it? I have no doubt of it. Among modern systems, Cartesianism recognises necessary truths; but it makes no attempt at completeness and precision with regard to them. In the eighteenth century, in France, necessary truths were set aside as by the previous question; they did not even receive the honor of being submitted to examination; they were guilty of being found in the old system; they must be sacrificed to sensation, the only basis and standard of all possible truth. The Scottish school which restored them to honor, enumerated a part of them, but did not think of making a complete account. It was reserved for Kant to renew the undertaking of Aristotle, and the first among the moderns, to attempt to form a complete list of the laws of thought. Of these, Kant made an

exact and profound review; and his labor, in this respect, is superior even to that of Aristotle; but, in my opinion, similar charges can be brought against him; and a long and detailed examination may have demonstrated to those who attended my Course of 1818, that if the list of Kant is complete, it is arbitrary in its classification, and is susceptible of a legitimate reduction. If I have accomplished any thing useful in my teaching, it is perhaps on this point. I have at least renewed an important question; I have debated the two most celebrated solutions; and I have ventured to propose another which time and discussion have not yet shaken. In my opinion, all the laws of thought may be reduced to two, namely, the law of causality and that of substance. These are the two essential and fundamental laws, of which all others are only derivatives, developed in an order by no means arbitrary. I have demonstrated, as I think, that if we examine these two laws in the order of the nature of things, the first is that of substance and the second that of causality; while in the order of the acquisition of our ideas, the law of causality precedes that of substance, or rather both are given to us together, and are contemporary in our consciousness.

It is not sufficient to have enumerated, classed, and reduced to a system the laws of reason; we must prove that they are absolute, in order to prove that their consequences, whatever they may be, are also absolute. Here is the defect of the celebrated discussion of Kant respecting the Objective and Subjective in human knowledge. That great man, after seeing

so clearly all the laws which preside over thought, struck with the character of necessity which they bear, that is to say, our inability not to recognise and follow them, supposed that he saw in this very fact a bond of dependence and relativeness with respect to the me, the peculiar and distinctive characteristic of which he was far from having completely fathomed. Now as soon as the laws of reason are degraded to being nothing but laws relative to the human condition, their whole compass is circumscribed by the sphere of our personal nature; and their widest consequences, always marked with an indelible character of subjectivity, engender only irresistible persuasions, if you please, but no independent truths. This is the procedure, by which that incomparable analyst, after having so well described all the laws of thought, reduces them to impotence; and with all the conditions of certainty, arrives at an ontological skepticism, from which he finds no other asylum than the sublime inconsequence of allowing more objectivity to the laws of practical reason than to those of speculative reason. The whole endeavor of my Lectures of 1818, after a systematic catalogue of the laws of reason, was to free them from the character of subjectivity which seemed to be imposed upon them by that of necessity; to reinstate them in their independence; and to save philosophy from the rock on which it had been thrown the moment of reaching the port. Our public discussions, for several months, were devoted to showing that the laws of human reason are nothing less than the laws of reason in itself. More faithful than ever to the psychological method, instead of departing

from observation, I plunged into it more deeply; and it is by observation that in the recesses of consciousness, and at a depth to which Kant did not penetrate, under the apparent relativeness and subjectivity of the necessary principles of thought, I detected and unfolded the fact, instantaneous but real, of the spontaneous perception of truth,—a perception, which not reflecting itself immediately, passes without notice in the interior of consciousness, but is the actual basis of that which, at a subsequent period, in a logical form and in the hands of reflection, becomes a necessary conception. All subjectivity, with all that is of a reflective character, expires in the spontaneity of perception. But the spontaneous perception is so pure that it escapes our notice; it is the reflected light which strikes us, but often obscuring, by its false brightness, the purity of the primitive light. Reason, it is true, becomes subjective by its relation to the free and voluntary me, the seat and the type of all subjectivity; but in itself it is impersonal; it belongs to no one individual rather than another within the compass of humanity; it belongs not even to humanity itself; and its laws consequently depend only on themselves. They preside over and govern humanity which perceives them, as well as nature which represents them; but they belong neither to the one nor the other. It might even be said with greater truth that nature and humanity belong to them; since they have no beauty or truth but by their relation to intelligence, and since nature without the laws by which it is governed, and humanity without the principles which guide it, would soon be lost in the abyss of nothingness from which

they could never escape. The laws of intelligence therefore constitute a separate world, which governs the visible world, presides over its movements, sustains and preserves it, but does not depend upon it. This is the intelligible world, the sphere of *ideas*, distinct from and independent of their subjects, internal and external, which Plato had glimpses of, and which modern analysis and psychology still discover at the present day in the depths of consciousness.

The laws of thought having been demonstrated to be absolute, induction can make use of them without hesitation; and from absolute principles obtained by observation can legitimately conduct us to a point beyond the immediate sphere of observation itself. Now, among the laws of thought given by psychology, the two fundamental laws which contain all the others, the law of causality and the law of substance, irresistibly applied to themselves, elevate us immediately to their cause and their substance; and as they are absolute, they elevate us to an absolute cause and an absolute substance. But an absolute cause and an absolute substance are identical in essence; since every absolute cause must be substance in so far as it is absolute, and every absolute substance must be cause in order to be able to manifest itself. Besides, an absolute substance must be One, in order to be absolute; two absolutes are a contradiction; and the absolute substance must be One, or not at all. We may even say that all substance is absolute in so far as it is substance, and consequently One; for relative substances destroy the very idea of substance, and finite substances which suppose beyond

them another substance still to which they belong, bear a strong resemblance to phenomena. The Unity of substance, therefore, is involved in the very idea of substance, which is derived from the law of substance, an incontestable result of psychological observation; so that experience applied to consciousness, at a certain degree of profoundness, gives that which appears at first view to be the most opposed to it, namely, ontology. In fact, substantial causality is Being in itself; the rational laws, therefore, are laws of Being, and reason is the true existence. Thus, as analysis applied to consciousness at first separated reason from personality, so now on the elevated point to which we have been conducted by analysis, we perceive that reason and its laws, referred to substance, can be neither a modification nor an effect of the me, since they are the immediate effect of the manifestation of absolute substance. Ontology, therefore, returns to psychology the lights which it borrows from it; and we thus arrive at the identity of the two extremities of science.

Such is the analysis of reason. That of activity is not less important. Of all the active phenomena, the most striking undoubtedly is that of will. It is a fact, that in the midst of the movements which are carried on within us by external agents in spite of ourselves, we have the power of commencing a different movement, in the first place of conceiving it, then of deliberating whether we shall execute it, finally of resolving and proceeding to execution, of beginning it, of pursuing or suspending it, of accom-

plishing or retarding it, and at all times of controlling it. The fact is certain; and it is no less certain, that the movement accomplished on these conditions assumes a new character in our eyes; we impute it to ourselves, we refer it as an effect to ourselves, and in that case we consider ourselves as its cause. This is the origin of our notion of cause, not of an abstract cause, but of a personal cause, of ourselves. The peculiar characteristic of the me is causality, or will, since we refer to ourselves, we impute to ourselves, only what we cause, and we cause only what we will. To will, to cause, to exist for ourselves,—these are synonymous expressions of the same fact which comprises at once will, causality, and personality. The relation of the will and the person is not a simple relation of coexistence; it is a true relation of identity. To exist for ourselves is not one thing, and to will another, for in that case, there could be impersonal volitions, which is contrary to facts, or a personality, or self-conscious me without will, which is impossible; for to know myself as the me, is to distinguish myself from a not-me; now, we cannot distinguish ourselves from that but by separating ourselves from it, by leaving the impersonal movement and producing one which we impute to ourselves, that is to say, by exercising an act of volition. Will therefore is the essence of the person. The movements of sensibility, the desires, the passions, so far from constituting personality, destroy it. Personality and passion are essentially in an inverse relation, in an opposition to each other which constitutes life. As we can find the element of personality

only in the will, so also we can find the element of causality only in the same place. We must not confound the will or the internal causality which immediately produces effects, internal at first like their cause, with the external and actually passive instruments of this causality, which, as instruments, appear at first sight also to produce effects, but without being their primary cause, that is to say, their true cause. When I throw a ball against another, it is not the ball which actually causes the motion that it communicates, for this motion was communicated to it by the hand, by the muscles which, in our wonderful organization, are at the service of the will. Properly speaking, these actions are only effects connected with one another, alternately resembling causes, without containing a single real cause, and all traceable as effects, more or less distantly, to the will as their primary cause. If we seek the notion of cause in the action of one ball upon another, as was done previously to Hume; or in the action of the hand on the ball, and of the primary muscles of motion on their extremities, or even in the action of the will on the muscle, as was done by M. Maine de Biran; we shall find it in none of these cases, not even in the last, for it is possible that there should be a paralysis of the muscles which deprives the will of power over them, makes it unproductive, incapable of being a cause, and consequently of suggesting the notion of it. But what no paralysis can prevent, is the action of the will on itself, the production of a resolution, that is to say, an act of causation entirely mental, the primitive type of all causality, of which all external movements,

commencing with the muscular effort and ending with the action of one ball on another, are only symbols more or less imperfect. The first cause for us therefore is the will, of which the first effect is a volition. This is at once the highest and the purest source of the notion of cause, which thus becomes identical with that of personality. And it is the taking possession, so to speak, of the cause in the will and the personality which is the condition for us of the ulterior or simultaneous conception of external impersonal causes.

The phenomenon of will presents the following elements; 1. to decide upon an act to be performed; 2. to deliberate; 3. to resolve. Now if we look at it, it is reason which composes the first element entirely, and even the second; for it is reason also which deliberates, but it is not reason which resolves and determines. Now reason, which is thus combined with will, is combined in a reflective form; to conceive an end, to deliberate, involves the idea of reflection. Reflection is therefore the condition of every voluntary act, if every voluntary act supposes a predetermination of its object and a process of deliberation. Now to act voluntarily, is, as we have seen, to act in this manner; and it is because the will is in fact reflective, that it presents such a striking phenomenon. But can a reflective operation be a primitive operation? To will is,—with the consciousness that we can resolve and act,—to deliberate whether we shall resolve, whether we shall act in such or such a manner, and to decide in favor of one or the other. The result of this choice, of this decision preceded by deliberation

and predetermination, is volition, the immediate effect of personal activity; but in order to resolve and to act in this manner, it was necessary to know that we could resolve and act, it was necessary that we should have previously resolved and acted in a different manner, without deliberation or predetermination, that is to say, without reflection. The operation previous to reflection is spontaneity. It is a fact that even now we often act without having deliberated, and that rational perception spontaneously making known to us the act to be performed, the personal activity also spontaneously enters into operation and resolves at once, not by a foreign impulse, but by a kind of immediate inspiration, prior to reflection and often superior to it. The *Qu'il mourût!* of the old Horatius, the *à moi, Auvergne!* of the brave d'Assas, are not blind impulses and in consequence destitute of morality; but neither is it from reasoning or reflection that they are borrowed by heroism. The phenomenon of spontaneous activity therefore is no less real than that of voluntary activity. Only, as every thing which is reflective is completely determined, and for that reason distinct, the phenomenon of voluntary and reflective activity is more clear than that of spontaneous activity, which is less determined and more obscure. Moreover, the characteristic of every voluntary act is the power of repeating itself at will, the power of being summoned, so to speak, before the tribunal of consciousness, which examines and describes it at its leisure; while on the other hand, as it is the characteristic of a spontaneous act that it is not voluntary, the spontaneous act is not repeated at will and when it

takes place is either unperceived or irrevocable, and cannot be afterwards summoned back but on condition of being reflective, that is to say, of being destroyed, as a spontaneous fact. Spontaneity is therefore necessarily subjected to that obscurity which surrounds every thing which is primitive and instantaneous.

With all our seeking, we can discover no other modes of action. Reflection and spontaneity comprise all the real forms of activity.

Reflection as a principle and as a fact supposes and follows spontaneity; but as there can be nothing in the Reflective which is not in the Spontaneous, all that we have said of the one will apply to the other; and although spontaneity is not accompanied either with predetermination or deliberation, it is no less than will a real power of action and consequently a productive cause, and consequently again, a personal cause. Spontaneity then contains all that is contained by the will; and it contains it previously to that, in a less determined, but a purer form; and hence we arrive at the immediate source of causality and of the me. The me already exists with the productive power which characterizes it in the flashing forth of spontaneity; and it is in this instantaneous flashing forth that it instantaneously apprehends itself. We might say that it discovers itself in spontaneity, and establishes itself in reflection. The me, says Fichte, supposes itself in a voluntary determination. This point of view is that of reflection. In order for the me to suppose itself, as Fichte says, it is necessary that it should clearly distinguish itself from the not-me. To distinguish is to deny; to distinguish one thing from

another, is to affirm again, but by denying; it is to affirm, after having denied. Now it is not true that the intellectual life commences with a negation; and before reflection and the fact to the description of which Fichte has for ever attached his name, there is another operation, in which the me finds itself without seeking, supposes itself, if you please, but without having wished to suppose itself, by the sole virtue, the peculiar energy of the activity, which it recognises, as it manifests it, but without having previously known it; for the activity is revealed to itself only by its acts, and the first act must have been the effect of a power which has hitherto been ignorant of itself.

What then is this power which is revealed only by its acts, which finds and perceives itself in spontaneity, and again finds and reflects upon itself in will?

Whether spontaneous or voluntary, all personal acts have this characteristic in common, that they can be referred immediately to a cause which has its point of departure altogether in itself, that is to say, that they are free; such is the proper notion of liberty. Liberty cannot be confined to the will, for in that case, spontaneity would not be free; and on the other hand, liberty cannot consist merely in spontaneity, for then the will in its turn would not be free. If therefore the two phenomena are equally free, they can be so only on the condition, that we discard from the notion of liberty every thing which belongs exclusively either to one or the other of the two phenomena, and that we allow to it only what is common to both. Now, what circumstance is common to both, except that they have their point of departure in

themselves, and that they can be referred immediately to a cause, which is their proper cause, and which acts only by its own energy? Liberty being the common characteristic of spontaneity and of will, comprises both these phenomena in itself; it ought to possess and it consequently does possess something more general than either, and which constitutes their identity. This is the only theory of liberty that agrees with the different facts which are announced as free by the consciousness of the human race, and which in their diversities have occasioned theories in contradiction with each other, because they have been constructed exclusively for a specific order of phenomena. Thus, for example, the theory which concentrates liberty in the will must needs admit no other than reflective liberty, preceded by a predetermination, accompanied with a process of deliberation, and marked with characteristics which greatly reduce the number of free acts, which take away liberty from every thing which is not reflective, from the enthusiasm of the poet and artist in the moment of creation, from the ignorance which reflects but little and scarcely acts otherwise than spontaneously, that is to say, from three quarters of the human race. Because the expression free-will implies the idea of choice, of comparison, and of reflection, these conditions have been imposed on liberty, of which free-will is only one form; free-will is free-volition, that is to say, volition; but will is so far from being adequate to the extent of liberty, that even language adds to it the epithet free, thus referring it to something still more general than itself. We may assert the same of spon-

taneity. Disengaged from the accompaniment more or less tardy of reflection, of comparison, and of deliberation, spontaneity manifests liberty in a purer form, but it is only one form of liberty and not liberty entire; the fundamental idea of liberty is that of a power which, under whatever form it act, acts only by an energy peculiar to itself.[1]

If liberty is distinct from free phenomena,—as the characteristic of every phenomenon is to be more or less determined, but always to be so in some degree,—it follows that the peculiar characteristic of liberty in its contrast with free phenomena, is indetermination. Liberty therefore is not a form of activity, but activity in itself, the indetermined activity, which, precisely on that account, determines itself in one form or another. Hence it follows, once more, that the me or the personal activity, spontaneous or reflective, represents only the determined form of activity, but not its essence. Liberty is the ideal of the me; the me must needs constantly tend to it, without ever arriving at it; it participates in it, but is not identical with it. The me is liberty in action, not liberty in power; it is a cause, but a cause phenomenal and not substantial, relative and not absolute. The absolute me of Fichte is a contradiction. The very terms imply that nothing absolute and substantial is to be found in what is determined, that is to say, phenomenal. In respect to activity, substance then cannot be found but beyond and above all phenomenal activity, in power not yet passed into action, in the indetermined essence which is capable of self-determination, in liberty dis-

[1] See Note L.

engaged from its forms, which limit while they determine it. We are thus arrived then in the analysis of the me, by the way of psychology still, at a new aspect of ontology, at a substantial activity, anterior and superior to all phenomenal activity, which produces all the phenomena of activity, survives them all and renews them all, immortal and inexhaustible in the destruction of its temporary manifestations. And it is a remarkable fact, again, that this absolute activity, in its developement, assumes two forms parallel with those of reason, namely, spontaneity and reflection. These two elements are found in one sphere as well as the other, and the principle of both is always a substantial causality. Activity and reason, liberty and intelligence are therefore intimately combined with each other in the unity of substance.

The last phenomenon of consciousness which we have not yet analyzed, sensation, would require similar developements, but the time does not admit of them. I must content myself with a few words which thinkers will comprehend, and which will serve at least as a touch-stone for my future labors on the philosophy of nature.

Sensation is a phenomenon of consciousness no less incontestable than either of the others; now if this phenomenon is real, as no phenomenon is sufficient to itself, reason which acts under the law of causality and of substance compels us to refer the phenomenon of sensation to an existing cause; and as this cause is evidently not the me, it is necessary that reason should refer sensation to another cause, for the action

of reason is irresistible; it refers it therefore to a cause foreign to the me, placed beyond the influence of the me, that is to say, to an external cause; this is our notion of the outward world as opposed to the inward world which the me constitutes and fills, our notion of an external object as opposed to the subject which is personality itself, our notion of passivity as opposed to liberty. But let us not be deceived by the expression passivity; for the me is not passive and cannot be so, since it consists in free activity; neither is the object any more passive, since it is made known to us only in the character of cause, of active force. Passivity therefore is nothing but a relation between two forces which act on each other. Vary and multiply the phenomenon of sensation, reason always and necessarily refers it to a cause which it successively charges, in proportion to the extent of experience, not with the internal modification of the subject, but with the objective qualities capable of producing them, that is to say, it developes the notion of cause, but without departing from it, for qualities are always causes and can be known only as such. The external world therefore is nothing but an assemblage of causes corresponding to our real or possible sensations; the relation of these causes with each other is the order of the world. The world accordingly is of the same stuff with ourselves, and nature is the sister of man; it is active, living, animated like him; and its history is a drama no less than our own.

Besides, as the developement of the personal or human force takes place in consciousness, in some sort, under the auspices of reason, which we recognise as

our law even when we violate it; so the external forces are necessarily conceived of as submitted to laws in their developement, or to speak more correctly, the laws of external forces are nothing but their mode of developement, the constancy of which forms what we call regularity. Force in nature is distinct from its law, as personality in us is distinct from reason; distinct, I say, and not separate; for all force carries its law with it and manifests it in its action and by its action. Now, all law supposes a reason, and the laws of the world are nothing but reason as manifested in the world. Here then is a new relation of man with nature. Nature, like humanity, is composed of laws and of forces, of reason and of activity; and in this point of view, the two worlds are again brought closely together.

Is there nothing further? As we have reduced the laws of reason and the modes of free force to two, could we not also attempt a reduction of the forces of nature and of their laws? Could we not reduce all the regular modes of the action of nature to two, which in their relation with the spontaneous and the reflective action of the me and of reason, would exhibit a still more intimate harmony than that which we have just indicated between the internal and the external world? It will be perceived that I here allude to expansion and concentration; but so long as methodical labors shall not have converted these conjectures into certainty, I will hope and be silent; I will content myself with remarking that the philosophical considerations which reduce the notion of the external world to that of force have already gained currency, and se-

cretly preside over modern Physics. What physical inquirer, since Euler, seeks any thing in nature but forces and laws? Who now speaks of atoms? And even molecules, the old atoms revived,—who defends them as any thing but an hypothesis? If the fact be incontestable, if modern Physics be now employed only with forces and laws, I draw the rigorous conclusion from it, that the science of Physics, whether it know it or not, is no longer material, and that it became spiritual when it rejected every other method than observation and induction which can never lead to aught but forces and laws. Now what is there material in forces and laws? The physical sciences then themselves have entered into the broad path of an enlightened Spiritualism; and they have only to march with a firm step, and to gain a more and more profound knowledge of forces and laws, in order to arrive at more important generalizations. Let us go still further. As it is a law already recognised of the same reason which governs humanity and nature, to refer every finite cause and every multiple law, that is to say, every phenomenal cause and every phenomenal law, to something absolute which leaves nothing to be sought beyond it in relation to existence, that is to say, to a substance; so this law refers the external world composed of forces and laws to a substance, which must needs be a cause in order to be the subject of the causes of this world, which must needs be an intelligence in order to be the subject of its laws, a substance, in fine, which must needs be the identity of activity and intelligence. We are thus arrived accordingly, for the second time, by observation and in-

duction in the external sphere, at precisely the same point to which observation and induction have successively conducted us in the sphere of personality and in that of reason; consciousness in its triplicity, is therefore one; the physical and moral world is one, science is one, that is to say, in other words, God is One.

Let us sum up these ideas, and at the same time more fully unfold them.

In returning within our consciousness, we have seen that the relation of reason, of activity, and of sensation is so intimate, that one of these elements being given, the other two immediately come into exercise, and that this element is the free activity. Without the free activity or the me, consciousness does not exist, that is to say, the other two phenomena, whether they take place or not, are as if they were not, for the me which does not yet exist. Now the me does not exist for itself, does not and cannot perceive itself, but by distinguishing itself from sensation, which by that act is perceived, and which thus takes its place in consciousness. But as the me cannot perceive itself, nor perceive sensation except by perceiving, that is to say, by the intervention of reason, the necessary principle of all perception, of all knowledge, it follows that the exercise of reason is contemporary with the exercise of personal activity and with sensible impressions. The triplicity of consciousness, the elements of which are distinct and irreducible one to the other, is then resolved into a single fact, as the unity of consciousness exists only on condition of that triplicity.

Moreover, if the three elementary phenomena of consciousness are contemporary, if reason immediately illumines the activity which then distinguishes itself from sensation; as reason is only the action of the two great laws of causality and of substance, it is necessary that reason should immediately refer the action to an internal cause and substance, namely, the me, and sensation, to an external cause and substance, the not-me; but as it cannot rest in them as causes truly substantial, both because their contingent and phenomenal character takes from them every claim to being absolute and substantial, and because as they are two, they limit each other and thus exclude each other from the rank of substance, it is necessary that reason should refer them to a single substantial cause, beyond which there is nothing to be sought in relation to existence, that is to say, in respect of cause and substance, for existence is the identity of both. The substantial and causative existence, therefore, with the two finite causes or substances in which it developes itself, is made known at the same time with these two causes, with the differences which separate them, and the bond of nature which connects them, that is to say, ontology is given to us at the same time in its completeness, and even at the same time with psychology. Thus, in the first fact of consciousness, the psychological unity in its triplicity is found, so to speak, face to face with the ontological unity in its parallel triplicity. The fact of consciousness which comprehends three internal elements reveals to us also three external elements. Every fact of consciousness is psychological and onto-

logical at once, and contains already the three great ideas which science afterwards divides or brings together, but which it cannot go beyond, namely, man, nature, and God. But man, nature, and God as revealed by consciousness are not vain formulas, but facts and realities. Man is not in the consciousness without nature, nor nature without man, but both meet together in their opposition and their reciprocity, as causes, and as relative causes, the nature of which is always to develope themselves, and always by each other. The God of consciousness is not an abstract God, a solitary monarch exiled beyond the limits of creation on the desert throne of a silent Eternity and of an absolute existence which resembles even the negation of existence. He is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only in so far as he is cause, and cause only in so far as he is substance, that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end and centre, at the summit of Being and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together, triple, in a word, that is to say, at the same time God, nature, and humanity. In fact, if God be not every thing, he is nothing; if he be absolutely indivisible in himself, he is inaccessible; and consequently he is incomprehensible, and his incomprehensibility is for us the same as his destruction. Incomprehensible as a formula and in the school, God is clearly visible in the world which manifests him, for the soul which feels and possesses him. Every where present he returns, as it were, to him-

self in the consciousness of man, of which he indirectly constitutes the mechanism and the phenomenal triplicity by the reflection of his own nature and of the substantial triplicity of which he is the absolute identity.[1]

Having gained these heights, philosophy becomes more luminous as well as more grand; universal harmony enters into human thought, enlarges it, and gives it peace. The divorce of ontology and psychology, of speculation and observation, of science and common sense, is brought to an end by a method which arrives at speculation by observation, at ontology by psychology, in order then to confirm observation by speculation, psychology by ontology, and which starting from the immediate facts of consciousness, of which the common sense of the human race is composed, derives from them the science which contains nothing more than common sense, but which elevates it to its purest and most rigid form, and enables it to comprehend itself. But I here approach a fundamental point.

If every fact of consciousness contains all the human faculties, sensibility, free activity, and reason, the me, the not-me, and their absolute identity; and if every fact of consciousness be equal to itself, it follows that every man who has the consciousness of himself possesses and cannot but possess all the ideas that are necessarily contained in consciousness. Thus every man, if he knows himself, knows all the rest, nature and God at the same time with himself. Every man believes in his own existence, every man therefore

[1] See Note M.

believes in the existence of the world and of God; every man thinks, every man therefore thinks God, if we may so express it; every human proposition, reflecting the consciousness, reflects the idea of Unity and of Being that is essential to consciousness; every human proposition therefore contains God; every man who speaks, speaks of God, and every word is an act of faith and a hymn. Atheism is a barren formula, a negation without reality, an abstraction of the mind which cannot assert itself without self-destruction; for every assertion, even though negative, is a judgment which contains the idea of being, and, consequently, God in his fulness. Atheism is the illusion of a few sophists, who place their liberty in opposition to their reason, and are unable even to give an account to themselves of what they think; but the human race which is never false to its consciousness and never places itself in contradiction to its laws, possesses the knowledge of God, believes in him, and never ceases to proclaim him.[1] In fact, the human race believes in reason and cannot but believe in it, in that reason which is manifested in consciousness, in a momentary relation with the me,—the pure though faint reflection of that primitive light which flows from the bosom of the eternal substance, which is at once Substance, Cause, Intelligence. Without the manifestation of reason in our consciousness, there could be no knowledge,—neither psychological, nor still less, ontological. Reason is, in some sort, the bridge between psychology and ontology, between conscious-

[1] See Note N.

ness and being; it rests at the same time on both; it descends from God and approaches man; it makes its appearance in the consciousness, as a guest who brings intelligence of an unknown world, of which it at once presents the idea and awakens the want. If reason were personal, it would have no value, no authority, beyond the limits of the individual subject. If it remained in the condition of primitive substance, without manifestation, it would be the same for the me which would not know itself, as if it were not. It is necessary therefore that the intelligent substance should manifest itself; and this manifestation is the appearance of reason in the consciousness. Reason then is literally a revelation, a necessary and universal revelation, which is wanting to no man and which enlightens every man on his coming into the world: *illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.* Reason is the necessary mediator between God and man, the λόγος of Pythagoras and Plato, the Word made flesh which serves as the interpreter of God and the teacher of man, divine and human at the same time. It is not, indeed, the Absolute God in his majestic individuality, but his manifestation in spirit and in truth; it is not the Being of beings, but it is the revealed God of the human race. As God is never wanting to the human race and never abandons it, so the human race believes in God with an irresistible and unalterable faith, and this unity of faith is its own highest unity.

If these convictions of faith be combined in every act of consciousness, and if consciousness be one in the whole human race, whence arises the prodigious

diversity which seems to exist between man and man, and in what does this diversity consist? In truth, when we appear to perceive at first view so many differences between one individual and another, one country and another, one epoch of humanity and another, we feel a profound emotion of melancholy; and are tempted to regard an intellectual developement so capricious, and even the whole of humanity, as a phenomenon without consistency, without grandeur, and without interest. But it is demonstrated by a more attentive observation of facts that no man is a stranger to either of the three great ideas which constitute consciousness, namely, personality or the liberty of man, impersonality or the necessity of nature, and the Providence of God. Every man comprehends these three ideas immediately, because he found them at first and constantly finds them again within himself. The exceptions to this fact, by their small number, by the absurdities which they involve, by the difficulties which they create, serve only to exhibit, in a still clearer light, the universality of faith in the human race, the treasure of good sense deposited in truth, and the peace and happiness that there are for a human soul in not discarding the convictions of its kind. Leave out the exceptions which appear from time to time in certain critical periods of history, and you will perceive that the masses which alone have true existence, always and every where live in the same faith, of which the forms only vary. But the masses do not possess the secret of their convictions. Truth is not science. Truth is for all; science for few. All truth exists in the human race; but the human race is not

made up of philosophers. In fact, philosophy is the aristocracy of the human species. Its glory and its strength, like that of all true aristocracy, is not to separate itself from the people, but to sympathize and identify itself with them, to labor for them, while it places its foundation in their hearts. Philosophical science is the rigorous account which reflection renders to itself of the ideas which it has not created. We have already shown, that reflection supposes a previous operation to which it applies itself, since reflection is merely a return upon what has gone before.

If there had been no prior operation, there could have been no voluntary repetition of this operation, that is to say, no reflection; for reflection is nothing else; it does not produce; it verifies and developes. There is therefore actually nothing more in reflection than in the operation which precedes it, than in spontaneity; only reflection is a degree of intelligence, rarer and more elevated than spontaneity, and with the condition, moreover, that it faithfully represent it, and develope without destroying it. Now, in my opinion, humanity as a mass is spontaneous and not reflective; humanity is inspired. The divine breath which is in it, always and every where reveals to it all truths under one form or another, according to the place and the time. The soul of humanity is a poetical soul which discovers in itself the secrets of beings; and gives utterance to them in prophetic chants which ring from age to age. At the side of humanity is philosophy, which listens with attention, gathers up its words, registers them, if we may so speak; and when the moment of inspiration has passed

away, presents them with reverence to the admirable artist who had no consciousness of his genius, and who often does not recognise his own work. Spontaneity is the genius of human nature; reflection is the genius of a few individuals. The difference between reflection and spontaneity is the only difference possible in the identity of intelligence. I have proved, as I flatter myself, that this is the only real difference in the forms of reason, in those of activity, perhaps even in those of life; in history also, it is the only difference which separates a man from his fellow-men. Hence it follows that we are all penetrated with the same spirit, are all of the same family, children of the same Father, and that the brotherhood of man admits of no differences but such as are essential to individuality. Considered in this aspect, the differences of individuals exhibit something noble and interesting, because they testify to the independence of each of us and separate man from nature. We are men and not stars; we have movements that are peculiar to ourselves; but all our movements, however irregular in appearance, are accomplished within the circle of our nature, the two extremities of which are points essentially similar. Spontaneity is the point of departure; reflection the point of return; the entire circumference is the intellectual life; the centre is the Absolute Intelligence which governs and explains the whole. These principles possess an inexhaustible fruitfulness. Go from human nature to external nature, you will there find spontaneity under the form of expansion; reflection, under that of concentration. Extend your view to universal existence; external

nature there performs the part of spontaneity, humanity, that of reflection. In fine, in the history of the human species, the Oriental world represents that first movement, the vigorous spontaneity of which has furnished the race with an indestructible basis; and the Pagan world, and still more the Christian, represents reflection which gradually developes itself, combines with spontaneity, decomposes and recomposes it with the liberty which is its essence, while the spirit of the world hovers over all its forms and remains at the centre; but under all its forms, in every world, at all degrees of existence, physical, intellectual, or historical, the same integrant elements are discovered in their variety and their harmony.

Such is the character of the system, in which, at the end of the year 1818, all the labor of the preceding years terminated; a system undoubtedly very imperfect, and which has since been enlarged and modified in my mind. But I should still defend the essential elements of this system, which at least had the advantage, in spite of its defects, at the epoch when it was conceived and set forth, of realizing in part the dominant idea of my whole life, that of reconstructing the eternal convictions of man in harmony with the spirit of the age, and of thus arriving at unity, but by the path of the experimental method. This is the point of view in which it should be examined and judged.

This system was at the foundation of my teaching in the year 1818; and it is to this, that all the Fragments of which the present volume is composed, directly or indirectly relate; it forms their unity, and

may serve as a clew in the midst of articles on different subjects and with different dates. This is the limit of my researches so far as the year 1819; and the foundation of all the dogmatic and historical developements of my teaching for the succeeding years. If we look at it, we find that the system which has thus been rapidly described is nothing but an impartial Eclecticism applied to the facts of consciousness. It was also applied from that time to the different doctrines which compose the history of philosophy, and numerous traces of this will be found in these Fragments; but it has since assumed both in my own mind and in my labors an importance of which it is impossible here to present the slightest idea. I will only say that since 1819, my dogmatic and systematic point of view being somewhat confirmed and elevated, I quitted speculation for a considerable time, or rather I pursued and realized it, by applying it more directly than I had yet done to the history of philosophy. Always faithful to the psychological method, I introduced it into history, and confronting different systems with the facts of consciousness, demanding of each a complete representation of consciousness without being able to obtain it, I soon arrived at the result which my subsequent studies have so fully developed, namely; that every system represents an order of phenomena and of ideas, which is perfectly real and true, but which is not the only one in consciousness, although in the system it holds an almost exclusive rank; whence it follows that the individual systems are not false but incomplete; whence it follows again that by combining the various incomplete systems, we should have a

complete philosophy, corresponding to the totality of consciousness. From this, to a true historical system, universal and precise, at once, the interval is undoubtedly great; but the first step has been taken; the path is open. I shall undertake to complete the work; I shall undertake, in spite of every obstacle, to pursue the reform of philosophical studies in France, in illustrating the history of philosophy by a system, and in demonstrating this system by the whole history of philosophy. With this object is connected the series of my historical publications, the whole scope of which my friends only can comprehend; and in pursuance of this plan, my teaching in the years 1819 and 1820, entered upon the history of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, in France, in England, and in Germany. I may, perhaps, publish those Lectures; but my previous Lectures from 1815 to 1818, will never see the light. They are studies which I have made before the public, and which I trust will not have been without use in restoring a taste for philosophical subjects among my countrymen, and in communicating a salutary direction to the pupils of the Normal School, and to the young men who attended my Courses in the Faculty of Literature. But I condemn them myself to oblivion; they are too far behind the point at which we have all now arrived. I should even have to ask pardon for these Fragments which relate to those Lectures and which certainly are inferior to them, if they had not been already printed, and their republication were not their final burial. I have thought, moreover, that without possessing sufficient generality to enter into the wants of the moment and the discussions

which the quarrels of parties have made the order of the day, they might be useful in recalling the attention to psychological details, arid without doubt, and destitute of all apparent grandeur, but which should never be lost sight of, since they are the legitimate point of departure for all the developements which can be received by philosophy. I have also thought that at a time when the parties of industry and of theocracy were both endeavoring to seduce the mind from the broad and impartial paths of science, it was almost a duty for me to raise an independent flag, which is perhaps not forgotten, and to remind the friends of truth of the only philosophical method which, in my opinion, can conduct to it; that method of observation and induction, which has raised all the physical sciences so high and has carried them so far; which gives a movement to thought, at once vast and regular; which rests only on human nature, but which embraces the whole of human nature and with it attains the Infinite; which imposes no system on reality, but undertakes to demonstrate that reality, if it be entire, is itself a system, a system complete and living, in the consciousness and beyond the consciousness, in the Universe and in history; that method, which proposing to itself no other task than that of comprehending things as they are, accepts, explains, and respects every thing, and destroys nothing but the artificial arrangements of exclusive hypotheses; that severe method, whose circumspect character conceals and justifies boldness, and beyond which all the movements of the mind are merely struggles without fruit for itself or for others, for science, for the country, or for the future.

Finally, I have wished to take a formal leave of three years of my life which are endeared to me by the remembrance of the obscure and painful labors with which they were filled; I here salute them for the last time and bid them a final adieu. It is from 1819 that my future publications will henceforth be dated.

IV.

THE MORAL LAW AND LIBERTY.

The moral law can command only a free will. The moral world is that of liberty. Wherever there is a free determination, a voluntary and deliberate act, there is the spiritual world. Now we live, we subsist, only by continual acts of liberty and will. The spiritual world therefore is already present to us upon the earth. We live, in some sort, on the confines of two separate kingdoms, of which we form the mysterious union. We need not pierce the shadows of the tomb, in order to penetrate into Heaven. Heaven already exists in the heart of the free man; *et cœlum et virtus*, says Lucan. I am a citizen of the invisible empire of free and active intelligences. But what is the determination of my will which reveals this invisible world to my eyes? Demand it of conscience. Observe when you do your duty, and Heaven will appear to you at the bottom of your heart. It is not by reasonings that we acquire a conviction of the spiritual world; it is by a free act of virtue, which is always followed by an act of faith in moral beauty, and by an internal view of God and of Heaven.

I am acted upon by the sensible world, and the impression which I receive is an occasion for the exercise of my will. My will in its turn determines a change in the sensible world. This is the ordinary course of

human life, in which the will is manifested only in consequence of sensible movements, and by means of sensible movements. But do more than this. Retain your will within itself; let it act without any external manifestation; let its free determinations not depart from the inward sanctuary; do not seek to mark your volition by sensible effects; and you will then be wholly enfranchised from the material world; your life becomes completely spiritual; you have ascended to the source of true activity; you have gained possession of the Holy, the Pure, the Divine; you have an internal view of the divine life which is revealed in your own. To place ourselves beyond the conditions of sense; to will, without regard to the consequences of our will; to will, independently of every antecedent and of every consequent; to rest our determinations upon themselves; this is true liberty, the commencement of Eternity. We may speak of liberty, of holiness, of purity; but we merely put words together, unless we are enfranchised in our own souls. It is the doctrine of Christianity, that we can enjoy the true sense of eternal life, only when we renounce the world and its aims. Then, faith in the Eternal enters into the heart. In fine, according to the images of Christian truth, we must lay down our lives, and be born again, before we can see the kingdom of Heaven.

Philosophy is nothing but the view of the soul, in its broadest generalization. If the will is confined to the sensible world, how can we believe in holiness and in another life? We shall regard Eternity as a fable, or our faith in it will be merely a prejudice. We must

reform our lives, in order to reform philosophy. The light of the intellect is but darkness without the light of virtue. Could but the soul of the last Brutus, could the soul of Saint Louis have related their inward history, what a noble moral psychology should we have had !

The Infinite and Eternal Will is revealed to us in our conscience, in that supreme law, " Will what is good;" and the human individual will unites with the Infinite Will, in freely obeying its voice. This is the great mystery of Eternity discovering itself to Humanity, and of Humanity freely clothing itself with Eternity. The whole man is included in this mystery; morality therefore is the source of all truth; and the true light resides in the depths of the free and voluntary activity.

Here is an incontestable fact of consciousness, and one, which at the same time is simple, and incapable of being decomposed.

" Do what is good, without regard to consequences; that is to say, will what is good."

Since this command has no visible, material, terrestrial object, applicable to the wants of this life and of this sensible world, it follows, either that it has no object, no end, or there is an invisible object, an invisible end, and it has reference to a world different from our own, where the external movements which result from our volitions are not taken into account, where our volitions themselves are every thing.

If there be no invisible world, where all our holy volitions are regarded, what is the end of virtue on this earth ? What good purpose does it serve ? Is it

necessary to the mechanism of the Universe? Is the civilization of the globe its object? Or the amelioration of human destiny in point of local and physical advantages? Or the peace of the world? Or the greatest moral developement of the human race, as the condition of its greatest perfection in general, and of its greatest happiness?

For all these objects, there would be no need of virtue. The Deity might have constructed machines without liberty; and he would then have had a sufficiently delightful spectacle, if he had wished only for the spectacle of happiness. But, it may be said, he wished for the production of it by ourselves. This will never take place. Universal happiness on earth is a chimera. Besides, the Deity, in order to accomplish this object, might have dispensed with giving to us the moral law and conscience; selfishness would have been enough. Observe that in the sensible world it matters little why a fact takes place, provided it does take place. Enlighten my selfishness still more, or increase the power of my natural sympathy, I should do as much or perhaps more good to others than by the single sentiment of duty.

We should always bear in mind the following principles.

1. The consequences of an action, whatever they may be, do not render it either morally good or bad; the intention is every thing. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a moral action; nothing but moral intentions.

2. An intention cannot be morally good, unless it be disinterested.

3. All intentions are regarded as interested, where there is a personal reference. Thus, to do any thing for the sake of honor, of glory, of applause, of pleasure, whether sensual or intellectual, whether external or internal; for the sake of hearing it said that we are generous, or of being able to say so to ourselves; for the sake of rewards, whether on earth or in Heaven,—all this is equally foreign to the sphere of morality.

4. Those actions which proceed from the influence of organization, are regarded as indifferent. Thus, the man, who led away by an irresistible impulse of pity and sympathy, hazards his life for the safety of another, is not yet a moral being.

5. He is regarded as a moral being, who, after having weighed an action and found it just, performs it only because he believes that he OUGHT to perform it, for the single motive that it is JUST.

V.

ON THE IDEA OF CAUSE AND OF THE INFINITE.

The basis of induction must always be laid in a close analogy. We should never conceive of external voluntary causes, if we were not conscious of an internal voluntary cause. We could not rise on this earth to the idea of another life, altogether spiritual, if we did not find an image of it in the interior life of the will, in the world of free determinations and of virtuous intentions, into which nothing sensual or terrestrial can penetrate. Take away this fact which is given by human experience, and the divine life is not only incomprehensible, it is inconceivable; induction does not reach it, and man would never have had the slightest idea of it. Descartes said, Give me matter and motion, and I will create the world. I may freely say, Give me consciousness and induction, I will create our first and last cognitions, the Subjective and the Objective, perception and belief. Our faith in a future life depends on the perception of a virtuous life by means of consciousness.

All the ideas which we can form of creation are borrowed, in the last analysis, from the consciousness of our personal causality. Now in causation, there is the creation of an interior determination, or of an external movement, that is to say, of a phenomenal existence. Proceeding from that what can authorize

us to conceive legitimately of the creation of substance?

There are two kinds of memory; the one, the result of sensation, the other, of will. Condillac saw only, in memory, the accidental return of the same image; but he did not speak of the voluntary power of recalling it, or of the knowledge of the past, or of the identity of the subject, which recalls what it has done and willed. Passive memory is to voluntary memory what sight is to touch.

It is asked, whether we commence with sensation or thought. I answer, with both at once. We do not find at first the external world alone; this would be a contradiction. A not-me, without a me, at least as a spectator, is absurd. Neither do we find the me alone; but we find it always in union with something foreign, which limits and at the same time determines it. We do not go from the circumference to the centre, nor from the centre to the circumference; the complete circle is presented to us in ourselves.

Experience and the senses are the teachers of Materialism; this world speaks only of dissolution, of death; the soul alone speaks of immortality.

The possibility of the idea of the Infinite and the Eternal proceeds from the infinite and eternal nature of the soul.

All our negative ideas are secondary and logical. Our primary ideas are positive and absolute. The Yes before the No.

The idea of time would be in contradiction with itself, if we supposed it derived from the notion of succession.

All succession is a limited duration; time has no limit. Multiply together all the separate portions of time; you do not thus obtain time in itself. A sum of moments, however considerable it may be, no more composes eternity, than the most considerable sum of ciphers composes a number. Succession measures time, it does not constitute it.

The past and the future are two relations in Eternity, which is a continual present.

VI.

RELIGION, MYSTICISM, STOICISM.

Life is only the consciousness of the me in its relation with the not-me or external nature. The not-me is indefinite, that is to say, the Finite multiplied by itself; the me is individual, that is to say, the Finite returning upon itself. It is in vain for the me to extend itself into the not-me, to resist it, even to conquer it, it does not pass the limits of the Finite; the scenes of life, whether more or less interesting, do not reach beyond the narrow theatre of the visible world.

The Visible is the Finite, the Invisible is the Infinite. We apprehend the Visible by the senses and by consciousness; the Invisible, which is eternally concealed from all direct apprehension, is revealed to humanity by the reason.

Reason is the faculty, not of perceiving, but of conceiving the Infinite.

By what means is the Infinite revealed to reason? By its idea.

And what are the forms in which the idea of the Infinite is presented to human reason?

The forms of the True, the Beautiful, the Good. The True, the Beautiful, the Good,—these are the three connecting links between man and the Infinite.

That man by himself cannot attain to the Infinite,

that the sphere of his consciousness and his sensibility terminates with the limits of the Variable and the Finite, that a mediator is necessary to unite this phenomenon of a day with the eternal and substantial existence; this is what we cannot doubt. Hence the necessity of a middle term between God and man; hence again the necessity that it should be God who manifests himself to man, and that the intermediate term should come from him in order to go to man,—man being absolutely incapable of creating for himself the ladder which is to raise him to God;—hence, the necessity of a revelation. Now, this revelation commences with life in the individual as in the species; the mediator is given to all men; it is "the light which enlighteneth every man who cometh into the world."

In other words, reason is contemporary with consciousness and sensibility; it acts with them, and at the same time with them; its objects only are different. The objects of consciousness and of sensibility are man and nature, both of them, finite, contingent, variable realities, which, in their comparisons, their abstractions, their generalizations, their most remote developements, can give to man nothing but contingent and finite knowledge. Now, it is a fact, and an incontestable fact, that he possesses a different order of knowledge, which it is impossible to reduce to the former; for example, mathematical knowledge, the principles of which are not founded on outward experience or on inward experience; the universal laws of physics which rest on calculation, and not on experience; the laws of morality which are applied to hu-

man actions, and which are not derived from them; certain political truths that are the rule of societies, which do not make them, but which ought to follow them; finally, the laws of taste which pass judgment on the works of nature and of man, and which consequently proceed from another source; all these truths which are distinguished by their absolute character, do not fall either under the consciousness or the senses; they are the special object of reason. We can refer them neither to man nor to nature, neither man nor nature being competent to the production of the Absolute. Ascend, therefore, says Plato, from this scene of life and nature which changes continually, to that which does not change, to absolute truths, to ideas. Arrived thus far, reason does not stop; it recognises the fact that truth is the manifestation of something ulterior, the manifestation of a Being to whom it is referred, as to its substance, since absolute truth must have its substance and its cause like every thing else. Truth conducts then to substance in itself, to God, who completely invisible in his essence, manifests or reveals himself to us by truth,—the holy relation which unites man with God. Such is the Platonic and the Christian theory.

I call this collection of ideas, a rational, religious system; rational, because reason is its point of departure; religious, because it reaches to the Infinite and Eternal.

Since God is revealed only by truth, truth is God; it is all which it is possible for us to know concerning him. If reason undertakes to dispense with truth and to arrive immediately at substance, to see the

Infinite, face to face, it is confounded and lost in the abyss of mysticism. Mysticism consists in the substitution of direct illumination for indirect revelation, of ecstacy for reason, of dazzled and bewildered vision for philosophy. I do not say that there is no other kind of mysticism than this; but all kinds of mysticism attach themselves to direct illumination. Mysticism is the most implacable enemy of reason. Mysticism and rationality are always in sight of each other, and according as one or the other prevails, religion is reasonable or absurd. On the other hand, if you go no further than the manifestation of truth, if you do not refer it to its principle, you will not possess the whole truth; and through fear of error, you will remain but half-way in the regions of thought.

Still further, the Infinite is not only revealed to us merely by its idea, by truth, but it is revealed to us only in the Finite; it is revealed to man, in man and in nature; it does not destroy the real world, it throws light upon it; it does not transport us from the Finite into the Infinite, for that is impossible; but it imposes on us the law of living in the Finite, in order to seek and to represent the Infinite to the utmost of our power in that sphere, by the worship of the Beautiful, the practice of the Good, and the pursuit of the True; so that he who worships the Beautiful, practises the Good, pursues the True, is already in fact religious; for it is God whom he unconsciously obeys, even when he fails to perceive that the Beautiful, the True, and the Good have a substantial cause beyond the limits of this world.

Now, as the human spirit is not always sufficiently

elevated to go from the True, the Beautiful, and the Good to the conception of their Eternal Author, often also it is not sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the True, the Beautiful, and the Good in their harmony. The Beautiful, which belongs to the sphere both of reason and sentiment, is attached by sentiment to sensibility,—which varies in different individuals; every individual therefore is not capable of worshipping and of representing the Beautiful; and he who seeks for truth and submits to the austere authority of virtue sufficiently worships beauty in the True and the Good. The enlightened and virtuous man is an artist, in his way, and, in his noble life and his elevated thoughts, exhibits the most admirable portion of the Beautiful. Neither is every one capable of being a philosopher, of incessantly pursuing the truth, although every one is obliged to seek it, in his sphere, and according to the measure of his ability. It is therefore only the Good which is obligatory in itself, equally obligatory on all, and from which, no one, under any pretext whatever, can be excused. This last point of view, in its somewhat rigorous grandeur, is the Stoical. It is the opposite extreme to mysticism.

VII.

CLASSIFICATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS AND SCHOOLS.

Instead of losing our strength by blindly plunging into the complicated labyrinth of those specific questions, whose infinite variety confuses the firmest and most obstinate attention, it would be better, perhaps, in the first place, to reduce all these questions which every where elude our grasp, to a certain number of leading problems, to which the concentrated force of intelligence should be applied; the preliminary question of all philosophy is that of the classification of philosophical questions.

The first law of a classification is that it should be complete, that it should embrace all questions, general and particular, both those which present themselves immediately, and those which must be sought in the depths of science; all questions that are known, and all questions that are possible.

The second law of a classification is, that it should establish the relation of all the questions which it enumerates, and describe with precision the order in which each question should be treated.

Now, when I meditate on all the questions which have occupied my mind; when I compare them with those which have occupied all philosophers; when I interrogate both books and myself; above all, when I consult the nature of the human mind,—reason as well

as experience appears to reduce all the philosophical problems to a very small number of general problems, whose character is determined by the general aspect under which philosophy is presented, and in philosophy, by the general aspect of metaphysics, to which particularly this discussion relates.

Philosophy, in my view, is only the science of human nature, considered in the facts which it presents to our observation; among these facts, there are some which refer more especially to intelligence, and which, on that account, are commonly called metaphysics. The metaphysical facts, the phenomena by which human intelligence is displayed, reduced to general formulas, constitute the intellectual principles; the science of metaphysics, therefore, is only the study of intelligence, in that of our intellectual principles.

The intellectual principles are presented under two aspects; either in relation to the intelligence in which they exist, to the subject which possesses them, to the consciousness and the reflection which consider them; or in relation to their objects, that is to say, no longer in themselves and in us, but in their external consequences and applications. Every intellectual principle, we know, is referred to the human mind; and, at the same time that it is referred to the human mind,—the subject of all knowledge and of all consciousness,—it contemplates objects placed beyond the mind which conceives them; and to use those celebrated expressions, so convenient on account of their conciseness and their energy, every intellectual principle is either *subjective* or *objective*, or *subjective* and

objective at once. There is no principle, no idea, no perception, no sensation that does not come under this general division, which arranges at first all the philosophical problems in two great classes; namely, problems relative to the *subject*, and problems relative to the *object*.

Let us unfold this general division, and derive from it the particular divisions which it involves; let us first examine the intellectual principles, independently of the external consequences to which they lead; let us develope the science of the *subject*.

This is the science of the interior world; the science of the *me;* a science entirely distinct from that of the *object*, which is, properly speaking, the science of the *not-me*. And this science of the me is not a romance on the nature of the soul, on its origin, and its end; it is the authentic history of the soul, written by reflection, under the guidance of consciousness and of memory; it is thought returning upon itself, and making itself the subject of contemplation; it is occupied exclusively with internal facts, with phenomena that are capable of being perceived and judged by consciousness; I call this science, *psychology*, or again, *phenomenology*, in order to designate the nature of its objects. Now, in spite of the difficulties which it presents to the reflection, always uncertain, of a being thrown at first, and constantly retained beyond himself by the wants of his sensibility and his reason, this science, entirely subjective, is not above the reach of man; it is certain, for it is immediate; the me and that with which it is occupied are contained in the same sphere, in the unity of consciousness;

in that sphere, the object of science is altogether interior, it is intuitively perceived by the subject; the subject and the object are closely connected with each other. All the facts of consciousness are self-evident, as soon as consciousness apprehends them; but they often escape its grasp by reason of their extreme delicacy, or the adventitious circumstances which surround them; psychology gives the most complete certainty; but we find this certainty only in those depths which not every eye can penetrate; to arrive at those depths, we must abstract ourselves from this visible and extended world in which we have dwelt so long, with whose colors all our thoughts and language are now tinged, without which, indeed, we scarcely think at all; we must abstract ourselves from this external world, which is so much more difficult to shut out than the former, this world which is constituted by every notion of absolute existence; that is to say, we must abstract ourselves from an essential portion of thought, for every thought implies the idea of absolute existence; and still further, we must separate thought without mutilating it, we must disengage the phenomena of consciousness from the ontological notions which naturally envelope them, and from the logical forms which at present encumber them, and at the same time, we must take care not to fall into mere abstractions. In fine, after having gained a secure footing in this world of consciousness, so delicate and so slippery, we must make a profound and wide-reaching review of all the phenomena which it comprises, for here the phenomena are the elements of the science; we must be sure that we have omitted

no element, without which the science is incomplete; we must be sure that we take no fact for granted, that we do not receive the phantoms of the imagination as the phenomena of consciousness; we must be sure not only that we have omitted no real element, that we have introduced no foreign element; but also that we have seen the real elements, and all the real elements, under their true aspect, and under all the aspects which they can present. When this preliminary labor has put us in possession of all the elements of the science, it remains to construct the science by bringing all these elements together, by combining them so that they may all be exhibited in the different classes to which they belong by their different characteristics, just as the naturalist perceives his vegetables or his minerals in a certain number of divisions which comprehend them all.

This being done, all is not yet done. The science of the *subject* is far from being exhausted. The greatest difficulties are not overcome. We have examined the interior world, the phenomena of consciousness, in the form in which they are presented by consciousness at this moment; we know the man as he now is, the actual man; we are still ignorant of the man as he was at first, the primitive man. It is not sufficient for man to contemplate the analytical catalogue of his ideas, arranged under their respective titles, and so to speak, according to the etiquette of method; his indefatigable curiosity cannot rest with these circumspect classifications; he aspires to those higher problems which at once terrify and attract him, which charm and which overwhelm him. It seems as

if we did not legitimately possess the present reality, so long as we have not attained to the primitive truth; and we constantly endeavor to ascend to the origin of our ideas, as to the source of all light. Now, the question of the origin of our ideas produces a new question, quite as difficult, perhaps indeed still more so; namely, that of the relation of the Primitive to the Actual. In truth, it is not enough to know where we are, and whence we came; we must know all the paths by which we have arrived at the point on which we now stand. This third investigation completes the other two; this closes the whole question; the science of the subject is entirely exhausted, for when we have gained possession of the two extreme points and of all the intermediate steps, nothing remains to be asked.

Let us now consider the intellectual principles in relation to their external objects.

Here is a singular fact. A being knows and perceives beyond his own sphere. He is only himself, yet he knows what is not himself. His existence is for him only his own individuality, yet from the bosom of this individual world which he inhabits and which he constitutes, he attains to a world foreign from his own; and this, by powers, which altogether interior and personal as they are in their relation of inherence in their subject, extend beyond its limits, and discover to it objects that are placed beyond its reflection and its consciousness. That the mind of man is endowed with these extraordinary powers, can be doubted by no one; but is their reach legitimate? Does that which they reveal actually exist? Are the intellectual

principles, which possess an incontestable authority within the interior world of their subject, of equal validity in relation to their external objects ?

This is eminently the objective problem. Now as every thing which is placed beyond the consciousness is objective, and as all real and substantial existences are exterior to the consciousness, which is employed only upon the internal phenomena, it follows that every problem, which refers to any particular being, or which, in general, implies the question of existence, is an objective problem. In fine, as the problem of the legitimacy of the means which we possess of knowing any objective reality, whatever it may be, is the problem of the legitimacy of the means which we possess of knowing in an *absolute* manner,—as the Absolute is that which is not relative to the individual, but which is referred to Being in itself,—it follows that the problem of the legitimacy of all external, objective, ontological knowledge, is the problem of absolute knowledge. The problem of the Absolute constitutes the higher logic.

When we are certain of the legitimacy of our means of knowing in an absolute manner, we apply these means which have been demonstrated to be legitimate, to some object, that is to say, to some particular being; we discuss the reality of the existence of the substantial *me*, of the *soul* which conceives but does not perceive itself; of that extended and visible world which we call *matter;* and of that Supreme Being, the ultimate ground of all beings, of all external objects, and of the subject itself which ascends even to Him, God.

Finally, after these problems relative to the existence of different particular objects, we come to those which relate to the modes and to the characteristics of this existence; problems superior to all others, since if it be singular that the personal intelligence should know that there are existences beyond its own sphere, it is still more singular that it should know what takes place within those spheres which are foreign from its own.

These special investigations constitute the higher metaphysics, the science of the Objective, of Being, of the Invisible; for all Being in itself, all that is objective is invisible to consciousness.

Let us recapitulate. The objective problems are divided into two great problems, the one logical, the other metaphysical; namely, the problem of the Absolute, the question of the reality of the existence of every thing objective; and the question of the reality of the existence of different particular objects. Add to these two objective questions, the three questions contained in the general question of the subject, and you have all the metaphysical questions; there is none which does not enter into this general outline; we have therefore satisfied the first law of a classification; let us attempt to satisfy the second, and to ascertain the order in which it is necessary to examine each question.

Let us first examine the two problems which contain all others, that of the subject and that of the object.

Whether the object exist or do not exist, it is clear that it exists for us only in so far as it is manifested

to us by the subject; and if it be pretended that the subject and the object, actually and primitively, are given to us, one with the other, it must always be admitted, that in this natural relation, the term which knows should be considered, as it really is, the fundamental element of the relation. It is therefore with the subject, that we ought to commence; it is we ourselves that we must know, in the first instance, for we know nothing except in ourselves and by ourselves; it is not we who revolve around the external world; it is rather the external world which revolves around us; or if these two spheres have each a peculiar and individual movement, and merely correlative, we know the fact only because it is taught us by one of them; it is always with this that we are obliged to learn every thing, even the existence of the other, and its independent existence.

We must then commence with the subject, with the me, with consciousness.

But the question of the subject itself comprises three others; with which of these must we commence? In the first place, there is one of them which consists in determining the relation of the other two, the relation of the Primitive to the Actual; it is evident that we cannot treat of this until we have treated of the other two; it remains then to determine the order of these two latter. Now, a rigorous method will not hesitate to place the Actual before the Primitive; for, by commencing with the Primitive, we should obtain only a false primitive, from which we could obtain by deduction only an hypothetical actual, whose relation to the Primitive would be only the relation of two

hypotheses more or less consistent. When we commence with the Primitive, if we fall into error, all is lost; the science of the subject is falsified, and in that case, what becomes of the object? Besides, to commence with the Primitive is to commence with one of the most obscure and embarrassing problems, with neither guide nor light; whereas, by commencing with the Actual, we commence with the least difficult question, with that which serves as an introduction to all the rest. Experience and the experimental method are every where celebrated as the triumph of the age, and the genius of our epoch; the experimental method in psychology will be to commence with the Actual, to exhaust it, if possible, to make a rigid examination of all the principles which now govern intelligence; those only will be admitted which are really presented, but none of these will be rejected; none will be asked whence it comes or whither it goes; it exists, that is enough; it must have a place in science, since it has a place in nature; no arbitrary judgment, no systematic selection will be employed upon facts; we shall be willing to register one with another; we shall no longer hasten to torture them for the sake of extracting a premature theory; we shall patiently wait, until with the increase of their number, their relations are developed, and the theory is presented of itself.

If we now pass from the subject to the object, and seek the order of the two questions of which the object is composed, it is easy to see that we ought to treat of the logical before the metaphysical, the problem of the Absolute and of existence in general before that of particular existences; for the solution, whatever

it be, of the first problem, is the principle of the second.

In this way then the laws of a classification are satisfied; thus are the outlines of philosophy divided and arranged; now, by whom are they to be filled up?

And, in the first place, have they ever been filled up, by any philosopher that has hitherto existed? If this were the case, there would be a metaphysical science, as there is a geometry and a chemistry. Have philosophers at least distinguished these different outlines, if they have not been able to fill them up? Have they marked out the contour and the proportions of the edifice, if they have not yet been able to realize it? If this were the case, the science would be commenced, the path opened, the method decided. But if philosophers have been able neither to fill up the outlines of philosophy, nor even to recognise and distinguish them, what can they be said to have accomplished? I will answer in a few words.

The first philosophers have treated of every thing, and have resolved every thing, but confusedly. They have treated of every thing, but without method, or with arbitrary and artificial methods. There is not a metaphysical problem which has not been agitated in every point of view, and analyzed in a thousand ways by the philosophers of Greece, and by the Italian metaphysicians of the sixteenth century; still, neither the former with their mighty genius, nor the latter with all their sagacity, could discover or fix the true limits of each problem, its relations, and its extent. No philosopher before Descartes had clearly stated the primary philosophical problem,—the dis-

tinction between the subject and the object; this distinction had scarcely been any thing but a grammatical and scholastic subtilty, which the successors of Aristotle agitated in vain without being able to derive from it any thing but consequences of the same nature with their principle; grammatical consequences, which passing from grammar into logic, and thence into metaphysics, corrupted the science of the human mind, and loaded it with useless verbal argumentation. Descartes himself, notwithstanding the singular vigor of his intellect, did not comprehend the whole extent of this distinction; it is his glory that he created it, and placed the true point of departure for philosophical investigations in thought, in the consciousness of the me; but he was not struck, as he should have been, with the abyss that separates the subject and the object; and after having stated the problem, this great man resolved it too easily. It was reserved for the eighteenth century to apply and to diffuse the spirit of the Cartesian philosophy, and to produce three schools, which, instead of going astray in external and objective researches, commence with the examination, more or less rigid, more or less profound, of the human mind and its faculties. It belonged to the greatest philosopher of the last century to designate the character of modern philosophy by the very title of his own philosophy. The system of Kant is called a Critique. The other two European schools, the school of Locke and that of Reid, both far below the school of Kant, no less by the inferiority of the genius of their founders, than by the inferiority of their doctrines, both differing greatly from

each other in their principles and their consequences, are connected with the school of Kant, and related to each other, by the spirit of criticism and analysis, which favorably distinguishes them.

But if these three great schools are connected by the general spirit which animates them, they differ quite as much in their positive principles; and the reason of this difference is the particular point of view in which each of them has considered philosophy. As all the questions of philosophy can be reduced to three great questions,—namely, with regard to the object, the question of the Absolute and of the reality of existences, with regard to the subject, that of the Actual, and that of the Primitive,—the weakness of human nature, from which the strongest minds are not free, did not allow Locke, Reid, and Kant to bestow their attention equally upon these three questions, and concentrated it principally upon one of them; now Locke, Reid, and Kant, each took a different question; so that by a singular fatality each of the three great questions into which the science of metaphysics is divided became the special object and the exclusive possession of each of the three great schools of the eighteenth century; the school of Locke aims at the origin of ideas; the Scottish school seeks rather to ascertain the actual characteristics which are presented by human ideas in the developed intelligence; and the school of Kant is principally occupied with the legitimacy of the passage from the subject to the object. I do not say that each of these three schools has agitated only a single problem; but I say that each of them was more particularly occupied

with a special problem, and is principally characterized by the manner in which it resolved that problem. Every body confesses that Locke mistook many of the actual characteristics of human ideas; Reid does not conceal that he regards the question of their origin as of little importance; and Kant is satisfied with indicating in general the source of human knowledge, without investigating the special origin of each of the intellectual principles, of the celebrated categories, which he establishes and the extent of which he estimates. Now, it seems to me that if we were to follow this parallel division of philosophical questions and schools, we should regard the history of philosophy under a new aspect; in the three great modern schools we could study and fathom the three great philosophical questions; each of these three schools, limited and incomplete in itself, would be enlarged by the proximity of the others; opposed, they would only exhibit their relative imperfections; connected, they would supply their mutual deficiencies. It would be an interesting and instructive study to ascertain the defects of the modern schools by placing them in opposition to each other, and to collect their different merits in the centre of a wide Eclecticism in which the three should be combined and completed. The Scottish philosophy would demonstrate the defects of the philosophy of Locke; Locke would serve to interrogate Reid on the questions which he has too much neglected; and the examination of the system of Kant would introduce us into the depths of a problem which has escaped both the other schools.

NOTES ON COUSIN.

NOTES

TO THE TRANSLATIONS FROM

COUSIN.

NOTE A.

NOTICES OF THE LIFE OF COUSIN.

It does not come within the plan to which I have been obliged to limit myself in the arrangement of these volumes, to present biographical notices of the writers from whose works selections have been made for translation. I have thought however that a slight sketch of the life of M. Cousin might be gratifying to those who are interested in the study of his philosophy, and I accordingly subjoin such notices as I have been able to gather in this place. They may be depended upon for their authenticity, as I am indebted for the possession of the principal portion of the materials from which they are composed, to M. Cousin himself.

Victor Cousin was born at Paris, the 28th of November, 1792. His parents, who were not in wealthy circumstances, placed him for his early education, at the humble schools of his native city. He soon gave such indications of a love of learning, that they were induced, by the advice

of his teachers, to allow him the advantage of a liberal education. The first public seminary which he entered was the *Lycée Charlemagne* of Paris, where he at once took the precedence of his fellow students, and gained the high rank in the classes which he never afterwards lost. He was every year honored with numerous prizes, particularly with that for distinction in rhetoric, a department in which he has since exhibited such eminent ability. He was indebted for his success, not only to his uncommon mental endowments, but to the unwearied industry which had become a habit with him at this early age. At that time, when the Empire enlisted in its service every variety of talent, and kindled a glowing ambition in all classes of society, different careers were every where opened to the most distinguished pupil of the Colleges of Paris. He was entitled, on account of having received the highest honors, to be exempt from conscription, and to enter the Council of State as auditor with an annual grant of 5,000 *francs*. But the enthusiastic love of study was stronger than any other consideration; and M. Gueroult, the celebrated translator of Pliny, honorary counsellor of the University, commissioned by M. de Fontanes to organize the Normal School, decided the young student, whom he had known and patronized in his previous career, to engage in the profession of public instruction. His name was, accordingly, inscribed the first on the list of the pupils admitted into the Normal School, at its commencement. M. Cousin was eighteen years of age, when he first entered the Normal School in 1810, which he never afterwards quitted; and of which he became the Principal, subsequent to the Revolution of 1830. After having remained in it for two years as a pupil, he was appointed an instructer in the department of Literature, at the close of 1812, and in 1814, was made Master of the Conferences, in the place of M. Villemain. At the same time, he was employed as assistant teacher in the different Lyceums of Paris. In 1815, he was entrusted, during the Hundred

Days, with the class in philosophy at the *Collége Bourbon*. In this manner, M. Cousin passed through the successive functions of secondary instruction.

He had not yet however discovered his true sphere. He has himself described in the Preface to his *Philosophical Fragments*, the impression which he received, upon his entering the Normal School, from the Course of M. Laromiguière, and a short time afterwards, from that of M. Royer-Collard. After hearing those celebrated professors, his heart was irrevocably given to philosophy. But his patron, M. Gueroult, Principal of the Normal School, entertained different views with regard to him; and after many useless struggles, M. Cousin found himself condemned, even by his very success, to the teaching of Literature. He did not lose his attachment, however, to his favorite science; and all his wishes were at last fulfilled, when towards the close of 1815, he was appointed by M. Royer-Collard, who had been placed by the new government at the head of the University, to succeed him as Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Literature.

From that time, M. Cousin devoted himself entirely to philosophy, at the University and at the Normal School. For five years, he sustained the burden of this double teaching. His Course at the University gave a lively impulse to the public mind, and produced a more general taste for philosophical studies; while his teachings at the Normal School were adapted to call forth and cultivate those young men who have since so ably seconded his labors.

"M. Cousin," says Damiron,[1] "possessed a very simple, but very powerful means of success in his Lectures. This was the eloquence with which he was inspired by his thought. His manner of being taken possession of by his ideas; his facility in representing metaphysical abstractions in graphic sketches; the lively bursts of his

[1] *Histoire de la Philosophie en France.*

mind; the bold expressions of consciousness, which made up those *improvisations*, at once so animated and so serious, so graceful and so imposing,—all conspired to impress and captivate his numerous auditory. As he was not merely a simple demonstrator, a cold and unimpassioned witness, but an earnest observer and an enthusiastic teacher, a philosopher and an orator at once, both in his Chair and out of it, at the Normal School and in the familiar conversations which he was always ready to engage in with his young friends, he announced the truths of philosophy, with that glow of feeling, that profound earnestness, that elevation of thought, which moved and carried away every mind. His Lectures contained something beside doctrine. They displayed the labor by which it was prepared, the method which led to it, the love and the zeal with which it was investigated; these passed from his soul to that of his pupils, and inspired them with the very spirit of his philosophy."

Of his labors at the Normal School, M. Cousin has given an interesting account in the Appendix to his volume of *Philosophical Fragments*. He refers to the period from 1815 to 1820, during which, as he says, "in profound obscurity, master and pupils, equally feeble, but full of zeal, we were uninterruptedly employed in the reform of philosophical studies. The course of instruction at the Normal School included three years, after which the pupils were sent into the provinces to take possession of the vacant Chairs. As Master of the Philosophical Conferences of the third year, it was my office to prepare them for the important duties on which they were about to enter. All the pupils of the third year attended my Course; but it was particularly intended for the small number of them, who were destined to a philosophical career. They bore the weight of the labors of the Conference; and were the principal source of the interest which was taken in those labors. They were present also at my Lectures in the Faculty of Literature, where they

might have the opportunity of obtaining more general ideas, and breathing in a more vigorous life in an atmosphere of greater publicity. Within the interior of the School, the teaching was more didactic and rigid; the Course bore the name of Conferences, and deservedly so; for every Lecture occasioned a discussion in which all the pupils participated. Formed to the philosophical method, they made use of it with the professor as well as with themselves; they presented their doubts, their objections, their arguments, with perfect freedom; and were thus exercised in that spirit of independence and of criticism, which I trust, will one day bear its fruits. A truly fraternal confidence united the professor and pupils; if the pupils took the liberty to discuss the instruction which they received, the professor also felt authorized by reason of his duty, his intentions, and his friendship, to be severe. At this day, we all love to recall that period, so cherished in our memory, when ignorant of the world and unknown by it, buried in the study of the eternal problems of the human mind, we passed our life in attempting those solutions of them, which, though they have since been modified, continue to interest us, on account of the labor which they cost us, and the sincere, earnest, and persevering researches of which they were the result. It was under this austere discipline, but at the same time free from every narrow, mechanical restraint, that we were all formed; and, in truth, if I do not deceive myself, many of my friends owe me some favor for my severity at that time, for having so often made them recommence their imperfect compositions, for having required more precision in the details and a closer connexion in the whole performance; and above all, for having endeavored to inculcate upon them so earnestly the spirit of philosophical method,—that psychological sense, that art of inward observation, without which man remains unknown to man, and philosophy is nothing but an assemblage of lifeless conceptions, of arbitrary formulas, more or less ingenious, bold, comprehensive, but

always destitute of reality. For myself, I confess, that the exacting zeal of the Conference has often been of use to me; and I feel a pleasure in recording here the expression of my regret for that epoch, so tranquil and so studious, of my life."

In 1817 and 1818, M. Cousin employed his vacations in travelling in Germany, with a view to increasing his acquaintance with the German philosophy. His intercourse with the most distinguished philosophers of that country is described in the Preface which forms the second article translated in this volume.

In 1820, he made a voyage to the north of Italy, for the purpose of comparing the manuscripts in the public libraries, with reference to his contemplated edition of the unpublished works of Proclus. But on his return, he found a great change in the state of affairs in France. M. Royer-Collard was no longer at the head of the University. He had been dismissed from the Council of State, together with M. Guizot; and both the government and public instruction were subjected to a retrograde influence. M. Cousin himself was suspected of liberal views in politics; his Course at the University was suspended; and he remained in disgrace for seven years. The Normal School was suppressed in 1822. During this interval, M. Cousin, though deprived of all public employment, and destitute of fortune, did not abandon his philosophical mission. His writings, at this time, served to increase his own reputation and to advance the cause of philosophy.

A singular incident took place in 1824, which added, in no small degree, to his previous well-earned popularity. While travelling in Germany with the eldest son of Marshal Lannes, the Duke of Montobello, he was arrested at Dresden, and conducted to Berlin, where he was detained in prison for several months. This affair, however, terminated to his honor and to the shame of his enemies. He displayed through the whole process a firmness and moder-

ation which gained for him the high esteem of the Prussian government, and indeed of all the enlightened men of Germany. It was demonstrated that M. Cousin was entirely innocent of all the plots which he had been accused of forming against the German governments, and that the whole secret was to be found in the policy of the Jesuits, who wished, by means of Germany, to be revenged upon him, for his conduct in France. In fact, although a philosopher, or rather because he was a philosopher, the pupil and friend of M. Royer-Collard could not remain a stranger to the affairs of his country; and, at all times, he had exhibited the most liberal principles, and regulated his conduct in accordance with those principles. Thus, in 1822, having accidentally become acquainted at Paris with the Count de Santa-Rosa, who had taken such an honorable part in the Piedmontese revolution of 1820, struck with the noble character of the unfortunate Italian, he formed an intimate and fraternal friendship with him. When without the slightest pretext, Santa-Rosa was arrested and thrown into prison, M. Cousin did not hesitate to offer himself as security for his friend; and after the perfect innocence of Santa-Rosa had been proved by inquiry, and, as he could not be condemned, he was banished to Alençon, M. Cousin went as his companion.[1] It was for crimes like these that M. Cousin became odious to the Jesuits. As they dared not accuse him at Paris, they persecuted him in Germany. They only gave him the occasion, however, of gaining new titles to the esteem of every honorable man. M. Cousin displayed the utmost energy of character while a prisoner; and no less mildness after his restoration to liberty. Satisfied with the marks of respect which were given to him by the Prussian government, he forgot all feelings of resentment in the midst of the old friends whom he found at Berlin, and among others Schleiermacher and Hegel.

[1] See the end of this Note.

Upon his return to France in 1825, he was not permitted to resume his Lectures. It was not until after the elections of 1827, when M. Royer-Collard was re-established in the Presidency of the University, that he received a new appointment as Professor in the Faculty of Literature. He resumed his course in 1828, with a brilliant success, such as has been rarely known in the history of philosophical instruction. At the same time, his Lectures were distinguished by the greatest moderation in philosophy, in religion, in politics, in every thing.

At the Revolution of 1830, with the high reputation of M. Cousin, his singular talents as an orator, his practical energy, and the popularity which he had gained during the three celebrated days, he might easily have entered into the Chamber of Deputies and taken part in public affairs, with his two colleagues, M. Guizot and M. Villemain, and his friend M. Thiers. But M. Cousin declared that he would remain faithful to philosophy. "Politics," said he at that time, "are an episode with me; but the foundation of my life belongs to philosophy." The only change, which he was willing to accept, was the passing, according to the most rigid forms of University advancement, from the Faculty of Literature to the Royal Council of Public Instruction, and the principal direction of the Normal School, which he re-established and organized. To give place to one of his most able pupils, M. Jouffroy, he exchanged the Chair of the History of Modern Philosophy, for that of the History of Ancient Philosophy. He refused to accept any political function, confined himself entirely to the University, and devoted his well-known activity to the continuation of his philosophical writings, which had been interrupted by his Lectures. From 1830 to 1835 he published a great number of works; four new volumes of the translation of Plato; a new edition of the *Fragments*, with the Preface already alluded to; an edition of the posthumous works of M. Maine de Biran, with a Preface, which

is itself a treatise of philosophy ; and finally, a labor of considerable magnitude on the Metaphysics of Aristotle ; to say nothing of numerous special memoirs and dissertations. He is now occupied with extensive researches on the Scholastic philosophy, and has just published the unprinted manuscripts of Abelard.

The merits of M. Cousin, as an historian of philosophy, are admitted by all to be of the highest order. His labors embrace almost all of the great epochs in the history of philosophy. 1. For antiquity, a *Translation of Plato with Critical Notes and Introductions*, of which nine volumes have been already given to the public ; the *Metaphysics of Aristotle ;* six volumes of *Alexandrine Commentaries ;* a volume entitled *New Fragments*, treating of the most difficult points of ancient philosophy. 2. For the Scholastic philosophy, a large quarto *on Abelard*. 3. For modern philosophy, a complete edition of Descartes and a multitude of special dissertations. 4. Finally, for the general history of philosophy, several volumes, comprising the most original and fruitful views, and at their side, the translation of the valuable *Manual* of Tennemann.

The efforts of M. Cousin for the improvement of public instruction have gained him no less honor and far more popularity than his philosophical career. "The education of the people and the progress of philosophy," says M. Cousin in a letter to an American correspondent, "are to decide the future condition both of your country and mine. These are the holy interests to which I would devote my life ; and for which I rejoice to see so many good and useful exertions in a country called to such a high destiny as the United States." The services of M. Cousin, to the cause of popular education are generally well known among us, and have awakened a deep interest in his name with many who are comparatively strangers to his philosophy. It is gratifying to perceive that the two great objects, which should never be separated,—the instruction of the people and the ad-

vancement of philosophy—have found such an earnest advocate in the most popular philosophical writer of the day.

M. Cousin is admirably qualified for the formation of an improved system of education, no less by his practical experience, than his native abilities. This subject, it is said, has too often occupied the attention in France only of speculative men, like Rousseau, who, unacquainted with the affairs of life, have proposed theories, without reference to existing facts, and which could not be realized without destroying the actual institutions; or of men who were conversant only with practical details, and incapable of comprehending any general views. M. Cousin, acquainted at once with the schools and with philosophy, combines all the elements which form an accomplished teacher. As the historian and critic of the most important systems of philosophy, he could not remain the slave of ancient routine; and as a pupil and professor of the Imperial University he was not tempted to destroy the illustrious body, at whose bosom he had been nursed. Hence the course which he has pursued as one of the magistrates appointed to preside over the interests of education. It has been his endeavor to enlarge the frame-work of the University, without deforming it.

From the commencement of his labors in the Council of Instruction, M. Cousin has been employed with two principal objects, namely, the organization and direction of the Normal School, and the arrangement of philosophical studies, in the Colleges. He is the author of the present constitution of the Normal School, and of that admirable system of studies, which does the utmost honor to his practical talents. Nor have his services been less valuable in the improvement of the teaching of philosophy in the Colleges of France. He has thus laid a broad foundation which promises the happiest results for the growing advancement of philosophy in that country, and consequently, in every country on which it exerts an influence.

M. Cousin is no less interested in the schools for primary instruction. He has, in this way, acquired a new title to the gratitude of France. He is a true friend of the people. He sprung from them. He wishes for their happiness. He delights to labor in their behalf. He is never weary in pleading their cause. He looks less, however, to change of government, than to their own elevation, for any permanent advantage. The regeneration of the people, he is persuaded, must come from within. He would have no pains spared to give them true light,—the light of morality no less than of knowledge, of pure and virtuous principles as well as of scientific instruction. "Primary instruction," says M. Cousin, "is not to be found in the Programme of the *Hôtel de Ville;* it is the genuine benefit which the Revolution of July should procure for France. The practical part of my life is devoted to the labor of procuring this instruction. As a philosopher, I address myself to the *élite* of thinkers, to fifty individuals in Europe. In laboring for primary instruction, I labor for the masses of my countrymen."

In 1831, M. Cousin solicited of the French government, a special mission for examining the establishments of public instruction in Germany. He received the appointment, and left Paris, May 24, 1831, for the discharge of its duties. He inspected all the public establishments of the city of Frankfort; of the Grand-Duchy of Weimar; of Saxony, and particularly of Leipsic; of Prussia, and particularly of Berlin; and was on his return to Paris about the middle of July, having sent his Reports to the minister, dated at Frankfort, Weimar, Leipsic, and Berlin. These Reports have been received with an almost universal interest in every civilized country of Europe, and in the United States.

M. Cousin has been elected a member of the French Academy,—an honor which was justly due to his eminent talents and extensive literary acquisitions. In 1832, he was made a Peer of France.

He has recently been employed in examining the establishments for public instruction in Holland. The last work of his, which we have seen, is entitled *De l'instruction primaire a Rotterdam*, Dec. 28, 1836.

The character of M. Santa-Rosa is beautifully drawn by M. Cousin in the Inscription to his Translation of the *Lysis* of Plato. I cannot refrain from inserting it in this place, although it is such an exquisite specimen of French composition, that I could not hope to be forgiven the attempt to translate it.

A LA MÉMOIRE

DU COMTE

SANCTORRE DE SANTA ROSA,

NÉ A SAVILLANO LE 18 SEPTEMBRE 1783,
SOLDAT A 11 ANS,
TOUR A TOUR OFFICIER SUPÉRIEUR ET ADMINISTRATEUR
CIVIL ET MILITAIRE,
MINISTRE DE LA GUERRE DANS LES ÉVÈNEMENS DE 1821,
AUTEUR DE L'ÉCRIT INTITULÉ : DE LA RÉVOLUTION PIÉMONTAISE,
MORT AU CHAMP D'HONNEUR
LE 9 MAI 1825,
DANS L'ÎLE DE SPHACTÉRIE PRÈS NAVARIN,
EN COMBATTANT POUR L'INDÉPENDANCE DE LA GRÈCE.

L'INFORTUNÉ A ÉCHOUÉ DANS SES PLUS NOBLES DESSEINS.
UN CORPS DE FER, UN ESPRIT DROIT, LE COEUR LE PLUS SENSIBLE,
UNE INÉPUISABLE ÉNERGIE,
L'ASCENDANT DE LA FORCE AVEC LE CHARME DE LA BONTÉ,
LE PLUS PUR ENTHOUSIASME DE LA VERTU
QUI LUI INSPIRAIT TOUR A TOUR UNE AUDACE OU UNE MODÉRATION
A TOUTE ÉPREUVE,
LE DÉDAIN DE LA FORTUNE ET DES JOUISSANCES VULGAIRES,
LA FOI DU CHRÉTIEN AVEC LES LUMIÈRES NOUVELLES,
LA LOYAUTÉ DU CHEVALIER MÊME DANS L'APPARENCE
DE LA RÉVOLTE,

LES TALENS DE L'ADMINISTRATEUR AVEC L'INTRÉPIDITÉ
DU SOLDAT,
LES QUALITÉS LES PLUS OPPOSÉES ET LES PLUS RARES
LUI FURENT DONNÉES EN VAIN.
FAUTE D'UN THÉATRE CONVENABLE,
FAUTE AUSSI D'AVOIR BIEN CONNU SON TEMPS
ET LES HOMMES DE CE TEMPS,
IL A PASSÉ COMME UN PERSONNAGE ROMANESQUE,
QUAND IL Y AVAIT EN LUI UN GUERRIER ET UN HOMME D'ÉTAT.

MAIS NON, IL N'A PAS PRODIGUÉ SA VIE POUR DES CHIMÉRES ;
IL A PU SE TROMPER SUR LE TEMPS ET LES MOYENS,
MAIS TOUT CE QU'IL A VOULU S'ACCOMPLIRA.
NON : LA MAISON DE SAVOIE NE SERA POINT INFIDÈLE
A SON HISTOIRE,
ET LA GRÈCE NE RETOMBERA PAS SOUS LE JOUG MUSULMAN.

D'AUTRES ONT EU PLUS D'INFLUENCE
SUR MON ESPRIT ET MES IDÉES.
LUI, M'A MONTRÉ UNE AME HÉROÏQUE ;
C'EST ENCORE A LUI QUE JE DOIS LE PLUS.

JE L'AI VU, ASSAILLI PAR TOUS LES CHAGRINS
QUI PEUVENT ENTRER DANS LE COEUR D'UN HOMME,
EXILÉ DE SON PAYS,
PROSCRIT, DÉPOUILLÉ, CONDAMNÉ A MORT
PAR CEUX QU'IL AVAIT VOULU SERVIR,
UN INSTANT MÊME MÉCONNU ET CALOMNIÉ PAR LA PLUPART
DES SIENS,
SÉPARÉ A JAMAIS DE SA FEMME ET DE SES ENFANS,
PORTANT LE POIDS DES AFFECTIONS LES PLUS NOBLES
ET LES PLUS TRISTES,
SANS-AVENIR, SANS ASILE, ET PRESQUE SANS PAIN,
TROUVANT LA PERSÉCUTION OU IL ÉTAIT VENU CHERCHER
UN ABRI,
ARRÊTÉ, JETÉ DANS LES FERS,
INCERTAIN S'IL NE SERAIT PAS LIVRÉ A SON GOUVERNEMENT,
C'EST A DIRE A L'ÉCHAFAUD ;

ET JE L'AI VU NON SEULEMENT INÉBRANLABLE,
MAIS CALME, JUSTE, INDULGENT,
S'EFFORÇANT DE COMPRENDRE SES ENNEMIS
AU LIEU DE LES HAÏR,
EXCUSANT L'ERREUR, PARDONNANT A LA FAIBLESSE,
S'OUBLIANT LUI-MÊME, NE PENSANT QU'AUX AUTRES,
COMMANDANT LE RESPECT A SES JUGES,
INSPIRANT LE DÉVOUEMENT A SES GEOLIERS;

ET QUAND IL SOUFFRAIT LE PLUS,
CONVAINCU QU'UNE AME FORTE FAIT SA DESTINÉE,
ET QU'IL N'Y A DE VRAI MALHEUR QUE DANS LE VICE
ET DANS LA FAIBLESSE,
TOUJOURS PRÊT A LA MORT, MAIS CHÉRISSANT LA VIE,
PAR RESPECT POUR DIEU ET POUR LA VERTU
VOULANT ÊTRE HEUREUX,
ET L'ÉTANT PRESQUE
PAR LA PUISSANCE DE SA VOLONTÉ,
LA VIVACITÉ ET LA SOUPLESSE DE SON IMAGINATION,
ET L'IMMENSE SYMPATHIE DE SON COEUR.

TEL FUT SANTA ROSA.

O TOI QUE J'AI RENCONTRÉ TROP TARD, QUE J'AI PERDU SI VITE,
QUE J'AI PU AIMER
TOUJOURS SANS BORNES ET TOUJOURS SANS REGRET,
PUISQUE C'EST MOI QUI TE SURVIS,
SANCTORRE, SOIS MON ÉTOILE A JAMAIS!

Paris, ce 15 août 1827.

VICTOR COUSIN.

NOTE B. Page 32.

SCHELLING'S OPINION OF COUSIN.

The obscurity of style, which, to a greater or less degree, is found in the writings of the most eminent philosophers of Germany, and which repels so many from the study of their systems, begins to be perceived and complained of by the Germans themselves. This is a good omen. It cannot be repeated too often, it cannot be insisted on too strongly, that truth is valuable to the human mind only in proportion to its clearness; and that all truth is intended to be the property of the world, not the monopoly of a few. The admirable reasonings of Kant on the immutability of moral distinctions, the absolute authority of conscience, and the reality of disinterested virtue, are, in a great measure, lost to the world, by reason of the perplexed phraseology in which they are expressed. We can hardly be too grateful to students and writers, like Cousin and the school which he has formed, for their services in giving currency to ideas, in holding up to the popular mind in broad day-light, truths of universal interest and importance, which but for them would have remained locked up in the iron abstractions of scholastic formulas. With regard to the merits of Cousin in this relation, we have a distinct confession from Schelling's own own lips.

"In his different visits to Germany," he remarks, "Cousin has won great personal esteem and friendship, not only among philosophers by profession, but among the German scholars, in general. The peculiar circumstance, however, which gives the Germans a permanent interest in his labors is, that he, together with the able and profoundly learned Guizot and a few others, was the first, after the restoration of peace from the wars of the Revolution, to awaken the attention of his countrymen to German science and literature. Cousin accomplished this particu-

larly in regard to German philosophy. Whoever among us should imagine that the advantage of this is altogether on the side of the French would betray a singular narrowness. For it is now pretty generally acknowledged, that in point of a simple, lucid, and well-considered mode of exhibiting scientific subjects, we have something to learn from our Western neighbors. But style, if any value at all be ascribed to it, always reacts on thought, on the subject-matter of discussion. The Germans have so long philosophized merely among themselves, that they have been gradually departing more and more from what is universally intelligible, both in thought and expression, and the degree of this departure has at length been almost assumed as the standard of philosophical superiority. It is hardly necessary to adduce examples. As families, which, avoiding the general intercourse of society, live altogether with each other, at last, among other disagreeable peculiarities, come to use a singular phraseology, intelligible to none but themselves; so the Germans have proceeded in philosophy; and, as after many ineffectual attempts to spread the philosophy of Kant, beyond the limits of their country, they have renounced the idea of making themselves intelligible to other nations, they have been led also to regard philosophy as something existing for themselves alone, without considering, that the original purpose of all philosophy,—which is never to be lost sight of, though it has been so often unsuccessful,—is to arrive at universal intelligibility. It certainly does not follow from this, that works of thought are to be judged of as exercises of style; but it does follow unquestionably that a philosophy, whose essential doctrines cannot be made comprehensible to every cultivated nation, and accessible to all languages, for that reason alone, cannot be the true and universal philosophy. The interest accordingly, which is manifested by foreign nations in German philosophy, cannot fail to exert a favorable influence upon that. The philosophical writer, who some ten years ago could not

lay aside the scholastic language and forms which he had once assumed, without prejudice to his reputation as a scientific man, will more easily free himself from this restraint. He will seek for profoundness in his thoughts; and at least, a total incapacity and unskilfulness of expression, will not be considered, as has been the case, a token of philosophical inspiration.

"Cousin has been reproached with his love for German philosophy, as an anti-national tendency; but, on the contrary, he has remained true to that national character, of which he says, that it makes an absolute point of purity, precision, and clearness of connexion. If any man is called to give to France a correct notion of the progress and the historical developement of modern philosophy, it is Cousin, who combines, in an eminent degree, in himself, and has displayed through his whole scientific career, the indefatigable research, the acuteness, the moderation, the honorable impartiality, and in short, all the peculiar qualities which form a philosophical historian of philosophy."[1]

NOTE C. Page 41.

PRESIDENT HOPKINS ON NATURAL THEOLOGY.

The article here alluded to is entitled "Argument from Nature, for the Divine Existence," and is from the pen of the Rev. Mark Hopkins, President of Williams College. Its purpose is to discuss the place which is held by the argument from design, as exhibited in external nature, in producing the belief of a God in mankind at large; and also the real import and logical validity of that argument.

[1] See *Victor Cousin über französische und deutsche Philosophie*, Von Dr. Hubert Beckers, *Vorrede* von Schelling, pp. iii–v. xxviii. Stuttgart und Tübingen, 1834.

It by no means follows, the writer maintains, that because the argument from design is generally stated as the formal proof of the being of a God, it is therefore the real ground of our belief; for it often happens that we are fully convinced of a truth ourselves, and yet, when we would convince others, we are obliged to adduce arguments, and invent media of proof entirely different from those on which our own conviction rests. It is, moreover, a fact that the universal belief in God is altogether disproportioned to the perception of design in the material universe. In the infancy of society, in the early stages of the civilization of every country, the operations of nature are obscure and perplexing. Design is often concealed. It is still oftener seen but indistinctly, and unity of design is not seen at all. Yet a faith in God, in some form or other, is every where displayed. In like manner, the great importance of this faith to the highest interests of our race, makes it probable that it was not intended to be entirely dependent on the varying process of induction from outward premises. We may suppose that religion, which necessarily involves the idea of God, must have its roots in the very foundation and elements of the soul of man. It is only on this supposition that the common definition of man as a religious being can be sustained.

This view is confirmed by a rigid examination of the argument from design. Such an examination forces us to the conclusion, in the opinion of President Hopkins, that correct, logical accuracy does not compel the deduction of a Being possessing the highest attributes of intelligence,—that the argument from design falls short of being a strict proof of the existence of a personal God. But if this argument be not logically valid, as this writer shows, and as Kant had previously shown, there is another argument, according to his theory, which may be pressed with perfect success. This is derived from the nature of the human soul. The soul exhibits effects of a different character

from any that are found in the material universe. These are spontaneous activity, thought, free-will, reason, conscience. The existence of a soul, endowed with these attributes, is a direct proof, reasoning from effect to cause, of a creative Mind, and is indeed the only condition on which the conception of such a mind can be formed, or the knowledge of it brought to light. Having thus verified our belief in the existence of the Father of Spirits, we are led to the conviction, from the adaptation of the body to the mind, and their mutual action on each other, that one being was the Creator of both, and we again perceive the reality of God, as the Author of nature. "We have therefore as the source of all things, as the principle of unity in all things, instead of a blind, unconscious principle, which general laws would seem to indicate, and which men call nature, or by whatever name pleases them, one, free, all-pervading, all-inspecting, all-comprehending, personal God."

The above meagre sketch does little justice to an argument which is carried out by the author with a sufficient completeness of detail and great beauty of illustration. Allowing the principles which are established by a sound, spiritual philosophy, I know not how its force and conclusiveness can be invalidated. It coincides, in the main, with the process of reasoning by which Cousin infers the Absolute Causality, or Free-Will of God, from the existence of those attributes, in a relative character, in the human soul; and also the moral and intellectual attributes of God, from a view of analogous attributes in man. The only thing wanting, as it seems to me, in the argument of President Hopkins, is the legitimation of our reasoning from the Finite in ourselves to the Infinite in God. With this omission, it presents a vulnerable side to the Materialist, who contends that the soul itself, with all its attributes, is the result of organization; and also to the Idealist, who should be disposed to maintain that the soul itself is the Absolute Existence, and implies no objective reality corresponding

to the inward phenomena of which we are conscious. The true basis of our belief in God must be found, in the last analysis, in the two principles, that our own existence is relative, limited, finite, and that we are compelled, by the necessity of our reason, to admit an absolute, perfect, and infinite existence. This view is repeatedly unfolded by Cousin, and indeed forms the principal element in his philosophical system, as may be seen in the present work.

With the addition of these principles, the argument of President Hopkins furnishes us with a conclusive vindication of the great, fundamental belief of humanity. If I mistake not, its value and importance will be more highly estimated by future inquirers, than it has yet been, as far as I am informed, among our philosophical theologians. The manner in which it is exhibited in the article referred to, indicates a mind of very rare analytical skill, and familiarity with the precise bearing of the various points, which it undertakes to set in order. It can scarcely fail to meet with the attention which it deserves from the student of metaphysics, in proportion as that science is cultivated with freedom and earnestness.

NOTE D. Page 66.

ME AND NOT-ME.

The expression equivalent to this is now so common in the philosophical language of continental Europe, that I might perhaps justly be charged with affectation, if I were to avoid the use of it in translating. At any rate, I could not do so, without an awkward circumlocution, by which nothing would be gained, either in respect of significance or grace. No one, indeed, is bound to be more scrupulous with regard to the introduction of foreign modes of speech into our native English, than the conscientious translator. If I have

transgressed in this way, in the present instance and in some others, it has been by compulsion and not by choice; and I shall look for the most speedy forgiveness from those who are best aware of the necessity of the case. As regards the phrase in question, it seems to be as forcible as any that could be selected for the expression of the abstract idea of personality and its opposite; an idea which lies at the foundation of all philosophical inquiries concerning the higher nature of man. The old English writers were in the habit of using the corresponding Latin term, to express the same idea; but I think this is more barbarous even than the modern phrase; and with the example of some good writers and translators who have preceded me, I must solicit for it a hospitable reception from the reader.

NOTE E. Page 79.

PANTHEISM.

"Aristotle in his book on *Xenophanes, Gorgias*, and *Zeno*,[1] Simplicius in his *Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle*,[2] and Theophrastus in Bessarion,[3] have preserved the substance of the argumentation, by which Xenophanes demonstrated that God had no beginning and could not have been born. It is impossible not to experience a profound and almost a solemn impression, in considering this argumentation, when we reflect that it is perhaps the first time, at least in Greece, that the human mind has attempted to give an account to itself of its faith and to convert its belief into theories. It is curious to be present at the birth of religious philosophy; we behold it there, if we may so speak, in its swathing clothes; as yet, it does but stammer on those formidable problems; but it is the duty of the friend

[1] *Ch.* 3. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Contra calumniatorem Platonis, II.* 11, *p.* 32.

of humanity to hear with attention and to gather up with care the half-formed words which escape from it, and to salute with respect the first appearance of reasoning. Here is the argumentation of Xenophanes, as preserved by Aristotle and Simplicius. 'It is impossible to apply to God the idea of birth, for every thing which is born must of necessity be born either of something like or of something unlike. Now each of these cases is impossible, for the like has no action on the like, and can no more produce it than it can be produced by it. On the other hand, the unlike cannot be born of the unlike; for if the strongest is born of the weakest, or the greatest of the smallest, or the better of the worse, or on the contrary, the worse of the better, being would proceed from non-being, or non-being from being, which is impossible. God therefore must be eternal.' We ought to read the same argumentation abridged in Simplicius, and still further reduced in Bessarion; we should not neglect even the passage of Plutarch in Eusebius, a passage which in the midst of grave errors, contains happy illustrations of the fragment of Aristotle, and in which Plutarch expressly acknowledges that Xenophanes has here taken a path peculiar to himself; and in fact Diogenes asserts that Xenophanes was the first to demonstrate that every thing which is born must also perish. We here see the early dawn of the principle, which was afterwards to become so celebrated; being cannot proceed from non-being, non-being can produce nothing, that is to say, nothing creates nothing. Here is perhaps the first expression of the principle of causality. Xenophanes did not invent this principle; it is inherent in the human mind which possessed it, made use of it, and applied it, or rather was governed by it in all its proceedings, though unconsciously; for that which most escapes the notice of intelligence, is precisely that which lies the deepest in its nature. To draw forth this principle from the depths and obscurity, in which it acts spontaneously and developes itself in a concrete, living, and active form,

to unfold it to the light of reflection, and to transform it into a law, into an abstract and general formula, of which the mind obtains the consciousness, and which it examines in some sort, as an external object; this is the glory of philosophy.

"The conclusion of this argumentation in Aristotle is that, 'since God cannot be born, he cannot perish, as every thing which is born must needs perish, while that which is not born, that is to say, that which does not become a being by means of another, but which is a being in itself, is eternal.' This is not merely the principle of causality, it is the distinct conception of accident and of substance; of phenomenal being and of being in itself, and the attributing of the notion of corruptibility to the one, and the notion of incorruptibility and eternity to the other, that is to say, the principle of substance, in all its extent and relations.

"The presence of two opposite tendencies in the physics and theology of Xenophanes is evident. It indicates two sorts of antecedents, through which it has passed, and of which it forms the point of reunion. But how has it combined these contrary elements? How is the Pythagorean theology united in Xenophanes with the Ionic physics? This is the question which ought to be settled, for it is precisely this combination which characterizes the original doctrine of Xenophanes, gives it a peculiar physiognomy, and assigns to it an independent rank in the history of the philosophy of this epoch.

The Ionic school and the Pythagorean school introduced into the Greek philosophy, the two fundamental elements of all philosophy; namely, physics and theology. We may thus see philosophy in Greece in possession of the two essential ideas on which it turns, the idea of the world and that of God. The two extreme terms of all speculation, accordingly, being given, nothing remains but to discover their relation. Now, the first solution which presents itself to

the human mind preoccupied, as it necessarily is, with the idea of unity, is the absorbing of one of the two terms in the other, the identifying of the world with God or of God with the world, and thus cutting the knot instead of untying it. These two exclusive solutions are both perfectly natural. It is natural,—when we possess the feeling of life, of this grand and diversified existence of which we are a part; when we consider the extent of this visible world, and at the same time, the harmony which every where reigns in it, and the beauty which shines through all its parts,—that we should stop with the limits of the senses and the imagination, that we should suppose that the beings of which this world is made up are the only beings which exist, that this great whole so harmonious and so uniform is the true subject and the last application of the idea of unity, that this whole, in a word, is God. Express this result in the Greek language, and we have Pantheism. Pantheism is the conception of the whole as the only God.

"On the other hand, when we discover that the apparent unity of the whole is only a harmony and not an absolute unity, a harmony which admits an infinite variety, which strongly resembles a systematic war and revolution, it is no less natural, in that case, to detach from this world the idea of unity which is indestructible in our minds, and, thus detached from the imperfect model of this visible world, to refer it to an invisible being placed above and beyond this world, the sacred type of absolute unity, beyond which there is nothing to be conceived or sought. Now, having once arrived at this absolute unity, it is no longer easy to depart from it, and to comprehend how, absolute unity being given as a principle, it is possible to arrive at plurality as the consequence; for absolute unity excludes all plurality. Nothing remains then, in relation to this consequence but to deny it, or at least, to despise it, and to regard the plurality of this visible world as a deceptive shadow of the absolute unity which alone exists, a fall hardly comprehensible,

a negation and an evil which we ought to escape from, in order to tend incessantly to the only true being, to the absolute unity, to God. Here is the system opposed to Pantheism. Call it whatever you please, it is nothing but the idea of unity applied exclusively to God, as Pantheism is the same idea applied exclusively to the world.

"Now, once more, these two exclusive solutions of the fundamental problem are both equally natural; and this is so true that they constantly return at every great epoch of the history of philosophy, with the modifications which are caused by the progress of time, but at the bottom always the same; and we may even say, that the history of their perpetual conflict, and of the alternate dominion of one or the other, has hitherto composed the history of philosophy itself. It is because these two solutions belong to the foundations of thought, that it constantly reproduces them, with an equal inability to dispense with one or the other, and to satisfy itself with either alone. In fact, neither taken separately, is sufficient for the human mind; and these two opposite points of view, so natural, and consequently so durable and so vital, exclusive as they are by themselves, for this very reason, are equally defective and unsatisfactory. A cry is raised against Pantheism. All the ability in the world can never absolve this doctrine, or reconcile it with the feelings of the human race. If we are consistent, all our efforts are vain; we can arrive with it merely at a sort of soul of the world as the principle of things; at fatality as the only law; at the confounding together of good and evil; that is to say, at their destruction, in the bosom of a vague and abstract unity, without any fixed subject; for there is certainly no absolute unity in any of the parts of this world taken separately; how then should it exist in their aggregate? As no effort can derive the Absolute and the Necessary from the Relative and the Contingent, so also from plurality, added to itself as often as you please, no generalization can derive unity;

totality only is thus obtained. At bottom, Pantheism turns on the confusion of these two ideas, which are so essentially distinct. On the other hand, unity without plurality is no more real, than plurality without unity is true. An absolute unity which does not depart from itself, or which projects only a shadow, may overwhelm us with its grandeur, may transport us with its mysterious charm; but it is all in vain; it does not enlighten the mind; it is loudly contradicted by those faculties which are in relation with this world, and which attest its reality, and by all our active and moral faculties, which would be a mockery, which would be an accusation against their author, if the theatre, in which they are called to exercise themselves were only an illusion and a snare. A God without a world is no less false than a world without a God; a cause without effects which manifest it, or an indefinite series of effects without a primary cause; a substance which should never be developed, or a rich developement of phenomena without a substance which sustains them; reality borrowed only from the Visible or the Invisible; in both these extremes, there are equal error and equal danger, equal forgetfulness of human nature, equal forgetfulness of one of the essential sides of thought and of things. Between these two abysses, the good sense of the human race has long pursued its path; far from systems and from schools, the human race has long believed with equal certainty in God and in the world. It believes in the world as a real and permanent effect, which it refers to a cause, not to an impotent and contradictory cause, which, forsaking its effect, would thus destroy it, but to a cause worthy of the name, which constantly producing and reproducing, deposits its strength and its beauty, without ever exhausting them, in its work; it believes in the world as an aggregate of phenomena, which would cease to exist the moment the eternal substance should cease to sustain them; it believes in the world as the visible manifestation of a hidden principle which speaks

to it beneath this veil, and which it adores in nature and in its own consciousness. This is what, as a mass, the human race believes. The glory of true philosophy would be to accept this universal faith, and to give a legitimate explanation of it. But through want of supporting itself on the human race, and of taking common sense for its guide, philosophy, hitherto straying on the right hand and left, has fallen by turns into one or the other extreme of systems that are equally true in one relation and equally false in another; and both vicious for the same reason, because they are equally exclusive and incomplete. This is the everlasting rock to which philosophy is exposed."—*Nouveaux Fragmens*, pp. 63 et seq.

NOTE F. Page 84.

PHILOSOPHY OF ENTHUSIASM.

"I HOLD that the highest degree of knowledge is intuitive knowledge. This knowledge, in many cases,—for example, in regard to time, space, personal identity, the Infinite, all substantial existence, as well as the Beautiful and the Good, has this characteristic, that it is not founded on the senses or on consciousness, but on reason, which, without the intervention of reasoning, arrives at its objects and conceives them with certainty. Now it is an attribute inherent in reason to believe in itself; this is the origin of faith; if therefore intuitive reason is above inductive and demonstrative reason, the faith of reason in itself, in intuition, is purer and more elevated than the faith of reason in itself, in induction and demonstration. Let it be remembered that the truths which reason intuitively discovers are not arbitrary, but necessary; that they are not relative, but absolute; the authority of reason is absolute; it is therefore a characteristic of the faith which is attached to reason, that it is abso-

lute like reason itself. Such are the admirable characteristics of reason, and of the faith of reason in itself.

"This is not all. Whenever we interrogate reason concerning itself, whenever we demand of it its peculiar principle and the source of the absolute authority which characterizes it, we are compelled to perceive that this reason is not our own, in the sense that it is we who constitute it. It is not in our power, it is not in the power of our will, to cause reason to give us, or not to give us such or such a truth. Independently of our will, reason intervenes, and, certain conditions being accomplished, gives us, or rather imposes upon us those truths. Reason is manifested in us, although it is not identical with us, and can never be confounded with our personality; reason is impersonal. Whence then comes this wonderful guest? What is the principle of this reason which enlightens us, without belonging to us? This principle is no other than God, the first and last principle of every thing. Now if reason has hitherto cherished an unbounded faith in itself, when it refers itself to its principle, when it knows that it comes from God, the faith which it before had in itself increases, not in degree, but in nature. It receives, if I may so speak, all the superiority of the eternal substance over the finite substance, in which it is manifested. Faith thus gains a double energy in relation to those truths which the supreme reason makes known to us within these shadows of time, within the limits of our own frailty.

"Reason is thus clothed in its own eyes with divine authority on account of the principle on which it rests. Now this state of reason which listens to and regards itself as the echo of God on earth, with the peculiar and extraordinary characteristics which then distinguish it, is what we call enthusiasm. The word is a sufficient explanation of the thing. Enthusiasm is the breath of God within us; it is immediate intuition opposed to induction and demonstration; it is primitive spontaneity opposed to the ulterior de-

velopement of reflection; it is the perception of the loftiest truths by reason, when it is most independent both of the senses and of our personality. Enthusiasm, in its highest degree, and, so to speak, in its crisis, is peculiar only to certain individuals, and again to certain individuals in certain circumstances; but in its faintest degree, enthusiasm is a fact like any other, a fact by no means extraordinary, which does not pertain to such or such a theory, individual, or epoch, but to human nature itself, in all men, in all conditions, and almost at every hour. It is enthusiasm which produces spontaneous convictions and resolutions, on a small as well as on a large scale, in heroes and in the feeblest woman. It is enthusiasm which forms the poetic spirit in every thing; and the poetic spirit, thank God, is not the exclusive property of poets; it has been given to all men in some degree, more or less pure, more or less elevated; it appears especially in certain individuals and in certain movements of the life of those individuals who are Poets by way of eminence. It is enthusiasm, moreover, which gives birth to religions; for every religion supposes two things; namely, that the truths which it proclaims are absolute truths, and that it proclaims them in the name of God himself by whom they are revealed.

"So far all is well. We are still within the sphere of humanity and of reason; for it is reason which composes the foundation of faith and of enthusiasm, of heroism, of poetry and of religion; and when the poet or the priest repudiates reason in the name of faith and of enthusiasm, he does nothing else, whether he know it or not, and it is not the concern of either to know what he does,—he does nothing else, I say—than place one mode of reason above the other modes of the same reason; for if immediate intuition be above reasoning, it still pertains no less to reason; we attempt in vain to repudiate reason, we are always obliged to make use of it. Enthusiasm, therefore, is a rational fact which holds its place in the order of natural facts

and in the history of the human mind; but this fact is one of singular delicacy, and enthusiasm can easily be converted into folly. We are here on the doubtful confines of reason and extravagance. Here is the universal, necessary and legitimate principle of religious philosophy, of religions, and of mysticism, a principle which we should not confound with the aberrations which may corrupt it. Thus unfolded and illustrated by analysis, philosophy ought to recognise it, if it wishes to recognise all the essential facts, all the elements of reason and of humanity.

"Look now at the way in which error begins. Enthusiasm, I repeat it, is the spontaneous intuition of truth by reason, independent also as it can be of the personality and the senses, of induction and of demonstration,—a state, which we have discovered to be genuine, legitimate, and founded on the nature of human reason. But it often happens that the senses and the personality, which inspiration ought to surmount and reduce to silence, still continue and introduce themselves even into inspiration, and combine with it details of a material character, which are at once arbitrary, false, and ludicrous. It happens, moreover, that they who participate, to a remarkable degree, in that revelation of God, which is made to all men by reason and truth, imagine that it is peculiar to themselves, that it has been refused to others, not only in the same degree, but totally and absolutely; they constitute in their own minds, to their advantage, a sort of privilege of inspiration; and as in inspiration we feel the duty of submitting ourselves to the truths which inspiration reveals to us, and the holy mission of proclaiming and spreading them, we often go so far as to suppose that it is also our duty, in submitting ourselves to those truths, to submit others with us; to impose them upon their reception, not by virtue of our personal light and authority, but by virtue of the superior power from which all inspiration proceeds; bowing the knee before the principle of our enthusiasm and our faith,

we wish also to make others bend under the same principle, to cause it to be adored and served for the same reason for which we adore and serve it ourselves. Hence religious authority; hence, in a short time, tyranny. We begin with believing in special revelations made in our favor; we end with regarding ourselves as the delegates of the Deity and of Providence, commissioned not only to enlighten and to save docile spirits, but to enlighten and to save those, whether they will or not, who offer resistance to the truth and to God. The folly of enthusiasm soon conducts to the tyranny of enthusiasm." *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, Tom. II. pp. 478—485.

The belief that reason and conscience possess an authority superior to that of our personal desires, is one of the common sentiments of humanity. The philosophical validity of this belief is established by Cousin in the above extract, as well as in many other passages of his writings. We find the same doctrine not unfrequently alluded to by the most profound philosophers both of ancient and modern times, but I have never met with any one who has developed it so clearly, and pointed out its foundation in human nature, with so much precision, as Cousin has done in this passage, in the first and second Prefaces to the *Fragments*, in the Programme of his *Course on Absolute Truths*, and in the sixth Lecture of his *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*. Cousin himself quotes these striking expressions of Fenelon from his treatise on *the Existence of God*, in illustration of his own views. They are doubtless familiar to most of my readers; but they deserve their repeated attention. "In truth, my reason is in myself; for I must constantly return within, in order to find it. But the superior reason which corrects me when necessary, and which I consult, does not belong to me; it makes no part of myself.

Accordingly, that which appears to us the most constantly, which seems to form the very essence of ourselves, I mean our reason, is that which is least of all our own property, which we ought the most to regard as a borrowed treasure. We receive, every moment, without cessation, a reason superior to ourselves, just as we constantly breathe the air which is a foreign substance, or as we constantly see the objects around us by the light of the sun, the rays of which are bodies foreign to our eyes. There is an interior school, in which man receives what he can neither give himself, nor obtain from other men, who live like him on what is borrowed. Where is this perfect reason which is so near me, and yet so distinct from me? Where is this supreme reason? Is it not the God whom I seek?"

Cousin refers also to Bossuet, *Introduction à la Philosophie*. Ch. IV. Sect. 5—9. and to the whole system of Malebranche.

The excellent Reinhold in the latter part of his philosophical career seems to have had a glimpse of the necessity of this doctrine, in order to escape from the too subjective conclusions of Kant. He failed, however, to reduce it to a satisfactory systematic form, and probably never comprehended it in its full extent. The first hint of the independence of reason appears to have been suggested to him by his friend Bardili. An interesting account of the operations of his mind in regard to this point is given by his biographer.

"Just before the conclusion of the century, late in the autumn of 1799, Reinhold became acquainted with Bardili's *Outlines of Logic*, which had been recently published. Although he was not satisfied with the language and the tone of this book, his attention was strongly aroused by its principal thought, which, the more he considered it in a clear ight, appeared to him to be important and true. It was

a thought to which he had nearly approached himself in this expression, 'that there is a power in a human being to perceive the being of God above nature, in a manner which transcends the activity of our individual conception.' This fundamental thought, as it presented itself to Reinhold, may be expressed in the following propositions. Reason, as it is in itself, must be distinguished from reason, as it is exhibited in human consciousness. Reason in itself is the manifestation of God, the principle of all being and knowing. It displays itself in our consciousness, where its developement is conditioned by the nature of sensible intuition, and inseparably united with that, assumes the character of our human mode of thought; in the first place, by our reference of variety to unity, of consequences to grounds, of effects to causes, of actions to intentions, by the recognition of design, calculation, the adaptation of means to ends in the whole Universe; still further by the reference of unity in point of quantity to absolute unity, of grounds to the original ground, of causes to the ultimate cause, of intention and ends to the final end; in short, by the reference of the Universe to the One in which and through which every thing is arranged, grounded, designed, and effected. While the philosopher is conscious of rational activity, which although it appears in man only in union with sensible intuition, bears the character of absolute, of divine thought, he will at the same time be conscious in it of the existence of all reality as determined by this thought."[1]

A quotation to the same effect from a valuable writer of the seventeenth century, is given by Mr. Coleridge in the *Aids to Reflection*. Mr. Coleridge says, "Take one passage among the many from the posthumous Tracts (1660) of

[1] See REINHOLD's *Leben und litterarisches Wirken*, von ERNST REINHOLD, S. 99. Jena, 1825.

John Smith, not the least Star in that bright Constellation of Cambridge men, the cotemporaries of Jeremy Taylor. 'While we reflect on our own idea of Reason, we know that our own souls are not it, but only partake of it; and that we have it κατα μεθεξιν and not κατ' ουσιην. Neither can it be called a faculty, but far rather a light, which we enjoy, but the source of which is not in ourselves, nor rightly, by any individual, to be denominated *mine*.' This *pure* intelligence he then proceeds to contrast with the *discursive* faculty, *i. e.* the understanding."[1]

It is also clear, I think, from many passages in the writings of our great American metaphysician, Jonathan Edwards, that he had an indistinct conception of the character of reason as independent of personality, and involving a divine principle. He expresses this idea, it is true, in the language of his peculiar theology, and as Sir James Mackintosh justly observes of him in another connexion, "thought it necessary to limit his doctrine to his own persuasion by denying an insight into divine things to those Christians who did not take the same view with him of their religion." No writer, however, is more strenuous in claiming for the human mind, under certain conditions, the power of perceiving and judging spiritual truth. This power is the result of a divine principle imparted to the nature of man, and as such possesses absolute and infallible authority. The essential difference between Edwards and Cousin is that the former regards the intuitive power as a special gift and limited to the sphere of religion, while the latter regards it as an universal attribute of humanity and the ground of all knowledge. It would be no difficult thing to bring these views into harmony, were this the place for it. With all its defects, the advocacy which

[1] *Aids to Reflection*, Note, p. 323. Burlington Ed.

Edwards has given to the faculty of spiritual intuition, forms an invaluable contribution to a sound religious philosophy, and in spite of great differences of opinion, must always make him a favorite author with thinkers who wish to investigate the ultimate grounds of truth. The following passage from his celebrated Discourse on the "Reality of Spiritual Light" applies as well to the theory of Cousin, as to that which was had immediately in view by Edwards himself.

"It is rational to suppose, that this knowledge should be given immediately by God, and not be obtained by natural means. Upon what account would it seem unreasonable, that there should be any immediate communication between God and the creature? It is strange that men should make any matter of difficulty of it. Why should not he that made all things, still have something immediately to do with the things that he has made? Where lies the great difficulty, if we own the being of a God, and that he created all things out of nothing, of allowing some immediate influence of God on the creation still? And if it be reasonable to suppose it with respect to any part of the creation, it is especially so with respect to reasonable, intelligent creatures; who are next to God in the gradation of the different orders of beings, and whose business is most immediately with God; who were made on purpose for those exercises that do respect God and wherein they have nextly to do with God: For reason teaches, that man was made to serve and glorify his Creator. And if it be rational to suppose that God immediately communicates himself to man in any affair, it is in this. It is rational to suppose that God would reserve that knowledge and wisdom, that is of such a divine and excellent nature, to be bestowed immediately by himself, and that it should not be left in the power of second causes. Spiritual wisdom and grace is the highest and most excellent gift that ever God bestows on any creature: In this

the highest excellency and perfection of a rational creature consists. It is also immensely the most important of all divine gifts: It is that wherein man's happiness consists, and on which his everlasting welfare depends. How rational is it to suppose that God, however he has left meaner goods and lower gifts to second causes, and in some sort in their power, yet should reserve this most excellent, divine, and important of all divine communications, in his own hands, to be bestowed immediately by himself, as a thing too great for second causes to be concerned in? It is rational to suppose, that this blessing should be immediately from God; for there is no gift or benefit that is in itself so nearly related to the divine nature, there is nothing the creature receives that is so much of God, of his nature, so much a participation of the Deity: It is a kind of emanation of God's beauty, and is related to God as the light is to the sun."—EDWARDS's Works, Vol. VIII. First American Edition.

NOTE G. PAGE 85.

JACOBI.—REASON AND UNDERSTANDING.

THE description which is here given of Jacobi's philosophy is, strictly speaking, applicable only to an early period of his investigations. At the commencement of his career, his attention was almost exclusively directed to the faculty of perceiving super-sensual truth, in reference to its actual results, rather than to its character and authority. The primary fact of consciousness with which he commenced, was that the human mind is in possession of indestructible convictions, that are not the product either of sensation or of reasoning. These convictions, as he maintained, are grounded on immediate feeling, and on faith in the reality and certainty of feeling. At this point of his inquiries, he considered reason only as the faculty of reflection, of deduc-

ing logical consequences from given premises; but did not recognise it as the highest principle in man, the source of his holiest convictions, the universal and absolute teacher of spiritual truth. He was accordingly accused of making war upon reason in behalf of feeling, of elevating sentiment at the expense of science. His philosophy was reproached with being merely an individual product; grounded on his own personal experience and temperament; and destitute of a legitimate foundation on universal principles. In the course of his investigations he was led to perceive these defects of his system. His mind was thus turned to a more thorough examination of the nature of reason; and the conclusions at which he arrived with regard to its ultimate authority, although expressed in a popular rather than in a scientific form, bear a close analogy to those maintained by Cousin, as the principal elements of his own philosophy. Jacobi, it must be confessed, was better able to obtain a genuine insight into super-sensual truth for himself, than to demonstrate its validity for the satisfaction of others. His writings, accordingly, are more valuable for their strong and eloquent statements of the essential facts of our nature, than for their elucidation of the manner in which those facts can be established to the conviction of the scientific inquirer. They form an excellent preparatory study for the system of Cousin; while that serves to complete and legitimate the spontaneous perceptions which they present.

The leading principles of Jacobi's philosophy are of such an interesting character, that perhaps, a slight exposition of them may be gratifying to the reader. The few extracts which I shall here give from his works, exhibit a favorable view of his personal character, his earnest and unwearied strivings after truth, his taste for the most elevated ideas, and the strong religious tendency of his mind. Perhaps also they will throw some light on the distinction between reason and understanding, of which so much account is made by Mr. Coleridge, but which is no where so clearly unfolded as in the writings of Jacobi.

"With the earliest thought that has remained in consciousness," he tells us of himself, "I have sought for the truth; and afterwards have waited upon its steps, with every thought of my mind; but, as at that time, so also at all subsequent periods, never with the vain and idle desire of adorning myself with it, as if I had been the discoverer, as if it had first proceeded from myself. I was craving for a truth, which should not be my creature, but of which I was the creature myself; a truth, which should turn my poverty into fulness; bring light into the darkness which surrounded me; call forth the dawn before me and within me, according to the instinctive promises of my nature."[1]

"My philosophical reflection was never without purpose, but always had a determinate object in view. It was not merely to obtain that self-understanding, which regardless of its direction, begins sometimes in this way and sometimes in that, turns first in one quarter and then in another; but I wished to come to the understanding of a specific fact, and that was, the inborn devotion which I felt to an unknown God. If self-understanding should lead me to the conclusion, that all faith in a God to whom we can pray—and devotion recognises no other,—was a folly; then I should have become wise to my own injury; my great want would not be satisfied, namely, the want to discover God as the primary ground of all knowledge, and to find him again every where. It was never my object to establish a system for the school; my writings came forth from the depths of my life; they possess an historical connexion; I composed them, as it were, not by my own will, not according to my own pleasure; but impelled by a higher and irresistible power."[2]

[1] *Schelling's Lehre u. s. w. von* Friedrich Köppen, *nebst drey Briefen verwandten Inhalts von* F. H. Jacobi, quoted in Jacobi's *Werke*, B. iv. Vorrede, S. xiii.

[2] *Werke*, B. iv. Vorrede, S. xvi.

"The human soul seeks the Eternal, Unchangeable, Self-subsisting, Absolute; it is not willingly deprived of truth; but it wishes to discover, not the shadow, but that which casts the shadow. All men inwardly call something the truth, in anticipation; of which they are not yet in possession; after which they strive; and yet which they could not suppose, unless it had been manifested to them in some way already. The twilight opens their eye, and strangely announces to them a Sun which has not yet arisen. The morning has broke, but the day has not come. God alone celebrates the Sabbath-rest; but it is for man to keep it holy. If the supposition of this truth be a mere personal deception of rational beings, if they have not even the most dim intuition of it, then is their inquiry vain and idle. 'But not vain and idle is this inquiry;' so prophesies devotion in the beginning.[1]

"As it is religion which raises Man above the animals, as it is this which makes him a man, it is this also which makes him a philosopher. Does religious feeling strive with devout purpose to fulfil the will of God, religious insight more surely strives to obtain the knowledge of God, to discover that which is concealed. It was with this religion, the central point of all spiritual life, that my philosophy had to do, not with the acquisition of other scientific knowledge, which might be obtained even without philosophy. Intercourse with nature was to help me to intercourse with God. Eternally to remain in nature, to learn to forget and to dispense with God in it, I was unwilling.

"I appeal to an unconquerable, resistless feeling as the primary and immediate ground of all philosophy and religion; to a feeling which gives man the perception and the consciousness, that he possesses a sense for the supersensual. This sense I call reason, to distinguish it from the senses which are conversant with the visible world.

[1] *Ibid.* S. xviii.

Such an appeal can be known, and with it reason, only on condition of personality and consciousness. Glimpses of the first fair, first good, and first true, are given to man in the contemplating spirit; and because he has these glimpses, he knows that a spirit lives in him, and a spirit over him."

It is admitted by Jacobi, in one of his latest writings, that he was guilty of an erroneous use of language, on account of neglecting the fundamental distinction in our intellectual nature between reason and understanding. This distinction, whether expressed by the terms just named, by the spontaneous and reflective reason, or by the constituent laws of human belief and the notices of the senses, is so far from being an ingenious and useless subtilty, that it is constantly recognised by the great mass of mankind, and is essential to a comprehensive view of the original principles of knowledge. For want of perceiving this distinction, Jacobi tells us, he was for a long time unable to give a philosophical support to his main doctrine of a power of faith superior to the faculty which is employed in demonstrative science. The leading purpose of his philosophy, therefore, at a subsequent period, was to establish the certainty of immediate knowledge, as distinguished from that which is secondary, and dependent for its proof on a process of ratiocination. His system, in fact, is an attempt to investigate the laws and results of the spontaneous reason, as Cousin would call it, in opposition to the reflective understanding. It is plain to every one who has looked into the subject at all, that a great deal of our reasoning is concerned with facts, of which we have obtained an intuitive knowledge, through the medium of the external senses. The materials thus furnished by the eye, the ear, the touch, are acted on by intelligence according to its own laws, reduced to order and harmony, and from the changing and

[1] *Ibid.* S. xx—xxiii.

fragmentary character which they bear in themselves, brought to a systematic unity in the perceptions of consciousness. The facts are supplied by the senses; the form is given by the understanding; the original data of this kind of knowledge are brought from without; the conclusions of science are the product of the intellect. In this way, we obtain an acquaintance with the material world, investigate and establish the physical sciences. This is the relation which subsists between the senses and the understanding. So far there is no doubt in any mind, no room for a difference of opinion. But the question then arises, is the reflective understanding conversant with a higher order of ideas, than those which are suggested by the notices of the senses? Is there a source of inward light corresponding to the outward senses; in connexion with which the understanding is placed; from which it receives truths with equal certainty as from the latter; without which it would know nothing save the material Universe, and its own operations in regard to the facts which it presents? Jacobi maintains that there is such a faculty in the nature of man; the power of immediate perception of spiritual truth; the foundation of religion and morality; the medium of communication between the understanding and the invisible world, just as the senses are between that and the visible world. This power he calls reason. The faculty which receives its notices he calls understanding. Materials of thought, of knowledge, of science are given us both by the senses and by reason; but the materials furnished must be understood; that is, they must be reflected on, examined, arranged, comprehended, in short, according to the essential laws of the human understanding. It would appear at first sight, says Jacobi, as if there could be no difficulty in a broad and accurate distinction between reason and understanding, since we perpetually make it, without falling into error, when we speak generally of the difference between man and animals. No one has ever spoken of an animal

reason. But we all know and speak of an animal understanding. We recognise also many degrees in the merely animal understanding. How much above the ox, for instance, do we not place the dog, the horse, or the elephant? But none of these degrees brings the animal nearer to reason. All, the more perfect as well as the more imperfect, are destitute of it, to the same extent, that is, absolutely and entirely.

But how is it that there can be a merely animal understanding, which sometimes appears to surpass the human understanding, and absolutely no merely animal reason? A thorough discussion of this question must bring us the solution of the riddle.

The animal perceives only the objects of sense. Man, endowed with reason, perceives also what is beyond the objects of sense. The faculty with which he perceives what is super-sensual, he calls his reason; just as the faculty with which he perceives the objects of sense, he calls his eye. The organ of super-sensual perception is wanting in the animal. On account of this deficiency, the notion of a merely animal reason involves an impossibility. Man possesses this organ, and it is only by virtue of this, that he is a reasonable being. If that which we call reason were only the product of a faculty of reflection resting upon sensible experience, it would be the merest folly to speak of super-sensual things. In that case, reason as such, would be without foundation, nothing but a fiction. But if reason be a power which actually reveals truth above the cognizance of the senses, then the human understanding is one elevated above the animal, and having knowledge of God, Freedom, and Virtue, of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.[1]

"These views," says Jacobi, "which did not become perfectly clear to me, until a later period, and after many

[1] See *Werke*, B. II. Vorrede.

struggles, were, at the time of my previous work,[1] still dimly seen through the cloud of prevailing conceptions. With all the philosophers of that epoch, I gave the name of reason to that which is not reason; namely, the mere faculty of notions, judgments, and conclusions with regard to the perceptions of sense,—a faculty which of itself is absolutely incapable of giving any positive knowledge. But that which reason truly and properly is, the faculty of supposing the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, in themselves, with entire confidence in the objective validity of this supposition, I stated under the name of the power of faith, as a faculty above reason; and this gave occasion to unpleasant misunderstandings, and prevented the correct exhibition of my genuine opinion."[2]

According to Jacobi, philosophy commences, as soon as the human consciousness begins to distinguish, with clearness and precision, the perceptions of sensible objects from the perceptions of those objects which are above the senses. This distinction is dimly seen even by the child, which yet in the cradle, attempts its stammering words, and as mothers say, smiles with the angels; but centuries must elapse, before an Anaxagoras appears, who opens the way for a higher developement to the understanding, which has been so long turned to the contemplation of external nature, in its scientific advancement,—the way to the knowledge of a Spirit presiding over nature, of a Creative Intelligence.

Like every other system of knowledge, philosophy receives its form from the understanding alone, as the general faculty of intellectual conceptions. Without the conceptions of the understanding, there is no reflected consciousness, no consciousness of the actual cognitions that are brought to it; and hence also, no discrimination and comparison, no

[1] *Ein Gespräch über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus.*

[2] *Werke*, B. II. Vorrede.

division and combination, no weighing and considering of these cognitions, in a word, no actual taking possession of any truth whatever. The substantial and peculiar contents of philosophy, on the other hand, are given alone by reason,—the faculty of knowledge independent of sensibility and unattainable by it. Reason creates no intellectual conceptions, builds no systems, passes no judgments; but, like the external senses, merely reveals to the understanding the materials of actual, positive knowledge.

This is to be held fast above every thing else. As there is a sensible intuition, an intuition by sense; so also there is a rational intuition, an intuition by reason. Both are opposed to each other as peculiar sources of knowledge. It is no less impossible to derive the latter from the former, than the former from the latter. In like manner, both sustain the same relation to the understanding, and so far also, to demonstration. No demonstration is of force against sensible intuition, since all demonstration is only the referring of the conception under consideration to the sensible intuition on which it is founded. This, in respect to physical knowledge, is the First and the Last, that which is unconditionally valid, the Absolute. On the same ground also, no demonstration is of force against rational intuition, which gives us the knowledge of objects, beyond the sphere of Physics; that is to say, which makes us certain of their reality and truth.

We must use the expression, intuition of reason, because the language has no other terms, to indicate the manner, in which the knowledge of that which is unattainable by the senses is given to the understanding in immediate feeling,—and yet as truly objective, not merely an affection of thought.

This power of feeling is the most elevated faculty which man possesses; that which alone specifically separates him from the animals; and which raises him incomparably above them not only in degree, but in kind. This faculty is one

and the same with reason. As the senses bring knowledge to the understanding in sensation, so the reason brings knowledge to the understanding in feeling. The conceptions of those truths which are given us only in feeling (the intuitive perceptions of reason) we call ideas. These ideas are at the foundation of freedom and virtue, of our knowledge of God, of wisdom, and of art.

"We have started with the question, is human reason nothing but understanding hovering over the intuitions of sense, and with no actual relation to any thing above them; or is it a higher faculty actually revealing to man, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good; and not palming off upon him merely false and hollow images, that are destitute of objective reality?

"We have shewn, that the first is assumed in all philosophies since Plato, with and after Aristotle, until the time of Kant, both in the so-called rational philosophies of Leibnitz, Wolf, and Sulzer, and in the professedly merely sensual philosophies of Locke, Condillac, and Bonnet.

"We could appeal for the truth of this assertion to the proofs given of it by Kant, which incontestably make out, that a reflective understanding employed only on the sensible world and on itself, as the faculty of intellectual conceptions, whenever it attempts to pass beyond the bounds of sense falls into a void and barren sphere, in which it can only seize its own shadow, extended on all sides to Infinity. Hence, we have further concluded, that every thing supersensual is a fiction, and the notion of it without significance,—or the knowledge of the super-sensual must be given to man by a higher faculty, which reveals what is true in and above external phenomena, in a manner of which the senses and the understanding take no cognizance."[1]

"The human reason is to be regarded, on the one hand,

[1] *Ibid.*

as the faculty of perceiving what is divine over and beyond man; and on the other hand as the faculty of perceiving what is divine in man,—and as this divine element itself. If our rational being were not originally of a Divine Nature, it would be impossible for it to attain, by any means whatever, to the true knowledge or the true love of God."[1]

The statements now given concerning Jacobi's philosophy, though fragmentary, in the extreme, like all his writings, will enable the reader to perceive that he was a genuine scientific inquirer, and no mystic, although he did not succeed in reducing his system to a compact and luminous form. With all his deficiencies, however, he has exerted no small influence on the developement of thought in Germany, and will always occupy an elevated and an honored rank in the history of its modern philosophy. An interesting biographical sketch of Jacobi, is contained in Mrs. Austin's "Goethe and his Contemporaries," Vol. II. p. 189, and a strangely distorted account of his philosophical opinions in the same Work, Vol. III. p. 267. The student will find some discriminating and valuable criticisms on the system of Jacobi in KRAUSE's *Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft*, S. 471—491. 1829, and in J. H. FICHTE's *Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie*, S. 181—244. 1829. See also WEISSE, *Ueber das Verhältniss des Publicums zur Philosophie in dem Zeitpuncte von Hegel's Abscheiden*, S. 8, 9. 1832.

NOTE H. PAGE 92.

THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL.—ABSOLUTE PARTY IN FRANCE.

THE appellation Theological school, is given to the party in the Catholic Church which is distinguished by its attach-

[1] *Werke*, B. III. S. 239.

ment to absolute government in politics and to rigid doctrines in religion. One of its most celebrated representatives was the eloquent De Maistre, whose posthumous work entitled *Les Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg*, has obtained a wide European reputation. The following description of that party is given by Damiron.[1]

"The Theological school has its peculiar principle as well as Sensualism; but we need not say a very different one. Instead of seeing nothing in man but organs and sensation, it sees in him an intelligence served by organs, it sees in him especially an intelligence. It is eminently Spiritualist; but it is so, according to the Church; that is, its psychological idea is combined with a traditional dogma which produces a theory rather mystical than scientific, more valuable to faith than to reason. This dogma is original sin. In fact, it believes that the first man fell, and in him all his race; that his crime became that of his children, and of his children's children, to the latest generation; that he has made us all like himself, all guilty like him, all sinners in his sin; so that sin comes to us with life, and no one can escape from it. But if it be impossible to avoid it, it is not impossible to expiate it; and it depends on the conscience of every individual to purify itself by virtue, and to redeem itself by religion. This is the law of the human race. Its destiny is to regain by repentance the good which it has lost by the misfortune of its birth. It is painful and grievous, because it is a punishment. The world for our race is only a place of expiation. Nothing occurs in it but for the sake of justice and satisfaction. The evils with which it is filled are not simple trials; they are chastisements and penalties. Creatures who should be born feeble but innocent, imperfect but without vice, ought to be exposed only to those sufferings which are necessary for their better education; pain and want would be adapted to their condition as a motive, and a means for perfection and vir-

[1] *Histoire*, pp. 14—17.

tue; punishment would be unjust. If, on the contrary, they were born vicious and guilty, their condition is no longer the same, and in consequence, their life should be expiatory. It is important to remark this; for it is the great moral principle of the Theological school, that life, above every thing, is a discipline of penance.

"And as man can still increase his original sin by the addition of acquired vices and accidental crimes, and thus merit additional correction, there are not only evils of common desert on the earth, but also particular evils reserved for certain individuals according to their guilt. But if there be men sufficiently depraved to accumulate vice upon vice, and to be sinners at once on account of their fathers and on their own account, there are others who, more happy, not only pay their own debt, but who have besides sufficient merit to be able to be sureties for their brethren in distress, to sacrifice themselves to God to redeem them from sin. This they should do, as soon as they can; charity prescribes it to them as a law; and the Son of God has come into the world to give them the precept and example of this, with divine authority.

"As a general rule, humanity is not good, it needs severity; if the sovereigns who govern do not rule according to this principle, there is reason to fear that it will fall into all manner of disorder; it must have masters who will restrain it, subdue it, and make it fulfil by force the conditions of its destiny. It would be destroyed by liberty; for it would certainly not employ it as a means of expiation; it would not make use of it for the sake of salvation; it should be granted to it at least only at the discretion of authority; it should be a local and temporary concession, but not an essential, national, and general right.

"If therefore governments would answer to the wants of society for which they are instituted; if they wish to move in obedience to the law which God has marked out to their power, it behoves them to conduct according to the principles of expiation, never to succumb before the people, but to

rule over them with authority, to manage them with absolute sovereignty; they are something more for the people than instructers and guides, they are their judges, their correctors; it is the depraved that they have to lead. Such, in their most general aspect are the political applications of the doctrine of the Theological school. Hence the illiberal opinions of the partisans of this doctrine; hence their systematic opposition to every form of liberty; hence the plenary power, which they claim for the Prince and the State. It is true, that according to them, the Prince has not only force; he has also his spirit, his principles, his religion; but where does he obtain his religion? At the Holy See, of which he must be only the disciple and the spiritual subject; thus, the Prince and the Pope, the Prince under the Pope, absolute power under the law of the theocracy; here is the definite limit of all ultramontane politics."

And yet, I cannot but add, the connexion between the theological doctrines and the political principles here described is accidental and arbitrary. It is far from being the case that the sternest speculative theology is always allied with attachment to absolute power in the government. Our English and American history is crowded with examples to the contrary. The Puritans, to a man, were the enemies of the royal prerogative. With similar views in religion to those of the absolute party in France, the English Puritan was ever the uncompromising advocate of political freedom. "He could as little become the slave of a priestcraft as of a despot. He was himself a judge of the orthodoxy of the elders; and if he feared the invisible powers of the air, of darkness, and of hell, he feared nothing on earth. Puritanism constituted, not the Christian clergy, but the Christian people, the interpreter of the divine will. The voice of the majority was the voice of God; and the issue of Puritanism was therefore popular sovereignty." [1]

[1] See BANCROFT'S *History of the United States*, Vol. I. p. 462.

NOTE I. Page 99.

COUSIN'S VIEWS OF CHRISTIANITY AS A MEANS OF EDUCATION.

"Christianity ought to be the basis of the instruction of the people; we must not flinch from the open profession of this maxim; it is no less politic than it is honest. We baptize our children, and bring them up in the Christian faith and in the bosom of the church; in after-life, age, reflection, the breath of human opinions, modify their early impressions, but it is good that these impressions should have been made by Christianity. Popular education ought therefore to be religious, that is to say, Christian; for, I repeat it, there is no such thing as religion in general; in Europe, and in our days, religion means Christianity. Let our popular schools then be Christian; let them be so entirely and earnestly.

"Without neglecting physical science, and the knowledge applicable to the arts of life, we must make moral science, which is of far higher importance, our main object. The mind and the character are what a true master ought, above all, to fashion. We must lay the foundations of moral life in the souls of our young masters, and therefore we must place religious instruction,—that is, to speak distinctly, Christian instruction,—in the first rank in the education of our Normal schools. Leaving to the *curé*, or to the pastor of the place, the care of instilling the doctrines peculiar to each communion, we must constitute religion a special object of instruction, which must have its place in each year of the Normal course; so that at the end of the entire course, the young masters, without being theologians, may have a clear and precise knowledge of the history, doctrines, and, above all, the moral precepts of Christianity. Without this, the pupils, when they become masters, would be incapable of giving any other religious instruction than

the mechanical repetition of the catechism, which would be quite insufficient. I would particularly urge this point, which is the most important and the most delicate of all. Before we can decide on what should constitute a true primary Normal school, we must determine what ought to be the character of a simple elementary school, that is, a humble village school. The popular schools of a nation ought to be imbued with the religious spirit of that nation. Now without going into the question of diversities of doctrine, is Christianity, or is it not, the religion of the people of France? It cannot be denied that it is. I ask, then, is it our object to respect the religion of the people, or to destroy it? If we mean to set about destroying it, then, I allow, we ought by no means to have it taught in the people's schools. But if the object we propose to ourselves is totally different, we must teach our children that religion which civilized our fathers; that religion whose liberal spirit prepared, and can alone sustain, all the great institutions of modern times. We must also permit the clergy to fulfil their first duty,—the superintendence of religious instruction. But in order to stand the test of this superintendence with honor, the schoolmaster must be enabled to give adequate religious instruction; otherwise parents, in order to be sure that their children receive a good religious education, will require us to appoint ecclesiastics as schoolmasters, which, though assuredly better than having irreligious schoolmasters, would be liable to very serious objections of various kinds. The less we desire our schools to be ecclesiastical, the more ought they to be Christian. It necessarily follows, that there must be a course of special religious instruction in our Normal schools. Religion is, in my eyes, the best—perhaps the only—basis of popular education. I know something of Europe, and never have I seen good schools where the spirit of Christian charity was wanting. Primary instruction flourishes in three countries, Holland, Scotland, and Germany; in all it is profoundly religious. It is said to be so in America.

"I am not ignorant that this advice will grate on the ears of many persons, and that I shall be thought extremely *dévot* at Paris. Yet it is not from Rome, but from Berlin, that I address you. The man who holds this language to you is a philosopher, formerly disliked, and even persecuted, by the priesthood; but this philosopher has a mind too little affected by the recollection of his own insults, and is too well acquainted with human nature and with history, not to regard religion as an indestructible power; genuine Christianity, as a means of civilization for the people, and a necessary support for those on whom society imposes irksome and humble duties, without the slightest prospect of fortune, without the least gratification of self-love."—COUSIN'S *Report on the state of Public Instruction in Prussia.* Translated by SARAH AUSTIN, pp. 126, 288, 291.

NOTE J. PAGE 99.

RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE OF COUSIN'S PHILOSOPHY.

THE religious influence of the Eclectic philosophy is discussed at considerable length, and with a profound knowledge of the subject, by M. Vincent, one of the Pastors of the Protestant Church at Nismes, in his able work entitled *Views on Protestantism in France.* I would bespeak the attention of the theological reader in particular, to the following extracts. They bear the date of 1829.

"The moment, in which I am writing these pages, presents an interesting spectacle to the friends of philosophy. After a long interval of repose, during which the philosophical schools that had governed the world of thought for two or three generations, have peaceably ended their career; after an almost total abandonment of philosophy, occasioned by the inroads of the most pressing material inter-

ests, and the most certain dangers; tranquillity has awakened again the spirit of meditation. The mind, repulsed from without, has turned in upon itself. Disgusted with affairs, it has gone back to man. Weariness with the visible world has impelled it to the centre of the moral world. It has contemplated in that another order of things, other laws, other principles, other ends, in a word, entirely another nature, not less real, not less interesting, than that which appears to the eye, and which resists the hand. From that moment, philosophy was restored. It resumed the place which it ought to occupy in the estimation of men. And, at a single stroke, it changed its direction and its nature. It ceased to be an insignificant and confused branch of physical science, or rather a slender bough of this branch, which had become so contemptible, that is, merely the science of medicine, considered as a subordinate department of physics. It assumed an eminently spiritual character. And from that time, it has found its own world, its peculiar universe as an object of study. It has been ennobled itself, at the same time that it has ennobled man, its eternal and inexhaustible subject. As this higher movement is strongly impressed on the prevailing ideas, every thing must needs have been brought into accordance with it. This is the most certain token and pledge of its triumph. Ideas concerning humanity, morals, legislation, politics, religion, social institutions, the fine arts, literature, poetry, history, eloquence, must all have borrowed their direction, their form, their color, from these ideas, which had taken the place of the old Materialism and Sensualism. The human mind never advances a part at a time. And when it is strongly taken hold of in the very principles of its developement and its action, every thing which proceeds from it bears the seal of its internal being, and is nothing but the impression of the opinions and the ideas which compose the foundation of its intellectual life.

"A twofold movement therefore is going on in respect to

philosophy. In the first place, the public which formerly appeared to care nothing about it, returns to the subject, with fresh interest. The Lectures of M. Cousin have almost as many readers as the Journal of Debates. On the other hand, philosophy itself has changed its direction. It is no longer a material philosophy. It has become essentially spiritual and moral.

"Not that every mind is in the same path; nor that the spiritual system which has made its appearance, has overcome all opposition, and gained a peaceable dominion over the masses. Far from it. The systems which have hitherto prevailed, still number many adherents. Epicureanism will never entirely die out. It is the first philosophy, that is to say, the philosophy of the man who has no philosophy at all, and who yields to his outward impulses. But the power is not equally divided between the old and the new philosophy. The one is advancing, the other declines; the one takes possession of the mind, the other departs from it; the one holds those who are going off, the other seizes and captivates those who are coming on; the one is ending, the other beginning. I suppose there can be no reasonable doubt as to the result of the struggle."—Vol. II. pp. 223—225.

Having described the predominance of the Sensual philosophy, M. Vincent contiues as follows:—

"A state of philosophy like this could not last long. The exclusive attention to sensation compelled men to say that sensation could not explain every thing. It was in vain to transform it; the production of a multitude of ideas, which are inherent in the soul, and which are possessed by all men alike, could never be accounted for in this manner. It was soon perceived that with those principles, which claimed to be taken from nature, it was impossible to comprehend and to justify the great laws of human intelligence, without which we could see nothing and comprehend nothing in nature itself. Such for instance is the

law of causality. No explanation being found for this in the facts of sensation, in external nature, in the not-me, it was necessary to seek it in the inward nature, in the me. Here then commences the second series of philosophical systems,—those which have their basis in the me. These are essentially spiritual, as the former are essentially material.

"As the inadequacy of all the explanations which derive thought only from sensation was more and more felt, the soul in itself began to be made the object of study; the processes of thought were watched; its different faculties were analyzed; the laws of their action were investigated. As the inquirers lived much in company with the soul, as this was the constant object of their labors, its existence, its thought which was always found active and independent, whenever the attention was turned within, were the phenomena which produced the strongest impression. Every thing was made to converge towards this centre; and hence the system which was embraced was decidedly spiritual. This point was always reached, whenever one withdrew from the world for intimate communion with his own mind. It was the experimental system, the system of observation, still timid, but just and profound, by which the system of Locke and that of Condillac were for ever overthrown. It was the same circle which had been before marked out by the Scottish philosophers. It was this philosophy, to which M. Royer-Collard had given currency in France, and which has been continued with such brilliant success by some of his principal disciples. The works of Dr. Reid, those of Dugald Stewart, the Lectures of M. Royer-Collard, and the writings of M. Jouffroy are the sources from which the most thorough knowledge may be gained of this remarkable philosophy. The introduction of this philosophy into France gave a mortal blow to the philosophy of sensation; and marked the revival of Spiritualism among us. The soul held an independent place in

that philosophy as an essentially immaterial and thinking force. In reading the works of these philosophers, especially those of Reid, and even of M. Laromiguière, we feel that they are invincible in their attacks upon Sensualism; they clearly show that sensation accounts for nothing, not even for the primary ideas which arise in the mind on occasion of sensible impressions; but we also feel, every moment, that we have not yet obtained every thing necessary to exhaust the subject, or to solve the problem under consideration. We feel that we are brought to the vestibule of another order of ideas, of another universe, as it were, but that we have not yet entered it. This at least is the impression which I have often experienced in reading the profound and original work of Reid on the Human Mind, according to the principles of common sense. It was necessary that the door should be opened, and the world within explored. One man has done this. It is perhaps the most sublime intellectual conquest of the eighteenth century. This honor was not reserved for France.

"To seek in the nature and constitution of the human soul, and not in any result of sensation, those ideas without which we can feel nothing, perceive nothing, judge nothing, comprehend nothing; to make of these ideas and of these laws, which the school of sensation undertook to deny because it could not produce them in its system,—which the Scottish school recognised and established without seeking their origin,—to make, I say, of these ideas and of these laws, essential forms of the human mind, which it inevitably impresses on all the materials which are furnished by sensation; instead of making them the result of sensation, to make them a property, an active force of the soul, which is indispensable to the possibility of sensation, judgment, and consciousness; to explain in this manner space and time, substance and cause, all the operations of intelligence, the invincible limits which restrict it, and the principles of beauty, religion, and conscience; to prostrate Skepticism

and Materialism at once; this is the unquestionable merit of the astonishing labor which Kant presented to his age; a work of genius, if ever there were one, whatever opinion we may form of some of its details. In itself, it is yet little known; but the spirit which animates it begins to display itself; it is at the bottom of the writings which now gain the greatest popularity. Although we cannot expect to see it propagated in France, just as it proceeded from the mind of its author, since it has already received important improvements in the country of its birth; it may be said with truth that it is destined to furnish the broadest foundation on which a new and permanent philosophy will be established.

"In continuing, in the same direction, the study and analysis of the soul and of its developements, one of the first and most important ideas which we meet with is that of faith, that is to say, the belief of the soul which is founded neither on reasoning nor on experience, but on its own essential nature and inherent tendencies. These convictions are numerous and profound in every mind; even in those individuals who stand the most upon reasoning. They are vital, but inexplicable, except by our consciousness of them. We believe these facts, just as we see the lilies white and the meadows green. Such is the make of our eyes. Conscience, moral order, religion, God, and futurity are thus placed beyond the sphere of reasoning and experience; and brought within the sphere of faith. They are revealed to us by the tendencies of the soul towards the Infinite and the Absolute; but they escape as soon as we attempt to seize them by reasoning and experience.

"It is in this way, that we explain the eternal influence of these ideas upon humanity, in all of its manifestations. They do not come to man; they form the very essence of man. He does not invent them; he feels them in his soul whenever he looks within. They are never more powerful than when he attempts with all his might to crush them,

"These convictions assuredly belong to a different sphere from those at which we arrive by experience and syllogism. We need a word to distinguish them from others. The word faith has been chosen, which, in this sense, is opposed to the knowledge given by experience and reasoning."—pp. 230–235.

"It is evident that religion is inconsistent with every material system, under whatever form it may be presented. Religion is the acknowledgment of a moral order, of a spiritual world, which the eyes cannot see, nor the hands touch; the recognition of a Ruler of this universe of intelligence and conscience; the desire to regulate life, in view of this order, of this universe, of this Ruler. What have these ideas in common with corpuscles, organs of secretion, or transformed sensations? Religion gains or loses, lives or dies, in the human mind, in proportion as these systems obtain more or less authority. It cannot coexist with them. If this were not proved by speculation, we might appeal to experience. Wherever the opinions of the Materialists have prevailed, religion has receded before them; and within our own notice, we never see them combined in the same mind.

"In this respect, the return of opinion to spiritual systems, the popularity no less general than unforeseen of the philosophy taught by M. Royer-Collard and M. Cousin, are of immense advantage to religion. They have opened the path for it. They have dissipated the prejudices, without appearing to attack them, which were hostile to its progress. Without professing to be its champions, they have prepared the way for its triumph. They have pointed out in the soul those powers, which the senses did not give, and which terminate in religion. They have brought to light, in humanity as a mass, something beside the physical wants, which are provided for by industry. They have separated, in some sort, from the chaos of complicated historical facts, a vast spirit of humanity, which directs and animates

it in all its manifestations; and this spirit has nothing in common with material interests; it resembles religion more than any thing else. The new movement of philosophy is therefore as favorable to religion, as the preceding was disastrous to it. If I may so express it, it is full of humanity, while the former, with all its refinements, annulled humanity, in order to bring sensuality into its place."—pp. 237–239.

"If we would determine the relations of the new philosophy to Christianity, we must take into view its general spirit, its acknowledged tendency, rather than isolated and hasty expressions. This spirit and tendency have been already described. They are eminently favorable to religion; can they be hostile to Christianity? In order to answer this question, we should consider two things in Christianity, namely, what it came to teach, and the form in which its teachings are clothed. Whatever opinion may be held as to the origin of Christianity and the means by which it was given to man, it is plain that Christianity is a teaching, that it contains a doctrine, that it sets forth a religious system. It is plain, moreover, that if there be a difference of opinion on any point, it is far more important to be agreed with regard to this religious system, this treasure of ideas so precious in the history of humanity, than with regard to the form in which it has been transmitted to us. I confess, therefore, that when I compare the impression which is produced on me by Christianity as a doctrine, and that which is produced by the new philosophical school, I find them connected in the most intimate relations. There is the same spirit, the same starting-point, the same idea concerning humanity, the same tendency, and I have no doubt, that in its developements, the new philosophical school will gradually arrive at the same conclusions and the same results. I have no doubt even that it will approach so near to the most mysterious dogmas of Christianity, that, by expressing its conclusions in a somewhat human form, by

spiritualizing in philosophical language the declarations of Jesus and of his apostles, the distance may be made very small and easy to be passed over. The new philosophy is eminently spiritual; so is Christianity; it is that which first rendered Spiritualism popular. The new philosophy places man in consciousness; it raises him above sensuality; it recognises in him a destiny and faculties superior to those which the senses can discover, and which consciousness alone reveals. This fundamental idea is at the basis of Christianity. That also places man in consciousness; it raises him above sensation; it brings into perpetual contrast, in its expressions at once so sublime and so popular, the flesh and the spirit, the man of consciousness and the man of sensation.

"After having restored the human consciousness, not only as the certain pledge of the existence of the spirit, but also as the organ of a law superior to matter, the new philosophy builds upon it all true and profound morality. It establishes in this sanctuary at once the dignity and the liberty of man. It for ever overthrows Epicureanism, in whatever form it may be presented, and determines obligation, neither by interest, nor by pleasure, nor by any outward consequence, but by the pure law of morality, announced with authority by the conscience of man. Christianity does nothing else. If there be one point, to which we may say that Jesus Christ gave a double share of attention and perseverance, it is this. Perpetually he recalled man within his conscience. Perpetually he spiritualized morality. Perpetually he declared that if we act with a view to enjoyment, with a view to any interest whatever, and not through respect to conscience and the eternal order of which God is the centre, we have already received our reward. Perpetually he declared that external actions are of no importance, except in their relations to conscience, of which they are the expression. Perpetually he opposed, by every means in his power, the pretensions of sacerdotal religions, which believe that good is effected by passive obedience to legal

forms, which lose sight of the conscience, that is to say, of the man.

"It is on this characteristic of humanity, and on all the wants which result from it, that the new school of philosophy attempts to establish the great truths of religion. According to this philosophy, it is in the heart rather than in the reflective intellect, that man is to find these truths. Conscience reveals liberty; liberty, moral order in opposition to physical order; moral order, God and futurity, without which the human soul would be incomplete and mutilated; without which nothing that takes place in it would have connexion or aim; without which, in short, it would be an incomprehensible mystery. Christianity has not presented these two great ideas in any other point of view. In that, God and futurity are closely united with man and with conscience. They are presented in the character which conscience demands, and which it proclaims. In the midst of popular images and expressions, that were essential as an aid to the understanding, we always find, upon the slightest effort, the idea of God who is a Spirit, the Ruler of the moral world, and of a futurity, which is the necessary completion of the revelations of conscience.—I repeat it therefore, in considering only its essence, we thus far find an accordance between Christianity and the new philosophy."—pp. 245—248.

NOTE K. Page 106.

THEORY OF THE FRENCH CHARTER.

"After the great political and religious movement which in Europe occupied the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a new and still more important movement became necessary; civilization was called to a new and an incomparably more decisive progress. Thence, gentlemen, the eigh-

teenth century. What was the general character of the eighteenth century? It was the conflict of the old with the new state of society; the very idea of the eighteenth century is the necessity of a crisis.

"The French monarchy, after having marched from conquest to conquest to its natural frontiers, and demolished successively all the powers that had attempted to oppose its progress, had finally arrived by the genius of Richelieu and of Louis the Fourteenth, almost to the last boundaries of its territory and centralization. Nothing was wanting to France, thus situated as to externals, but a better internal organization. But this new internal organization could not take place without overthrowing that which already existed; and to overthrow it was very easy, for the society organized of old had already fallen into ruins. In fact, what had become of the monarchy in the eighteenth century? The monarchs themselves were a mere tradition of splendor and magnificence without real or apparent virtue. The monarchy which had been the providence of France, which had created it, had raised it and rendered it illustrious, was no longer sensibly perceptible to her. What did it do for the country abroad? What useful war, what glorious combats has it to show? The seven years war and the battle of Rosbach. What did it do at home? What was the life of royalty? It was the life of Versailles. The French noblesse, who formerly had served their country so well, and had mingled their history with that of all the glorious feats of arms of France, had lost the manly habits of their ancestors, and like royalty they slumbered amidst their pleasures. The French clergy, which had in the seventeenth century produced the Church of France, had degenerated into a worldly clergy, among which impiety was almost held in honor, and which has produced the most envenomed adversaries of Christianity. Finally, the French people itself, wearied with a royalty that no longer employed them, with a nobility that was no longer an exam-

ple to them, with a clergy that faintly taught them articles of faith which they no longer sustained by the authority of their morals; the French people had sunk into a state of deplorable corruption, sufficiently betrayed by the success of the works that then circulated among all classes, and carried into all the poison of systematic immorality. In such a state of things, a revolution was necessary for a thousand reasons; it took place, I come neither to defend nor to attack it; I explain it. It took place, and the throne, the noblesse, the clergy, the whole ancient order fell to the ground. The ancient order was the exclusive dominion of the monarchical principle, of the noblesse and of a religion of the state. In forsaking one exclusive system we are led into another exclusive system of an opposite nature. Hence the exclusive dominion of the monarchical principle, of a religion of the state, and of a privileged noblesse, was succeeded by the abolition of all public worship, by the sovereignty of the people, and an absolute democracy. But this democracy, spreading terror around it, had soon to sustain formidable conflicts with the rest of Europe. Thence the necessity of a government purely revolutionary, that is, of a council of war instead of a government. But after the sovereignty of the people, that it might defend itself the better, had resolved itself into a great council of war, it was necessary, in order to defend itself still more effectually, and to be able to act with greater energy, that it should resolve itself again into a great individual who charged himself with representing it: as has been said, the revolution became a man; the sovereignty passed from the council of war to the dictatorship, to a military dictatorship; thence our wars, our conquests, our victories, and our disasters.

"These revolutions were necessary, and they were beneficial to humanity; they have at least shaken if they have not reanimated the south of Europe; they have visited the benumbed and languid inhabitants of the two peninsulas,

and apprized them that the hour of awakening was come. On the other hand we have not appeared in vain upon the fields of battle in Germany; there also we have given the first impulse to a movement which has been useful and which endures. In the mean time the revolutionary system substituted in France for the ancient regime, exclusive as that which it had overturned, and more ardent and violent, was commissioned only to destroy what it has destroyed, without being itself established. It was only to appear, to do its work, and to disappear. It appeared for a moment with the convention; it has disappeared for ever with the empire.

"Now let us cast our eyes towards the north, which is always in the face of France; for France draws the south along with her without accounting to it for her actions; but she has always been compelled to reckon with the north, which possesses a genius and a destiny of its own. What had been passing in the north? What was the state of society in the north? In a few words, gentlemen, you know that beyond the Rhine were thrones, absolute but paternal; a warlike noblesse that had covered itself with glory in the seven years' war; a clergy reformed once for all, perfectly identified with the masses of population by their doctrines and morals, and in the enjoyment of boundless authority and veneration; and nations, honest, sufficiently industrious, warlike, and moved to obedience by the spontaneous impulse of sympathy and love. By the side of the ancient Austria two new empires had arisen at the voice of genius, young and consequently full of futurity; deeply imbued with the new spirit, and at the same time absolute in their form and military in their manners. Here you see the fair side of the north. But we must not forget that the nations there were entirely in the power of their chiefs; that these chiefs disposed of them at will, and sometimes disposed of them badly. The people intervened not at all in their own affairs; no national represen-

tation, no free emission of thought, unless by way of privilege and subject to the good pleasure of governments. Such an order of things was surely not produced by the last effort of German civilization, and consequently it was necessary that this order of things should come to its end. The formidable conflict of the north and south of Europe in the long war between France and Germany is nothing but the conflict of absolute monarchies with democracy. The result has been the downfall of democracy in France, and a considerable loss of absolute power to the monarchical governments of Germany. You know that it is not the masses of population which appear upon the fields of battle, but the ideas, the causes for which they combat. Thus at Leipsig and Waterloo the causes which encountered each other were those of paternal monarchy and military democracy. Which prevailed, gentlemen? Neither the one nor the other. Which was the conqueror? Which was vanquished at Waterloo? Gentlemen, none was vanquished. No, I protest that none was vanquished; the only conquerors were European civilization and the charte. Yes, gentlemen, it was the charte, the voluntary present of Louis the Eighteenth, the charte maintained by Charles the Tenth, the charte called to rule over France, and destined to subdue, I say not its enemies, for it has none, it has none any more, but all who retarded French civilization; it is the charte which has gone forth brilliantly from the sanguinary conflict of the two systems which now have equally served their time, namely, absolute monarchy and the extravagances of democracy. The fact, that from one end of Europe to the other the charte draws upon itself the eyes of all, causes every heart to beat, and rallies around it the wishes and the hopes of all, is the most convincing proof that it is the true result of all the troubles and the wars that filled the conclusion of the last century and the commencement of the nineteenth. Imitations of it, which were unfortunate, and which I am far from approving,

manifest sufficiently the deep sympathy of the south of Europe with the glorious results of the long labors of our nation. But also beyond the Rhine our ancient adversaries have hastened to claim the work of the new monarchy. In fact, gentlemen, all the banks of the Rhine are ruled according to excellent though imperfect imitations of our fine constitution. Bavaria, Wirtemburg, and Baden, have now representative governments; and preparatory experiments of inferior degrees of representative governments in the provincial districts, are already extending their circle in the north and reach even to the Baltic. Surely, since 1815, European civilization has by no means receded; on the contrary it has been in all parts extended and developed; and I repeat it, this charte, which went forth from the disasters of Waterloo, now covers the greater and the better part of Europe, and it is expected and invoked by the rest. Now, if it is an incontestable fact that the future prospects of Europe depend upon it, and if this is still more evidently the case in regard to France, let us rapidly examine what is the nature of the charte that is called to such destinies.

"It appears, at first sight, as if the charte had sanctioned the social order anterior to the eighteenth century, and which the eighteenth century has overturned. In fact, I there behold a king, a powerful monarchy, and a throne efficient and respected: I behold a chamber of peers invested with privileges and surrounded with universal veneration; I behold an established religion which, taking our children in the cradle, teaches each of them, at an early hour, his duties, his destiny, and the end of this life. And here we behold an element which does not proceed from the French revolution. It is nevertheless there, gentlemen, and it is necessary that it should be there; it is necessary that it should from day to day be more firmly established, and win back for ever both its respect and power; but is this the only element in the charte? No, gentlemen. By the side of the throne and the Chamber of Peers I also be-

hold a Chamber of Deputies nominated directly by the people, and taking a part in the making of all the laws, that warrant and authorize all particular measures; so that nothing can be done in the last village of France in which the Chamber of Deputies does not concur. Here is a new element. I perceive some image of it to have formerly existed in certain assemblies and certain judicial bodies; but it was more apparent than real; I find it in reality only in the wishes of the eighteenth century, and in the irregular attempts of the French revolution to establish it. We have then on the one hand an element of the old government, and on the other an element of the revolutionary democracy. Upon what terms do these elements subsist in the charte? In fact, gentlemen, they are there, and their union is so intimate that the most skilful civilian would be much embarrassed theoretically to define and to mark the limits of the particular agency of each of these two branches of the sovereign power; and in this respect there exists a certain obscurity which has precisely the effect of binding these two elements more strongly together. In fact, our glorious constitution is no mathematical fiction of the equilibrium of legislative and executive power, nor is it any of those vain and empty abstractions which should be left to the infancy of representative government; our constitution is the real unition of the king and people, seeking jointly the best manner of governing and of serving their common country. This is not all: in the charte I find, notwithstanding the existence of the Chamber of Peers, that all Frenchmen have access to all offices; so that even a common soldier, as the author of the charte said himself, carries his batoon of a marshal of France in his cartridge box; the lowest Frenchman may in every career ascend to the foot of the throne. Notwithstanding the existence of an established religion, I behold in characters equally manifest the liberty of every form of worship, and the liberty of the press; so that none may be destitute of religious instruc-

tion, while at the same time the freedom of worship permits every one to seek it in the different communions of the same Church; and that finally, thanks to the liberty of the press, no truth being suppressed, every man may in sincerity determine his own thoughts in favor of those opinions which seem to him the most true. Thus I behold in the charte all contrarieties; and this circumstance is what some men deplore. There are some who admire nothing in it but its democratical part, and would use that as the means of rendering all other parts powerless; there are others who sigh over the introduction of democratical elements, and who turn unceasingly the monarchical parts of the constitution against the democratical elements which serve as their safeguard. On both sides equal error, equal prepossession in favor of the past, and equal ignorance of the present time. On both sides, gentlemen, there are men whose age is exceedingly respectable, and who, belonging some to the seventeenth, and some to the eighteenth century, and not being the sons of the present epoch, are perfectly excusable in not comprehending the nineteenth century and its mission. But, thank God, every thing promises that the irresistible march of time will by degrees unite the minds and hearts of all in the intelligence and in the love of this constitution, which contains at once the throne and the country, monarchy and democracy, order and liberty, aristocracy and equality, all the elements of history, of thought, and of things." *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie, Introduction.* LINBERG'S *Translation*, p. 429—439.

It gives me great pleasure to avail myself of Mr. Linberg's accurate and elegant translation of the *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, in the above quotation, as well as in one or two others, which I have occasion to make from the same work. This translation, which was the first to introduce Cousin's philosophy into the English language, is executed with uncommon ability and does honor to the literature of our country.

NOTE L. Page 139.

COUSIN'S ANALYSIS OF THE WILL.

This discussion would be incomplete without the admirable analysis of the will which is given in Cousin's critical examination of the philosophy of Locke. It is, therefore, inserted in this place. The principles, which it sets forth with such rare precision and clearness, shed more light on the fundamental question of the free-agency of man, than most of the elaborate volumes that have been written on this controverted subject. In the hands of Cousin, the question is reduced within a narrow compass; divested of extraneous considerations; and presented to the consciousness of every thinker, in a simple and intelligible form. The genuine lover of philosophical investigation who is already familiar with this argument, I am sure will thank me, for bringing it again to his notice. As a model of accurate thought and lucid expression, it can scarcely be too strongly recommended to the youthful student.

"All the facts, which can fall under the consciousness of man, and consequently under the reflection of the philosopher, may be resolved into three fundamental facts which comprise all the rest,—three facts which without doubt in reality are never solitary, separated from one another; but which nevertheless are essentially distinct; and which a scrupulous analysis must distinguish, without dividing, in the complex phenomenon of intellectual life. These three facts are feeling, thinking, acting.

"I open a book and begin to read; let us decompose this fact, and we shall find that it contains three elements.

"Suppose that I do not see the letters of which each page is composed, nor the order and form of those letters; it is quite clear that I shall not comprehend the meaning which

custom has given to those letters, and that accordingly I shall not read. To see therefore is here the condition of reading. On the other hand, to see is not in itself to read; for, the letters being seen, nothing would be done, if intelligence were not added to the sense of sight in order to comprehend the signification of the letters under my eye.

"Here then are two facts which the most superficial analysis immediately distinguishes in the process of reading; let us examine the characteristics of these two facts.

"Am I the cause of vision, and of sensation in general? Am I conscious of being the cause of this phenomenon; of commencing it, of continuing it, of interrupting it, of increasing it, of diminishing it, of sustaining it, and of destroying it at pleasure? Let us take other examples that are more striking. Suppose that I press upon a sharp instrument; a disagreeable sensation is the result. I bring a rose to my smell; an agreeable sensation is the result. Is it I who produce these two phenomena? Can I put a stop to them? The suffering and the enjoyment—do they take place or cease as I like? Not at all. I undergo the pleasure as well as the pain; the one and the other come on, continue, and disappear without the concurrence of my will; in a word, sensation is a phenomenon marked, in the view of my consciousness, with the unquestionable characteristic of necessity.

"Let us now examine the character of the other fact, which sensation precedes, but which it does not constitute. When a sensation is effected, intelligence is applied to this sensation, and, in the first place, it pronounces that the sensation has a cause, the sharp instrument, the rose, and here, to revert to our former example, the letters under the eye; this is the first judgment which is passed by intelligence. Besides, as soon as the sensation is referred by intelligence to an outward cause, for instance, to the letters and the words which they form, the same intelligence conceives the sense of those letters and those words, and judges that the propo-

sitions which they compose are true or false. Intelligence therefore judges that the sensation which is experienced has a cause; but, I ask, could it judge the contrary? No. Intelligence can no more judge that this sensation had not a cause, than that it was possible for the sensation to exist or not to exist, when the sharp instrument was in the wounded flesh, or the rose under the smell, or the book under the eye. And not only does intelligence necessarily judge that the sensation is to be referred to a cause, but it also necessarily judges that the propositions contained in the lines perceived by the eye are true or false, for example, that two and two make four and not five, and the like. This is incontestable. I ask again if it be in the power of intelligence to judge at pleasure that such an action, of which the book speaks, is good or bad, such a form, which it describes, is beautiful or ugly? By no means.

"Without doubt, different intelligences, or intelligence in different moments of its exercise, will often pass very different judgments on the same thing. It will even often be deceived; it will judge that what is true is false, that what is good is bad, that what is beautiful is ugly, and the reverse; but at the moment in which it judges that a proposition is true or false, that an action is good or bad, that a form is beautiful or ugly, at that moment, it is not in the power of intelligence to pass a different judgment from that which it does pass; it obeys the laws of its nature which it did not make for itself; it yields to motives which determine it without any concurrence of the will. In a word, the phenomenon of intelligence, to comprehend, to judge, to know, to think, whatever name we give to it, is marked by the same characteristic of necessity as the phenomenon of sensibility. If therefore sensibility and intelligence are under the dominion of necessity, it assuredly is not in them that we are to seek for liberty? Where then shall we seek for it? Nothing remains but to look for it in the third fact, which is combined with the

other two, and which we have not yet analyzed. We must find it in that; or we shall not find it at all; and liberty is only a chimera.

"To see and to feel, to judge and to comprehend,—these processes do not exhaust the complex fact which is submitted to our analysis. If I do not consider the letters of this book, shall I see them, or at least, shall I see them distinctly? If, seeing the letters, I do not give my attention to them, shall I comprehend them? If instead of holding this book open, I close it, will the perception of the words and the understanding of their sense take place, and the complex fact of reading be accomplished? Certainly not. Now what is it to open this book, to give our attention, to consider? It is neither to feel nor to comprehend; for to consider is not to perceive, if the organ of vision be wanting or be unfaithful; to give our attention is not in itself to comprehend; it is indeed an indispensable condition of comprehending, but not always a sufficient reason; it is not sufficient to be attentive to the statement of a problem in order to resolve the problem; in a word, attention no more comprises understanding than does sensibility. To be attentive is to act, to produce a movement, internal or external,—a new phenomenon, which it is impossible to confound with the former two, although it is perpetually combined with them, and together with them, completes the total and complex fact of which we would give an account.

"Let us examine the character of this third fact, the phenomenon of activity. Let us distinguish in the first place different sorts of action. There are some actions which man does not refer to himself, although he is the subject in which they are displayed. We are told by others that we perform those actions; for ourselves, we know nothing of them; they are performed within us; we do not perform them. In a lethargy, in a real or artificial sleep, in delirium, we execute a variety of movements which resemble actions, which even are actions, if you please, but actions which present the following characteristics.

"We have no consciousness of them at the moment when we appear to perform them.

"We have no remembrance of having performed them.

"Consequently, we do not refer them to ourselves, either while we are performing them, or after we have performed them.

"Consequently again, they do not pertain to us, and we do not impute them to ourselves, any more than to our neighbor or to an inhabitant of another world.

"But are there no actions beside these? I open this book, I consider its letters, I give my attention to them; these also are actions; do they resemble the preceding?

"I open this book; am I conscious of doing so? Yes.

"This action performed, do I remember it? Yes.

"Do I refer this action to myself as having performed it? Yes.

"Am I convinced that it pertains to me? Can I impute it to any other individual as well as to myself, or am I not solely and exclusively responsible for it in my own eyes? Here again I answer yes to myself.

"In fine, at the moment when I perform this action, have I not, with the consciousness of performing it, the consciousness also of being able not to perform it? When I open this book, have I not the consciousness of opening it and the consciousness of being able not to open it? When I consider, do I not know at the same time, that I consider, and that I am able not to consider? When I give my attention, do I not know that I give it, and that I am able not to give it? Is not this a fact which each of us can repeat, whenever he pleases, in himself and on a thousand occasions? Is it not proved incontestably by experience? And is it not, moreover, the universal belief of the human race? Let us generalize what has now been shown, and say, that there are movements and actions which we perform with the twofold consciousness of performing them and of being able not to perform them. Now, an action which we per-

form with the consciousness of being able not to perform it, is precisely what men have called a free action; for here the characteristic of necessity no longer exists. In the phenomenon of sensation, I was unable not to enjoy when it was enjoyment which fell under my consciousness; I was unable not to suffer when it was suffering; I had the consciousness of feeling with the consciousness of being unable not to feel. In the phenomenon of intelligence, I was unable not to judge that two and two make four; I had the consciousness of thinking this or that, with the consciousness of being unable not to think it. In certain movements, moreover, I had so little the consciousness of being able not to perform them, that I had not even the consciousness of performing them at the moment that I did perform them. But in a great variety of cases, I perform certain actions with the consciousness of performing them and of being able not to perform them, of being able to suspend or to continue them, to complete or to destroy them. This is a class of facts perfectly real, they are numerous, I have no doubt; but if there were but a single one of them *sui generis*, that would be sufficient to establish the existence of a special power in man, namely liberty. Liberty therefore does not fall under sensibility or intelligence; it falls under activity, and not under all the facts which are referred to this class, but under a certain number which are marked by peculiar characteristics, that is to say, those actions which we perform with the consciousness both of performing them and of being able not to perform them.

"After having thus established the existence of free action, it is important to analyze it more attentively.

"Free action is a phenomenon which contains several different elements combined together. To act freely, is to perform an action with the consciousness of being able not to perform it; now, to perform an action with the consciousness of being able not to perform it, supposes that we have preferred performing it to not performing it; to

commence an action when we are able not to commence it, is to have preferred commencing it; to continue it when we are able to suspend it, is to have preferred continuing it; to carry it through when we are able to abandon it, is to have preferred accomplishing it. Now, to prefer supposes that we had motives for preferring, motives for performing this action and motives for not performing it, that we were acquainted with these motives, and that we have preferred a part of them to the rest; in a word preference supposes the knowledge of motives for and against. Whether these motives are passions or ideas, errors or truths, this or that, is of no consequence; it is important only to ascertain, what faculty is here in operation, that is to say, what it is that recognises these motives, which prefers one to the other, which judges that one is preferable to the other; for this is precisely what we mean by preferring. Now what is it that knows, that judges, but intelligence. Intelligence therefore is the faculty which prefers. But in order to prefer certain motives to others, to judge that some are preferable to others, it is not sufficient to know these different motives, we must moreover have weighed and compared them; we must have deliberated on these motives in order to form a conclusion; in fact, to prefer is to judge definitively, to conclude. What then is it to deliberate? It is nothing else than to examine with doubt, to estimate the relative value of different motives without yet perceiving it with the clear evidence that commands judgment, conviction, preference. Now, what is it that examines, what is it that doubts, what is it that judges that we should not yet judge in order to judge better? Evidently it is intelligence, the same intelligence which, at a subsequent period, after having passed many provisional judgments, will abrogate them all, will judge that they are less true, less reasonable than a certain other, will pass this latter judgment, will conclude and prefer after having deliberated. It is in intelligence that the phenomenon of preference takes place,

as well as the other phenomena which it supposes. Thus far then we are still in the sphere of intelligence, and not in that of action. Assuredly intelligence is subjected to conditions; no one examines who does not wish to examine; and the will intervenes in deliberation; but this is the simple condition, not the foundation of the phenomenon; for, if it be true, that without the faculty of willing, all examination and all deliberation would be impossible, it is also true that the faculty itself which examines and which deliberates, the faculty which is the peculiar subject of examination, of deliberation, and of all judgment, provisional or definitive, is intelligence. Deliberation and conclusion, or preference, are therefore facts purely intellectual. Let us continue our analysis.

"We have conceived different motives for performing or not performing an action; we have deliberated on these motives, and we have preferred some of them to others; we have concluded that we ought to perform it rather than not to perform it; but to conclude that we ought to perform, and to perform are not the same thing. When intelligence has judged that we ought to do this or that, for such or such motives, it remains to proceed to action, in the first place to resolve, to assume our part, to say to ourselves, not I OUGHT to do, but I WILL to do. Now, the faculty which says I ought to do, is not and cannot be the faculty which says I will to do, I resolve to do. The office of intelligence here closes entirely. I ought to do is a judgment; I will to do is not a judgment, nor consequently an intellectual phenomenon. In fact, at the moment when we form the resolution of doing a particular action, we form it with the consciousness of being able to form the contrary resolution. Here then is a new element which should not be confounded with the preceding; this element is will; just before it was our business to judge and to know; now it is our business to will. To will, I say, and not to do; for precisely as to judge that we ought to do is

not to will to do, so to will to do is not in itself to do. To will is an act, not a judgment; but an act altogether internal. It is evident that this act is not action properly so called; in order to arrive at action, we must pass from the internal sphere of will to the sphere of the external world, in which is definitively accomplished the action which you had at first conceived, deliberated on, and preferred; which you then willed; and which it was necessary to execute. If there were no external world, there would be no consummated action; and there must not only be an external world, the power of will also, which we have recognised after the power of comprehending and of judging, must be connected with another power, a physical power, which serves it as an instrument with which to attain the external world. Suppose that the will were not connected with organization, there would be no bridge between the will and the external world; no external action would be possible. The physical power, necessary to action, is organization; and in this organization, it is acknowledged that the muscular system is the special instrument of the will. Take away the muscular system, no effort would any longer be possible, consequently, no locomotion, no movement whatever would be possible; and if no movement were possible, no external action would be possible. Thus, to recapitulate, the whole action which we undertook to analyze is resolved into three elements perfectly distinct; 1. the intellectual element, which is composed of the knowledge of the motives for and against, of deliberation, of preference, of choice; 2. the voluntary element, which consists entirely in an internal act, namely, the resolution to do; 3. the physical element, or the external action.

"If these three elements exhaust action, that is to say, the phenomenon in which we have recognised the characteristic of liberty in opposition to the phenomena of intelligence and of sensation; it is now the question to determine precisely, in which of these three elements we are to find

liberty, that is to say, the power to do with the consciousness of being able not to do. Is this power to do, with the consciousness of the power not to do, to be found in the first element, the intellectual element of free action? No, for it is not in the power of man to judge that one motive is preferable to another; we are not masters of our preferences; we prefer one motive to another, on this side or that, according to our intellectual nature which has its necessary laws, without having the consciousness of being able to prefer or to judge differently, and even with the consciousness of being unable not to prefer and to judge as we actually do. It is not then in this element that we are to seek for liberty; neither is it in the third element, in the physical act; for this act supposes the external world, an organization which corresponds to it, and in this organization a muscular system, sound and appropriate, without which the physical act is impossible. When we accomplish this, we are conscious of acting, but on condition of a theatre which is not at our disposal, and of instruments which are imperfectly at our disposal, which we can neither restore, if they leave us, and they may leave us at any moment, nor set in order, if they become deranged and deceive us, and which often do deceive us, and obey their own peculiar laws, over which we have no power and with which we are scarcely even acquainted; whence it follows that we do not act here with the consciousness of being able to do the opposite of that which we do. It is not then in this third element any more than in the first that we are to look for liberty; it can only be in the second; and there in fact we find it.

"Neglect the first and the third element, the judgment and the physical act, and let the second element, the will subsist alone, analysis discovers two terms still in this single element, namely, a special act of will, and the power of will within us to which we refer this act. This act is an effect in relation to the power of will which is the cause

of it; and this cause, in order to produce its effect, needs no other theatre and no other instrument than itself. It produces it directly, without any medium or condition; it continues and completes it, or suspends and modifies it, creates it entirely or destroys it entirely; and at the very moment when it exercises itself by a special act of any kind, we have the consciousness that it could exercise itself by a special act of a quite contrary kind, without any obstacle, without exhausting itself by such action, so that after having changed its acts a hundred times, the faculty remains absolutely the same, inexhaustible and identical with itself in the perpetual variety of its applications, always being able to do what it does not do, and not to do what it does. Here then in all its perfection is the characteristic of liberty." *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, Tom. II. pp. 494—509.

NOTE M. Page 147.

MANIFESTATION OF GOD IN CREATION.

"There are men, reasonable beings, whose vocation it is to comprehend, and who believe in the existence of God, but who will believe in it only under the express condition that this existence is incomprehensible. What does this mean? Do they assert that this existence is absolutely incomprehensible? But that which is absolutely incomprehensible, can have no relations which connect it with our intelligence, nor can it be in any wise admitted by us. A God who is absolutely incomprehensible by us, is a God who, in regard to us, does not exist. In truth, what would a God be to us, who had not seen fit to give to us some portion of himself, and so much of intelligence as might enable his wretched creature to elevate himself even unto Him, to comprehend Him, to believe in Him? Gentle-

men, what is it—to believe? It is, in a certain degree, to comprehend. Faith, whatever be its form, whatever be its object, whether vulgar or sublime—faith cannot but be the consent of reason to that which reason comprehends as true. This is the foundation of all faith. Take away the possibility of knowing, and there remains nothing to believe; for the very root of faith is removed. Will it be said that God is not altogether incomprehensible? That he is somewhat incomprehensible? Be it so; but let the measure of this be determined; and then I will maintain, that it is precisely the measure of the comprehensibility of God, which will be the measure of human faith. So little is God incomprehensible, that his nature is constituted by ideas—by *those* ideas, whose nature it is to be intelligible. Many inquiries have indeed been made, to know whether ideas do or do not represent, whether they are or are not conformed to their objects. But in truth, the question is not whether ideas are representative, for ideas are above every thing; and the true philosophical question is, whether things are representative; for ideas are not the reflection of things, but things are the reflection of ideas. God, the substance of ideas, is essentially intelligent, and essentially intelligible."

"God is; He is, with all that constitutes his true existence; He is, with three necessary elements of intellectual existence. We must go on, gentlemen,we must proceed, from the idea of God to that of the universe; but how are we to proceed thither? What is the road that leads from God to the universe? It is—creation. And what is creation? What is it—to create? Shall I state to you its vulgar definition? It is this, "to create, is to make something out of nothing," that is, to draw something forth out of nothing; and this definition must necessarily appear to be very satisfactory; for, to this very day, it is every where and continually repeated. Now, Leucippus, Epicurus, Lucretius, Bayle, Spinoza, and indeed all whose powers of thought are somewhat

exercised, demonstrate, but too easily, that from nothing, nothing can be drawn forth, that out of nothing, nothing can come forth; whence it follows, that creation is impossible. Yet by pursuing a different route, our investigations arrive at this very different result, viz. that creation is, I do not say possible, but necessary. But, in the first place, let us look a little into this definition,—that to create, is to draw forth from nothingness. This definition is founded upon the very identical idea, of nothingness. But what is this idea? It is a purely negative idea. The mind of man possesses the power of making suppositions of every kind; he may, for instance, in the very presence of reality suppose its contrary; but truly, it is a most extravagant folly, from the mere possibility of a supposition, to infer the truth of that supposition. This supposition however has, in addition to those of many others, the misfortune of involving an absolute contradiction. Nothingness is the denial of all existence; but what is that, which in this instance, denies existence? Who denies it? It is thought; that is, you who think; so that you who think, and who exist, inasmuch as you think, and because you think, and who know that you exist, because you know that you think,—you yourself, in denying existence, deny your own existence, your own thought, and your own denial of existence. If you will attend to the principle of your hypothesis, you will find, either that it destroys your hypothesis, or that your hypothesis will destroy its own principle. What is said of doubt, what Descartes has demonstrated in regard to doubt, applies with greater force to the idea of nothingness. To doubt is to believe; for to doubt, is to think. Does he who doubts believe that he doubts, or does he doubt whether he doubt or not? If he doubt whether he doubt or not, he destroys his own skepticism; and if he believes that he doubts, he destroys it again. Just so, to think is to be, and to know that we are; it is to affirm existence; now, to form the hypothetical supposition of nothingness, is to think;

therefore, it is to be and to know that we are; therefore, it is to construct the hypothesis of nothingness upon the supposition contradictory to it, that is, upon the supposition of the existence of thought, and of him who thinks. Vainly should we strive to go beyond thought, and to escape from the idea of existence. Every negation is founded upon some affirmation; every hypothetical supposition of nothingness, implies as its necessary condition, the supposition of existence and of the existence of him who makes this very supposition of nothingness.

"We must therefore abandon the definition, that, to create is to draw forth from nothingness; for nothingness is a chimera of thought implying a contradiction. Now, in abandoning this definition, we abandon its consequences; and the immediate consequence of abandoning the hypothesis of nothingness as a condition of existence, is another hypothesis; for, once entered upon the career of hypothesis, we go on from one to another, without being able to get out of that career. Since God cannot create but by drawing forth from nothingness, and as nothing can be drawn forth from nothing, and nevertheless, the world, incontestably, *is*, and could not have been drawn forth from nothing, it follows that it has not been created; whence it follows again, that it is independent of God, and that it formed itself, by virtue of its proper nature, and of the laws which are derived from its nature. Hence follows another hypothesis, that of a dualism, in which God is on one side and the world on the other, which is an absurdity. For all the conditions of the existence of God are precisely absolute contradictions of the independent existence of the world. If the world is independent, it is sufficient for itself; it is absolute, eternal, infinite, almighty; and God, if he is independent of the world, must be absolute, eternal, almighty. Here, therefore, are two entire powers, in contradiction, one with the other. I will not plunge farther into this abyss of hypotheses and of absurdities.

"What is, to create?—not according to the hypothetical method, but the method we have followed,—that method which always borrows from human consciousness that which, by a higher induction, it afterwards applies to the divine essence. To create, is a thing which it is not difficult to conceive, for it is a thing which we do at every moment; in fact, we create whenever we perform a free action. I will, I form a resolution, I form another, and another; I modify it, I suspend it, I pursue it. What is it that I do? I produce an effect which I do not refer to any other person, which I refer to myself as its cause, and as its only cause, so that, in regard to the existence of this effect, I seek no cause above and beyond myself. This is to create. We create a free action, we create it, I say, for we do not refer it to any principle superior to ourselves; we impute it to ourselves exclusively. It was not; it begins to be, by virtue of that principle of causality which we possess. Thus, to cause is to create; but with what? with nothing? Certainly not. On the contrary, with that which is the very foundation of our existence; that is to say, with all our creative force, all our liberty, all our voluntary activity, with our personality. Man does not draw forth from nothingness the act which he has not yet done and is about to do; he draws it forth from the power which he has to do it; from himself. Here is the type of a creation. The divine creation is the same in its nature. God, if he is a cause, can create; and if he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create; and in creating the universe he does not draw it forth from nothingness, but from himself; from that power of causation, and of creation, of which we, feeble men, possess a portion; and all the difference between our creation and that of God, is the general difference between God and man, the difference between absolute cause and a relative cause.

"I create, for I cause, I produce an effect; but this effect expires under the very eye of him who produces it; it

scarcely extends beyond his consciousness; often it dies there, and it never goes far beyond it; and thus, in all the energy of his creative force, man finds very easily its limits. These limits, in the interior world, are my passions, my weaknesses; without, they are the world itself, which opposes the motions of my volition. I wish to produce a motion, and often I produce only the volition of motion; the most paltry accident palsies my arm; the most vulgar obstacle resists my power; and my creations, like my creative power, are relative, contingent, bounded; but after all, they are creations, and there, is the type of the conception of the divine creation.

"God therefore creates; he creates by virtue of his creative power; he draws forth the world, not from nothingness which is not, but from Him who is absolute existence. An absolute creative force, which cannot but pass into act, being eminently his characteristic, it follows, not that creation is possible, but that it is necessary; it follows, that God is creating without cessation and infinitely, and that creation is inexhaustible and sustains itself constantly. We may go further. The creations of God are from himself; therefore he creates with all the characteristics which we have recognised in him, and which pass necessarily into his creations. God is in the universe, as the cause is in its effect; as we ourselves, feeble and bounded causes, are, in so far as we are causes, in the feeble and bounded effects which we produce. And, if God is, in our consciousness, the unity of being and of intelligence and of power, with that variety which is inherent in him, and with the relation, equally necessary and equally eternal, which unites these two terms; it follows, that all these characteristics are also in the world, and in visible existence. Therefore, creation is not an evil, but a good; and thus do the holy scriptures represent this truth, 'and God saw that it was good.' Why? because it was more or less conformed to Him.

"Thus, gentlemen, we behold the universe created, ne-

cessarily created, and manifesting Him who created it. But this manifestation, in which the principle of manifestation renders itself apparent, does not exhaust that principle. Let me explain myself. I will, and I produce an act of volition; my voluntary force appeared, by this act and in it; it appeared there, for it is to it that I refer this act. Then is it there. But how is it there? Has it passed all entire into this act, so that there is nothing more left of it? No; for after having produced such an act, I may produce a new one, I may modify it, I may change it. The interior principle of causation, while developing itself in its acts, retains that which constitutes it a principle and a cause, and is not absorbed in its effects. So, if God makes himself appear in the world, if God is in the world, if God is there with all the elements which constitute his being, he is nevertheless unexhausted; and, at once one and threefold, he remains, after having produced this world, not the less perfect, in his essential unity and triplicity.

"We must therefore regard in two different points of view, the manifestation of God in the world, and the subsistence of his divine essence itself; in order to see the true relation between the world and God. For it is absurd, to suppose that God, in manifesting himself, should not in some measure transfer himself into his manifestation; and it is equally absurd, to suppose that the principle of that manifestation, should not still retain, all the superiority of a cause to its effect. The universe is therefore an imperfect reflection, but still a reflection of the divine essence." —*Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, LINBERG'S *Translation*, pp. 132, 136—143.

Do we not again find Cousin anticipated in some sort,—faintly shadowed forth, if nothing more, in this extract from one of the least known but most remarkable productions of President Edwards?

"As there is an infinite fulness of all possible good in God, a fulness of every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happiness; and as this fulness is capable of communication or emanation *ad extra;* so it seems a thing amiable and valuable in itself that it should be communicated or flow forth, that this infinite fountain of good should send forth abundant streams, that this infinite fountain of light should, diffusing its excellent fulness, pour forth light all around. And as this is in itself excellent, so a disposition to this, in the divine being, must be looked upon as a perfection or an excellent disposition, such an emanation of good is, in some sense, a multiplication of it; so far as the communication or external stream may be looked upon as any thing besides the fountain, so far it may be looked on as an increase of good. And if the fulness of good that is in the fountain, is in itself excellent and worthy to exist, then the emanation, or that which is as it were an increase, repetition or multiplication of it, is excellent and worthy to exist. Thus it is fit, since there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light should shine forth in beams of communicated knowledge and understanding: And as there is an infinite fountain of holiness, moral excellence and beauty, so it should flow out in communicated holiness. And that as there is an infinite fulness of joy and happiness, so these should have an emanation, and become a fountain flowing out in abundant streams, as beams from the sun.

"From this view it appears another way to be a thing in itself valuable, that there should be such things as the knowledge of God's glory in other beings, and an high esteem of it, love to it, and delight and complacence in it: This appears I say in another way, viz. as these things are but the emanations of God's own knowledge, holiness and joy.

"Thus it appears reasonable to suppose, that it was what God had respect to as an ultimate end of his creating the

world, to communicate of his own infinite fulness of good; or rather it was his last end, that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fulness of good *ad extra*, or without himself, and the disposition to communicate himself, or diffuse his own FULNESS, which we must conceive of as being originally in God as a perfection of his nature, was what moved him to create the world. But here as much as possible to avoid confusion, I observe, that there is some impropriety in saying that a disposition in God to communicate himself *to the creature*, moved him to create the world. For though the diffusive disposition in the nature of God, that moved him to create the world, doubtless inclines him to communicate himself to the creature, when the creature exists; yet this cannot be all: Because an inclination in God to communicate himself to an object, seems to presuppose the existence of the object, at least in idea. But the diffusive disposition that excited God to give creatures existence, was rather a communicative disposition in general, or a disposition in the fulness of the divinity to flow out and diffuse itself. Thus the disposition there is in the root and stock of a tree to diffuse and send forth its sap and life, is doubtless the reason of the communication of its sap and life to its buds, leaves and fruits after these exist. But a disposition to communicate of its life and sap to its fruits, is not so properly the cause of its producing those fruits, as its disposition to communicate itself, or diffuse its sap and life in general. Therefore to speak more strictly according to truth, we may suppose, *that a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fulness, was what excited him to create the world; and so that the emanation itself was aimed at by him as a last end of the creation.*" *End for which God created the World*, *Works*, Vol. VI. p. 32, First American Edition.

NOTE N. Page 148.

ATHEISM CONTRARY TO NATURE.

"What man, when he discovers himself in the act of exercising the spontaneity of his intelligence, does not believe in himself and in the world? This is evidently the case in respect to our personal existence, and of that of the world. It is the same, in respect to the existence of God. Leibnitz said, there is *being* in every proposition. Now, a proposition is only the expression of a thought; and in every proposition there is being, because there is being in every thought. The very idea of *being* implies, in its lowest degree, an idea, (more or less clear, yet real,) of *being* itself, that is, of God. To think, is to know that we think; it is to confide in our thought, that is, to confide in the principle of thought, that is, to believe in the existence of that principle. As this does not imply that we believe ourselves, or that we believe the world, and yet implies, that we believe;—it is evident, that, whether we know it or do not know it, it implies, that we believe in the absolute principle of thought; so that, all thought implies a spontaneous faith in God, and natural Atheism has no existence. I do not say only, that there exists not a language, in which this great name is not found; but if complete dictionaries of a language were placed before my eyes, in which that name were not to be found, I should not falter. Is there one man who speaks that language, who thinks, and yet places no faith in his thought? For instance, does he believe that he exists? If he believes this, I am satisfied; for if he believes that he exists, he then believes that his thought—that he believes his existence—is worthy of faith; he therefore places faith in the principle of his thought,—now, *there* is God. Because every thought contains faith in the principle of thought, therefore, according to my doctrine, every word pronounced with confidence, is nothing less than a

profession of faith in reason in itself, that is, in God. Every word is an act of faith; and so incontestable is this truth, that, in the cradle of societies, every primitive word is a hymn. Search in the history of languages, of societies, and of every remote epoch, and you will find nothing anterior to the lyric element, to hymns, to litanies; such is the intensity of the truth, that every primitive conception is a spontaneous perception, the impress of faith, and of an inspiration accompanied with enthusiasm,—that is to say, of a religious emotion. There, gentlemen, I repeat, is the identity of human kind. Every where, in its instinctive and spontaneous form, reason is equal to itself, in all the generations of humanity, and in all the individuals of which these different generations are composed. Whoever has not been cut off from the inheritance of thought, has not been cut off from the inheritance of those ideas which call forth its most immediate developement, and which science, afterwards presents to him with the apparatus, and under the affrighting title, of *the categories*. In their simple and primitive form, these ideas are every where the same. This is, in a manner, the golden age of thought. Then, gentlemen, respect humanity, which every where in this form, possesses truth. Respect humanity in all its members; for in all its members there is a ray divine of intelligence and essential fraternity, in the unity of those fundamental ideas which are derived from the most immediate developement of reason."

"Let not the example of the skeptic, who doubts every thing, be brought as an objection to this doctrine. I shall reply, as I replied, in my last lecture: Does he deny that he denies? Does he doubt that he doubts? I ask him only that. If he believe that he doubts, if he affirm that he doubts, then, inasmuch as he affirms that he is doubting, he affirms that he exists. He therefore believes himself;—this is something; and I would engage thus, successively to establish all the elements of general belief. Reflection, in its strongest aberrations, may always be brought back to

truth; because its aberrations are always only partial; because recourse may always be had to some element of truth still existing in the mind; and because there cannot fail to exist at all times, some element of truth, even in the mind of him who may appear to be the most absolute of skeptics. In days of crisis and agitation, together with reflection, doubt and skepticism enter into the minds of many excellent men, who sigh over and are affrighted at their own incredulity. I would undertake their defence against themselves; I would prove to them that they always place faith in something. Regard things on their fair side, gentlemen. When you lack truth on one point, attach yourself to that portion of truth which you still possess, and increase it successively. So also, when you behold one of your fellow creatures who, not being able to deny his own existence, (an effort of strength to which few feel competent), sets about denying the existence of the world, (no very common occurrence either,) and particularly the existence of God, (which without being so, seems more easy and is more common,) say to yourselves, and repeat it constantly, that this being is not degraded; that he still believes, because he still affirms something; and that his faith only lights upon, and is concentrated in a single point; and instead of incessantly viewing him, in regard to what he wants, as an Atheist or a skeptic; consider him rather, in regard to what still remains to him, as a man; and you will see that in the most partial, confined and skeptical reflection, there will always still remain a very considerable element of faith, and of strong and extensive convictions. So much for reflection. But besides reflection there still exists spontaneity, which is within reflection; and when the scholar has denied the existence of God, hear the man; ask *him*, take him at unawares, and you will see that all his words imply the idea of God; and that faith in God, is without his knowledge, at the bottom of his heart."—*Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, LINBERG'S *Translation*, pp. 172—175, 178—180.

THEODORE JOUFFROY.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTICE.

The selections from the writings of Theodore Jouffroy, contained in the present volumes, will enable the reader to understand the scope and character of his philosophy. They represent his opinions, on many of the most important topics of inquiry, and, though, with a few exceptions, they are clothed in a popular form, they are by no means destitute of scientific rigor and precision. The remarks which have been made in the Introductory Notice to Cousin, with regard to the reform of philosophy in France, are applicable, in a great measure, to the labors of Jouffroy. The influence which he has exerted in the restoration of a higher order of thought has been hardly inferior to that of the eminent founder of the Eclectic school; and the course which his researches have subsequently taken is adapted not only to continue the work that had been so happily begun, but to enrich it with new accessions of no small beauty and utility.

His writings, accordingly, present strong claims on the attention of the student of philosophy. In the actual state of that science, they are no less valuable

as a guide to what has been already accomplished, than as a foundation for the labors of future inquirers. They exhibit the results of modern philosophical investigations in a lucid and attractive style, and, at the same time, point out with equal freedom and candor, the defects of existing systems, and the progress that must be realized before philosophy can be elevated to the same rank with the physical sciences.

Jouffroy is not to be considered merely as an interpreter of the opinions of others. He is known to have taken a deep interest in the study of the Scottish philosophy, and to have contributed, in no small degree, to its introduction to the notice of his countrymen. He is also distinguished as a favorite pupil of M. Cousin, and on that account he may be deemed only the advocate and expounder of the views of his master. This, however, is not the case. He is equally independent of the Scottish school and of M. Cousin himself. He does not servilely follow in the track of any of his predecessors, but always shows himself to be a truly original, scientific observer. If, on the leading points of philosophical inquiry, he adopts the conclusions which have been illustrated with so much clearness and ability by M. Cousin, it is not because he is pledged to the principles of a school, but because he has verified their correctness by his own personal investigations. Nor is he confined within the limits of the system, the most important results of which he accepts as truth. He has extended his researches over a broad field, and cast an unexpected light on many points which had long remained in obscurity. His method of inquiry, the general objects

at which he aims, and the principal results at which he has arrived are similar to those with which we are familiar in the writings of Cousin; but he constantly brings into view novel and interesting aspects of truth, and gives to all his researches the impression of his own vigorous and earnest mind.

Philosophy with Jouffroy is a system of rigid and authentic science, and not the product of arbitrary speculation. Its basis can be found only in the examination of facts. Its sole value consists in its being an accurate representation of the objects which it undertakes to describe. The indulgence of the love of hypothesis is no less fatal to the study of philosophy, than it is to the study of physics. Its successful pursuit requires the eye of the observer rather than the genius of the poet. The human soul, so far as it is the object of philosophy at all, is to be made the object of a scientific examination, no less critical and searching, than that which is instituted by the anatomist in the study of physiology, or the chemist in the detection of the elements of material nature. But these facts have often been lost sight of, or called in question. Philosophy has been encumbered with a multitude of hypotheses, that have prevented the establishment of a genuine scientific theory. Conjectures have taken the place of researches; ingenious fictions been accepted instead of the facts of experience; and the Universe submitted to the guesses of the idle looker-on, rather than to the scrutiny of the competent observer. Hence the vital importance of a correct scientific method in the investigations of philosophy. This point is earnestly insisted on by Jouffroy,

as well as by Cousin; and the views which they hold in common with regard to this subject, can hardly be repeated too often. They are essential to the regeneration of philosophy; they afford the only means of solving those great questions which the heart of man has never ceased to ask; they place us in the right path for ascertaining the secret of the Universe, so far as we are permitted to know it from reflection on the fundamental laws of our own being; and without admitting them to their full extent, we shall always be overrun with hypotheses that are not only unsatisfactory in themselves, but mischievous in their ultimate consequences. These hypotheses will continue to be invented, so long as their place is not supplied by the legitimate observation of reality. Their disastrous effects need hardly be touched upon. They seduce the mind by the false appearance of knowledge, and prevent the patient and impartial study of facts which is the indispensable condition of scientific progress. Philosophy in this way, comes to be regarded by many merely as a science of speculation; in other words, a science destitute of foundation in the examination of nature; in other words again, a science destitute of all just claims to validity. It is supposed to consist in the construction of theories, more or less fanciful, for the explanation of the mysteries which are met with in the human soul and in the outward Universe. Hence, it is inferred, that one man's speculation is as good as another's; that is to say, all speculation at bottom is useless; it may be tolerated as the gymnastics of the understanding, but it is barren of fruit; that is to say, finally, the study of philosophy is idle, and all its professions are a vain pretence.

These conclusions could not be denied, if philosophy were admitted to be a mere speculative science. In that case, it would sustain the same relation to legitimate intellectual pursuits that such works, for instance, as Burnet's Theory of the Earth sustains to the writings of Cuvier and Buckland. It might furnish materials for agreeable amusement, but could add nothing to our stores of accurate knowledge. It could never be depended on for giving us an insight into the facts of nature; it should hence be avoided by the sober thinker as wasting his time, and corrupting his intellect; and should be expunged from our schemes of education and of popular improvement. But this error is removed by a knowledge of the true method, which, though defended, and, to a certain degree, put in practice by former philosophers, especially by Dr. Reid, and Dugald Stewart, has never been so fully illustrated, or so successfully applied, as by the principal writers of the Eclectic school. In this respect, Jouffroy holds a distinguished rank. For this reason, if for no other, his writings are among the most valuable fruits of the recent philosophical movement. He should be studied again and again, until his principles of method have been completely wrought into the mind; and then if he has fallen into errors in philosophy himself, we have the instrument in our hands with which to detect them.

Neither is there any organ of philosophical inquiry but reason, as it is manifested in the human intellect. This is competent to the perception and the developement of all truth which can be brought within the notice of man. If imagination be substituted in the

place of reason, the consequences cannot but be pernicious to the interests of philosophy. It may be employed, with singular advantage, in the service of reason; its plastic energy is needed to give form and symmetry to the primary materials of truth; and from the facts presented in the exercise of reason, to construct a complete and harmonious whole. But the moment imagination usurps the authority which belongs to reason; refuses to legitimate the views which it has gained in its loftiest flight, by rational laws; confides in the spontaneous suggestions of instinct, with no attempt to comprehend their nature, or establish their validity,—inspiration assumes the place of science, the philosopher is lost in the prophet, and instead of a system to explain reality, we receive a poem from the realms of fiction. These views will be found unfolded by Jouffroy in various applications; and in reference to the science of ethics, with important and admirable results.

The great question which lies at the bottom of all genuine philosophical researches, in the opinion of Jouffroy, is that which concerns the nature and destiny of man. These two points should never be separated. In truth, they are always united in the operations of the common mind of humanity. Man loves to inquire so curiously with regard to his inward nature, in order that he may comprehend his ultimate destiny. There is no human being for whom the highest questions of philosophy, stated in language that he understands, do not possess the deepest interest. There is no subject, which, in a pure and healthy state of mind, so firmly persists in demanding a hearing, as that which

relates to the profoundest mysteries of our being. Man craves to be revealed to himself; he would have the obscure instincts which speak at the bottom of his heart brought into clear and intelligible language; he would understand what he is, in order to know what he may become.

The object, which is never lost sight of by Jouffroy, in his philosophical instructions, is to present a satisfactory solution of the great problem of human destiny. That he has succeeded in fully accomplishing this object, is not pretended by himself. On the contrary, what he has hitherto done in this respect, must be regarded in the light of a preparation; but a preparation of such a thorough and judicious character, as to authorize the most sanguine expectations concerning its final results. A more detailed account of his views on this subject may be acceptable to the reader, and form an appropriate introduction to his miscellaneous writings.

According to Jouffroy, every man possesses, to a greater or less degree, the belief that he is appointed to a specific destiny.[1] The spectacle of the surrounding Universe, and of its various inhabitants, inspires the human mind with certain convictions which do not depend upon itself, which it cannot reject when they are once produced. As every being which we find in the world has a determinate nature, we cannot but believe that this nature imposes upon it a determinate destiny; and as the world itself is an harmonious whole, we believe that the determinate destiny of

[1] See *Mélanges Philosophiques*, pp. 426, et seq.

every particular being conspires to form the destiny of the whole, and composes an element of universal order. Every being, whatever it may be, seems to us destined, by its organization, to a certain end. The accomplishment of this end is the part which it has to act on earth; and the combination of these parts composes the drama of the creation. As all beings have their specific destiny, which is imposed on them by their nature, and because it is imposed on them by their nature, they all constantly and vigorously tend towards its accomplishment. This is common to them all. But while the greater part accomplish it unconsciously, it is given to beings, endowed with rational natures, to comprehend their destiny. This is the great distinction of man.

We are not however to suppose that the attention of man is early directed to the solution of this problem. For a long time he is merely an animal, more perfect, it is true, than other animals, but still destitute of those thoughts and conceptions which are the peculiar characteristic of human nature. The phenomenon of reason, conceiving the idea of destiny, conceiving that every being has its destiny, and that this destiny sustains a necessary relation to that of the Universe, is not produced in the mind of man, during the first period of his existence on earth. The day that it is produced is a memorable one in his history, one that he can never forget; but it is one that delays its arrival, and until it arrives, we may say that the existence of man is only the highest degree of animal existence.

It would seem, at first sight, that this primary mode

of life, which is evidently that of the child, is protracted to a great extent with the generality of men, and that even, with a considerable portion, it fills up the whole duration of existence. In fact, when we cast our eyes on the society in which we live, what do we perceive? Do we see men occupied with this grand problem of human destiny, men whom this problem torments, men from whom it takes a single thought, or whom it deprives of a moment of time? It must be confessed that if we each know certain individuals to whom this description will apply, their number is small; and that the multitude which surrounds us is not composed of such elements. Still it is true that there is not a man, however humble his birth, however wretched his circumstances, however destitute of education, who has not, at least at some time in the course of his life, under the influence of some grave misfortune, some severe trial, put to himself that fearful question, which hangs like a dark cloud over our heads, Wherefore is man placed on the earth? What is the purpose of his existence here? Every one can testify to the truth of this assertion. No one is ignorant of the question proposed.

What then are the circumstances which awaken this conception in the human mind? It is evident, in the first place, that if man did not bear within himself the two principles which have been already described, he would never conceive the moral question, and would never propose it. It is only because man is capable of comprehending that every thing is created for a certain end, and that, in the sum total of the Universe, the end of every particular thing must con-

tribute to the end of the whole, that he concerns himself with his own destiny, and with his relations to the world which he inhabits. Deprive man of reason, the faculty of comprehending, leave him only understanding, the faculty which he has in common with the animals; and there is no circumstance which could awaken the conception of this problem. Now the reason of man is born with him; but it long remains in a state of slumber; it needs powerful influences to arouse it, and so to speak, to bring out the principles which it contains. Every man bears within him from his infancy the principles which give birth to the question of human destiny; and yet this question is not proposed until comparatively a late period, and with many it hardly seems to be proposed at all. The question then recurs, what circumstances awaken the reason of man to the consideration of this subject, and force us to open our eyes upon the enigma of life?

It is probable that man would never demand of himself why he has been brought into the world, if the tendencies of his nature were constantly and completely satisfied. A perfect and perpetual harmony between the bent of his desires and the course of things would perhaps leave his reason in an unbroken sleep. That which awakens his reason, which compels him to inquire into the destiny of man, is Evil; Evil, which is found in every human condition, even in those fleeting enjoyments which we call happiness.

At the commencement of life, as our nature awakes with all the wants to which it is subject, and all the faculties with which it is provided, it comes in

contact with a world which seems to present an unlimited field for the satisfaction of the one, and the developement of the other. At the sight of this world which appears to contain the sources of happiness, our nature is elevated, in manifold hopes, in as manifold illusions. It is a part of the human condition that these hopes are not to be realized, that these illusions are to pass away. Of all the passions which God has given us, of all the faculties with which he has endowed us, how many can be found which attain their end on earth? It would seem as if the world in which we are placed were constituted so as to make this result impossible. And yet these desires and these faculties grow out of our nature; they seek the same object; they tend to the same end; and the attainment of this end is the true good of our nature. Our nature accordingly suffers. And not only so, but it revolts under suffering; as it did not make itself, it is not accountable for its inherent tendencies; the satisfaction of these tendencies therefore seems to it not only natural, but legitimate; it hence finds the laws of nature and those of justice injured by what it suffers; and hence that protracted incredulity at first, and then that secret protest which we oppose to the miseries of life. While our youth continues, suffering rather surprises than terrifies us; it seems as if what happens to us were an anomaly, and it does not cause us to renounce our confidence in the world. This anomaly is repeated without effect; we are not disabused; we are ready to accuse ourselves, rather than to call in question the justice of Providence; we believe that if we make mistakes, the fault is our

own, and flatter ourselves that we shall become more skilful; and even when our skill has been at fault a thousand times, we still persist in this belief. But at length our eyes are opened. The truth is revealed to us. The hopes which mitigated our sufferings then vanish, and are succeeded by bitterness, if not by anger; and from the bottom of our heart, oppressed with sorrow, from the depths of our reason, wounded in its most cherished convictions, the question inevitably arises, Why has man been placed in the world?

And it is not only the sufferings of life which direct the mind to this problem. It is suggested also by the happiness which we enjoy, because our nature is no less deceived in one than in the other. In the first moment of the satisfaction of our desires, we have the presumption, or rather, the simplicity, to believe that we are happy; but if this happiness continues, its most exquisite charms pass away; where our satisfaction seemed complete, a less degree of satisfaction ensues, until it is finally exhausted in weariness and disgust. The highest enjoyments of life are not sufficient for the heart of man; and this fact arouses his attention to the consideration of his destiny.

But this is not all. In the bosom of cities, man appears to be the principal concern of creation; his apparent superiority is there signally displayed; he there seems to preside over the theatre of the world, or rather to occupy it exclusively himself. But when this being, so haughty, so powerful, so absorbed by his own interests, in the crowd of cities and in the midst of his fellows, chances to be brought into a vast and majestic scene of nature, in view of the il-

limitable firmament, surrounded with the works of creation, which overwhelm him, if not by their intelligence, by their magnitude; when, from the summit of a mountain, and under the light of the stars, he beholds petty villages lost in diminutive forests, which themselves are lost in the extent of the prospect, and reflects that those villages are inhabited by frail and imperfect beings like himself; when he compares those beings and their wretched abodes with the magnificent spectacle of external nature; when he compares this with the world on whose surface it is but a point, and this world, in its turn, with the myriads of worlds that are suspended above him, and before which, it is nothing; in the presence of this spectacle, man views, with pity, his miserable, conflicting passions, his miserable enjoyments which invariably terminate in disgust; and then also the question arises in his heart, What is the purpose of his condition on earth?

The history of our race, moreover, and of the earth which we inhabit, awakens a desire to determine the problem of our destiny, even in those minds which are most exclusively occupied with the gratification of the passions.

The march of humanity presents a curious spectacle. We observe the broad plains of Asia taken possession of by races, which descend from the central mountains of that immense continent; races, which perhaps have ancestors, but which have no history. They arrive in a savage state, almost naked, scarcely armed, giving no account of their origin, or of their previous condition. From another quarter, and from

the deserts of Arabia, proceed other races, with a different organization and different ideas, but with the same ignorance of their country and their ancestors. These races, as they meet, are found hostile to each other; long conflicts ensue, which give birth to empires that are no sooner established than they are overthrown; one race finally gains precedence, and rules the country with absolute authority. This empire is hardly created before it comes in contact with Europe. There also are men without history; with a different organization, different ideas, a different mode of life. These two races, the one Asiatic and the other Greek, contend for the mastery; the Greeks are victorious, and Asia is subdued. But soon a new people, inhabiting the West, makes its appearance, rapidly increases, and in the immense extent of its empire, swallows up the Greek race, together with its conquests. This new people also is surrounded by races, which live, unknown to themselves and to others, from the most remote epochs, in the West and the North of Europe. These men, who resemble neither the Romans, nor the Greeks, nor the Orientals, who possess different languages, different beliefs, different ideas, have their mission which agitates them in the bosom of their forests, and which summons them in their turn, upon the stage of the world. They appear when the hour is come; and Rome falls beneath their breath. And then, at a later period, unknown countries are disclosed; the North of Asia, the South of Africa, America, the innumerable islands scattered like dust, on the surface of the ocean, are discovered; and every where, new tribes, tribes of all colors,

white, black, red, copper, with every variety of organization, all degrees of civilization, every kind of ideas; and of these tribes, not one knows whence it comes, what it is doing on the earth, or whither it goes; not one knows the tie by which it is bound to the universal mass of humanity.

When we reflect on this history of the human race, we are impressed with a feeling of awe; we are overwhelmed in view of the mysterious fatality which seems to weigh upon our species. We ask ourselves, what then is this humanity of which we form a part? What is its origin? What is its end? Has it the same destiny with the plants of the field and the trees of the forest? Or, is creation only a theatre in which it comes to perform one act of its immortal existence? Still further, will the light which does not shine upon its cradle, illustrate its developement? But who understands the course which it is to take? The Oriental civilization has fallen under Grecian civilization; the Grecian civilization has fallen under Roman civilization; a new civilization, proceeding from the forests of Germany, has destroyed the Roman civilization. What will be the issue of this new civilization? Will it conquer the world, or is all civilization destined to grow up and to decay? In a word, does humanity only revolve in the same circle, or does it advance? Or again, as some maintain, does it go back? For it has been supposed that all light was at the beginning, that from tradition to tradition, it has become fainter and fainter, and that without suspecting it, we are proceeding to barbarism by the way of civilization. Man is lost in view of these problems. Anni-

hilated, as he is, in the species, the annihilation of the species itself in the midst of a sea of darkness, freezes his heart and confounds his imagination. He asks himself, what is the law under which the human race unconsciously marches; and thus, once more, arises the question of his destiny.

A still more formidable motive, if the expression may be allowed, for proposing this question, is found in the recent discoveries of science. In penetrating the depths of the earth, we have brought to light authentic monuments of the history of this little globe on which we dwell. It has been shown that there was a time when nature produced nothing on its surface but the vegetable creation,—huge specimens of vegetation, compared with which our own are but pigmies, and which covered no living being with their shade. This creation was destroyed by a revolution, as if unworthy of the hand which fashioned it. At the second creation, among those immense plants, under the canopy of those gigantic forests, which distinguished the former, we see monstrous reptiles brought into life, the first attempts of animal organization, the first proprietors of the earth, which they alone inhabited. Nature also broke in pieces this creation, and, in the following, placed upon the earth quadrupeds, of which the species no longer exist, shapeless animals, roughly organized, which could not live without difficulty, and which seemed only the first sketch of an unskilful workman. Nature again broke in pieces this creation, as it had done the others; and from one attempt to another, going from the more imperfect to the more perfect, it finally arrived at this

last creation, which, for the first time, places man upon the earth. Thus man seems to be only an essay on the part of the Creator, an essay, among many others, which he has been pleased to make and to destroy. Those immense reptiles, those shapeless animals, which have disappeared from the face of the earth, have formerly lived on it, as we do now. Why should not the day also come, when our race will be blotted out, when our bones, as they are discovered, will be looked upon by the species that are then alive, as the rude sketches of nature, in a first experiment? And if then we are only a link in this chain of creations, more or less imperfect, how should we regard ourselves, what are our titles to hope and to pride?

Such are some of the circumstances, which even in the midst of the most unthinking life, often suddenly present to the mind the problem of human destiny. All these circumstances can be summed up in a single formula. What is common to them all, is the illustration which they give of the contradiction between the natural grandeur of the soul, and the misery of its present condition. They disabuse it of the profound confidence which it has in itself, and thus force it to remark that its destiny is an enigma, of which it has not yet found the solution. These circumstances are so numerous, the teaching which they impart is so direct and simple, that no man, during the course of a long life, can avoid the conception of this problem. It is, by no means, confined to the learned. The shepherd on the mountain, is in the presence of nature. He meditates, in his protracted leisure, concerning what he is, and what are

the beings beneath his feet. His ancestors have descended, one after another, to the tomb; he asks himself why they were born; why having lived a few years on the earth, they have died to make room for others, who have disappeared in their turn; and so perpetually, without reason and without aim. The shepherd muses like ourselves upon this infinite creation, of which he is but a fragment; like ourselves, he feels lost in this chain of beings, of which he cannot find the end; he seeks the relation between himself and the animals which he tends; he asks, if, as he is superior to them, there are not other beings superior to him; and, when he is conscious of his misery, he easily conceives of creatures more perfect, more capable of happiness, surrounded by circumstances more adapted to produce it; and, in his own right, by the authority of his intelligence, which bears the character of frailty and imperfection, he presumes to address the high and melancholy question to the Creator, Wherefore hast thou made me, and what is the purpose of my existence on the earth?

Now, when man is at length awakened, by one or the other of these circumstances, to consider the great problem, if he does not at once find a solution in the established faith, he is doomed to go through an agony of doubt. From that time, the man is no longer what he was; he has left the state of innocence; he has arrived at the reasonable and reflective state, at the human state, properly so called. This question is like the torch in the fable of Psyche; before this fearful revelation, the man obeyed his instincts, and without calculation, without disturbance,

arrived or did not arrive at the end to which they impelled him; when he attained this end, he was happy; when he did not attain it, he suffered; but these transitory distresses, soon effaced by the appearance of new passions, bore no resemblance to the profound sadness, which takes possession of him who has conceived the question of human destiny and observed the darkness which surrounds it; a new chord is then struck in the depths of his soul; and no external distraction can prevent its vibration on the slightest touch.

It is then, that, for the first time, are awakened in the soul, those three sentiments which hitherto have slumbered in peace. These sublime sentiments, the glory and the torment of our nature, are the Poetical Sentiment, the Religious Sentiment, and the Philosophical Sentiment. The age of innocence has its poetry; so has the age of maturity; and so superior is that of the latter, that when it is revealed to us, it destroys the charm of the former. It is absurd to give the name of poetry to that superficial inspiration which amuses itself with celebrating the frivolous joys, and with deploring the ephemeral sorrows of the passions. We must distinguish true poetry from those vulgar strains which address only the outward elements of the soul. True poetry expresses but one sentiment, that, namely, which agitates the soul in view of the question of its destiny. They who have not lived long enough comprehend but in part those low accents, which breathe forth the eternal feelings of the heart; but they echo loudly in those ripened spirits, in which the mysteries of life and of death,

the destinies of man and of humanity have developed the genuine poetical sentiment. To them alone it is given, to comprehend high lyric poetry; to them alone, we might say, it is given to feel poetry; for lyric poetry is the whole of poetry; the rest has only its form.

What we have said of the poetical sentiment is true, for similar reasons, of the religious sentiment. Man may learn a religion in his infancy; this may be taught, like every thing else; but he can never know what religion really is, until he has been forced, by the experience of life, to consider the problem of human destiny. A religion is only the reply to this problem and to the questions which it involves. Now of what importance is the solution of these problems, to him who has never proposed them, who has never felt the need of solving them? Can a man have a religion before he is religious, that is to say, before he has experienced the want of what religion gives, before he has conceived it, aspired after it, and perceived its unspeakable worth? All this takes place only when man returns within himself, when the mysteries of his being awaken his attention, when he is possessed with the craving desire to fathom them, when all the powers of his soul, excited and alarmed, implore light, as the lips of the parched traveller cry out for the fountain of the desert. From that time man is religious. Before, he was not so.

It is only then, moreover, that the philosophical sentiment is awakened within our souls; for like a religion, a philosophical system is nothing but a reply to the questions which interest humanity. Philosophy is the endeavor to solve those formidable problems

which torment the human soul. The philosophical sentiment is the craving to pursue these solutions with the torch of reason and science; and if philosophy is employed with the nature of man, it is because an acquaintance with man is the only path which can lead to these solutions. The case therefore is the same with philosophy, as with poetry, as with religion; its nature, its end, its value are revealed only to the heart of man,—and we may, with great reason, say the heart,—when he feels himself weighed down by the problem of his destiny, and the agony of doubt has seized him in the midst of his primitive indifference. Philosophy is an affair of the soul, as well as poetry and religion; and he who brings to it only his intellect, may indeed become a philosopher, but it is plain that he is not yet one. Poetry, religion, philosophy are three manifestations of the same sentiment, which is here satisfied by laborious researches, there by a lively faith, and still further by plaintive melodies; and it is this which creates a bond of brotherhood between poetical, religious, and philosophical spirits; which enables them to understand each other so perfectly, even when they speak such different languages; and which makes them equally unintelligible to those innocent minds, which do not know, which do not yet comprehend, the tempest that agitates them.

Such is the great revolution which is produced in man by the appearance of the problem of human destiny. But this problem does not remain in the same form in which it first entered the mind. It ferments, it introduces a multitude of other questions which it

involves, and which are proposed by the intellect, as certainly as it is proposed itself. Philosophy has divided this problem, in the endeavor to solve it. The investigation of the destiny of man on earth, it calls morality; of his destiny after this life, religion; of the destiny of the human race, the philosophy of history; of the origin and the laws of the Universe, cosmology; of the nature of God, and his relations with man and creation, theology. So with other problems, natural right, political right, the right of nations, and the like. Now all these divisions are useful, inasmuch as we must analyze a subject, in order to study it; but such lines, drawn through the subject of philosophy, do not destroy its radical unity. The questions, though distinct, are inseparable; they are branches, from the same stock; we cannot conceive one of them, without going to the others; they presuppose each other; they form but one in the human mind.

For instance, how can we determine the problem, What is the best possible government? Is not the best possible government that which best conducts society to its end, or which best permits it to go to that end? We must therefore know the end of society in order to know what is the best possible government. But how shall we know the end of a society of men, if we do not know the end of man himself; society is only an aggregate, and the end of an aggregate can have no other law than that of the elements of which it is composed. The political problem therefore is a corollary of the social problem, which is itself a corollary of the moral problem; so that it is as impossible to consider the consequence, indepen-

dently of the principle, as to stop with the principle without descending to the consequence. But the moral problem, moreover, cannot be separated from the religious problem. No one has demonstrated that the whole destiny of man is comprised in the space between the cradle and the grave. Humanity, which has always believed the contrary, which has always mused on the cradle of the infant and the tomb of the old man, persists in its faith; and science has brought to light no proof, no fact, which seriously shakes it.

These questions are no less closely connected with that which concerns the origin and destiny of the species. Man seeks his own destiny in that of his race; he cannot stop with his own individual interests; he is compelled to consider the destinies of humanity, and not only those of humanity, but those of the different beings which people creation, those of the whole Universe itself. In commencing with himself, he is led to the All, and to God, the source of the All. It is thus that the problem of human destiny is made so fruitful; it is thus that whenever this apparition is brought to the mind, it summons with it, a thousand others; it is thus, that all the questions which philosophy separates in order to solve, still continue united by an indissoluble bond, and in fact, form but a single problem, which, in the view of common sense, as well as of reason, is not resolved in any of its parts, unless it is resolved in all of them without exception.

Philosophy and religion, as has been said, are two different responses to the questions which interest humanity. The completeness with which these problems are solved is the criterion of every great religion,

of every great philosophical doctrine. A religion which neglects one of these problems is only a half-religion, as a philosophical doctrine which does not reply to them all is only a half-philosophy. We may apply this criterion to the Christian religion. There is a little book which is taught to children, and on which they are examined in the Church. If we read this book, which is the Catechism, we shall find a solution of all the problems, which have been proposed; of all of them, without exception. If we ask the Christian, whence comes the human race, he knows; or whither it goes, he knows; or how it goes, he knows. If we ask that poor child, who has never reflected on the subject in his life, why he is here below, and what will become of him after death, he will give you a sublime answer, which he will not thoroughly comprehend, but which is none the less admirable for that. If we ask him, how the world was created and for what end; why God has placed in it plants and animals; how the earth was peopled; whether by a single family or by many; why men speak different languages; why they suffer, why they struggle, and how all this will end; he knows it all. Origin of the world, origin of the species, question of races, destiny of man in this life and in the other, relations of man to God, duties of man to his fellow-men, rights of man over the creation,—he is ignorant of none of these points; and when he shall have grown up, he will as little hesitate with regard to natural right, political right, or the right of nations; all this proceeds, with clearness, and as it were of itself, from Christianity. This then is what we may call a great religion, for it

leaves no question unanswered which interests humanity.

If we examine the great philosophers we shall find the same universality in their systems. The doctrine of Epicurus, for instance, contains a solution, such as it is, of every question which interests humanity; not one is without an answer. The case is the same with Platonism, with Stoicism, with the philosophy of Kant, with every great philosophy. Like every great religion, every great philosophical doctrine resolves all the problems which interest and which torment humanity.

There is however an essential difference between a religion and a philosophical system. Growing out of the same want, these two solutions are not produced in the same manner; and hence, it follows, that in replying to the same questions, and addressing the same humanity, they assume different forms, and do not rest their authority on the same basis.

The religious solution claims to be the fruit of a supernatural intervention, and is clothed in poetical forms. The philosophical solution is the product of human reflection, and is expressed in the precise and rigorous forms of the understanding. Hence, it is evident that for many ages the mass of men are incapable of receiving the truth, in the philosophical form; and if religions have had their cradle and their throne in the bosom of the masses, it is because they are incomparably better adapted to their wants.

As intelligence advances, the need is felt of verifying the truths presented in the form of religion, by the processes of philosophy. This is the great problem

to the solution of which the labors of Jouffroy have been principally directed. The successful accomplishment of this object, in his opinion, is the primary want of the present age. There is no other resource, which can be of any avail, in the prevailing distractions of society and revolutions of thought. An answer must be given to the indestructible problems of humanity, by the exact deductions of science,—an answer which can sustain the scrutiny of reason, in whose hands the civilization of modern times has placed the sceptre of authority.

The translations here given are, with one exception, from a collection of Jouffroy's miscellaneous writings entitled *Mélanges Philosophiques*, published at Paris, in 1833, under the general divisions of Philosophy of History, History of Philosophy, Psychology, and Moral Science. The order in the present work is entirely changed, so as to give the first place to the articles on the History of Philosophy, and the last to those on the Philosophy of History, while the intervening space is occupied with selections on Psychology and Moral Science. It is to be hoped that this admirable writer will soon publish a second volume of "Miscellanies," according to the statement given in his Preface to the first, and thus increase his claims to the gratitude and esteem of the philosophical student.

I.

ON PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE.

1824.

THE history of philosophy presents a singular spectacle; a certain number of problems are reproduced at every epoch; each of these problems suggests a certain number of solutions, always the same; philosophers are divided; discussion is set on foot; every opinion is attacked and defended, with equal appearance of truth. Humanity listens in silence, adopts the opinion of no one, but preserves its own, which is what is called *common sense.*

Thus, to refer to examples, all philosophical epochs have produced upon the stage the opposite theories o Materialism and Spiritualism in metaphysics, and those of Stoicism and Epicureanism in morals. None of these doctrines has permanently prevailed; none has perished; all have found sincere and illustrious partisans; all have exerted nearly the same influence; but, in the end, the human race, which has witnessed their debates, has become neither Materialist, nor Spiritualist, neither Stoic, nor Epicurean; it has remained what it was prior to philosophy, believing at once both in matter and spirit, respecting duty and pursuing happiness at the same time.

This spectacle, which gives the superficial observer a contempt for philosophy, and which furnishes skep-

ticism with arms apparently so formidable, is full of profound instruction to him who seeks, in the events of the intellectual world, the laws of the developement of the human race, which is revealed in them with far more truth, and to a much greater extent, than in those of the political world; for the actions of men interpret their ideas, as their ideas interpret the laws of their nature; and of these two interpretations, the most immediate is also the clearest and the most faithful.

But this spectacle, before it can become instructive, must be comprehended; and before it can be comprehended, must be studied. Now, this is a subject still altogether new; and on which reflection has scarcely been exercised, except in the most cursory manner. The active developement of the human mind at first attracted general attention; this could not have been otherwise; we are always struck with what is most on the surface. The field of facts properly so called has been explored in every direction; every sort of actions, of events, of dates has been minutely looked into; and in this way, the history of humanity was commenced. But after the facts were collected, the need was felt of explaining these facts; and as deeper researches were instituted, their causes were sought for in manners, religions, political institutions. The age of chronicles and of erudition was succeeded by the age of Montesquieu and of Voltaire. The necessity of going further began to make itself felt, and summoned enlightened minds to higher flights and wider excursions. The manners, the institutions, and the dogmas, which explain the conduct and the destiny of

nations, are themselves only general facts, of which the origin and the succession demand to be explained. And as these general facts are only the expression of opinions that are successively admitted with regard to moral, political, and religious questions, this explanation can be found only in the history of the intellectual developement of humanity,—a developement which is accomplished by virtue of the laws of our nature.

The history of philosophy is therefore a new study, an important study, a study which eminently belongs to the present epoch; and it is no less curious than indispensable, to regard it not as a catalogue of strange opinions altogether foreign to the affairs of this world, produced at hazard in the head of certain individuals, at such or such a time, in such or such a country, but as a progressive series of attempts, to resolve the questions which most nearly concern humanity, by every thing most illustrious to which it has given birth.

This is not the aspect which the history of philosophy presents at the first glance to a superficial or prejudiced mind; but it is that which is discovered by an elevated and impartial view. In fact, in those problems which are invariably presented to human thought, whenever it is restored to activity after ages of slumber, it is impossible not to perceive those supreme and fundamental questions which interest man above every thing else, on which all others depend, and before which they disappear; questions, in a word, which contain, under different aspects, the enigma of the world. It is around these questions that philosophy has moved since the moment of its birth, that is to say, since there have been thinking men; its sys-

tems are only different solutions proposed to this enigma; its long debates are only the solemn discussion of this vast mystery; and its history faithfully represents the developement of human intelligence with regard to those problems which are emphatically human.

Now, to return to our starting-point, that which first strikes us in this philosophical developement, that which demands an explanation before any thing else, is the discrepancy and the want of consistency presented by its results. There is not an important question on which philosophy is in accordance with itself; there is not one of its solutions which has been able to gain a permanent footing, and to resist the force of universal opinion which has swept them all away. Nothing appears more strange at the first glance, or is more worthy of an attentive consideration, than this inability of reflection to obtain a definite result, this contradiction between men of genius and the mass, between philosophy and common sense, in respect to points which most nearly concern the interests of humanity. Plato and Aristotle, Zeno and Epicurus, Descartes and Hobbes, Leibnitz and Locke, Kant and Condillac, that is, the most powerful minds which the world has produced, have exhausted their strength on the nature of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, without being able to agree in a single result; and the mass which appears never to have bestowed a thought on the subject, obstinately persists in finding true what some have declared false, certain what others have judged to be doubtful, beautiful and good what their doctrines have deprived of

those characteristics; that which was a question for the philosophers has seemed no question at all to the mass; for while the former have exhausted themselves in the solution of those mighty problems, the latter, without appearing to think of them, has passed judgment on their solutions, has admitted or rejected, amended or corrected them; while the former have disputed or contradicted each other, the latter has appeared to doubt of nothing, and alone, always in accordance with itself, to have seen all philosophical doctrines pass by, and alone also, has preserved its own, without change.

If the case were the same with philosophy as with the higher mathematics, in which the great mass takes no interest, which it does not pretend to understand, we might regard its resistance as indifference, or at least deny its right to interfere in the debate; but neither the True, the Beautiful, the Good, nor any of the great subjects with which philosophy is employed, is beyond the province of good sense, since all men perpetually judge that such a thing is true, or beautiful, or good; nothing is less indifferent to them, since they are occupied only with truth, justice, beauty, and utility. We cannot deny the competence of humanity, since it passes judgment; but how can we deny that of Plato, of Descartes, and of Kant? They also were men, and besides that, men of genius; and yet their doctrines have not become the religion of the people; the religion of the people is older than philosophy; philosophy has not altered it; it has survived all systems, and this religion is common sense.

Must we conclude from this that nothing is certain,

that it is a vulgar illusion to suppose we can know what philosophers have not yet been able to demonstrate? But how shall we explain this illusion of the human race? How can we admit the idea of intelligent beings destined by the Creator without exception to believe what is false? Or should we rather infer that philosophers are senseless individuals who lose their reason by soaring above common sense, and who become incapable of discerning truth by the very fact that they seek for it? But who shall dare to insult common sense so far, as to proclaim the folly of so many illustrious men, whom common sense itself has proclaimed as the select portion of humanity? Both of these hypotheses are equally revolting; the difficulty cannot be resolved either by skepticism, or by contempt for philosophy.

No historical fact is more strange or curious; none which it is more important to explain. So long as we do not comprehend its significance, we cannot form a just idea of philosophy, nor of the importance which belongs to its progress, nor of the point of view in which we should consider it and endeavor to promote it among the civilized nations of Europe.

In general, a just but very superficial idea is formed of what is called common sense; and while it is repeated that there is a discrepancy between common sense and philosophy, scarcely any one thinks of comparing the nature of the two things, in order to discover their point of contact and of divergence.

Every body understands by common sense a certain number of principles or notions evident of themselves, from which all men derive the grounds of their judg-

ment and the rules of their conduct; and nothing is more correct than this idea. But it is not sufficiently known that these principles are merely positive solutions of all the great problems which philosophy agitates. How could we regulate our conduct, what judgments could we form, if we could not distinguish between good and evil, truthand falsehood, beauty and deformity, one being and another, and reality and nullity; if we did not know what we should hold to, concerning that which we see with our eyes, perceive with our consciousness, and apprehend with our reason; if we had no idea of the purpose and the consequences of this life, of the author of all things and of his nature? What would be the light of intelligence, how would society proceed, if there were even the shadow of doubt on the notions which we possess in regard to most of these points? Now what are these notions, so firmly and so necessarily established in the intelligence of all men, but a series of responses to these questions, What is the True? What is the Good? What is the Beautiful? What is the nature of things? What is Being? What is the origin and certainty of human knowledge? What is the destiny of man in this world? Is his entire destiny accomplished in this life? Is this world the production of chance, or of an intelligent cause? And, we ask, are not these the questions with which philosophy is occupied? Do they not contain, in their germs at least, all the questions of logic, metaphysics, morals, politics, and religion?

Common sense therefore is nothing but a collection of solutions to those questions which philosophers

agitate. It is another philosophy prior to philosophy properly so called; since it is found spontaneously at the bottom of every consciousness, independently of all scientific research. There are accordingly two votes on the questions which interest humanity, namely, that of the mass and that of the philosophers, the spontaneous vote and the scientific vote, common sense and systems.

We have a clear idea of common sense; let us now examine the contradiction between common sense and philosophy, and see in what it consists.

If we compare the solution given by common sense to any problem whatever with the different solutions which have been proposed by philosophers, we shall always find that the solution of common sense is more comprehensive than the philosophical solutions. This is proved by examples. Zeno defined good, that which is in accordance with reason; Epicurus, an agreeable sensation; Kant, that which is obligatory. Common sense adopts all these opinions, and for that reason cannot be confined to any one of them. The exclusive spiritualists affirm the existence of spirit; the exclusive materialists, that of matter; but the former end with denying matter, and the second with denying spirit. Common sense equally admits both matter and spirit; and thus places itself in contradiction to each of those systems. The empirics recognised no authentic sources of knowledge but the eyes and the hands; Descartes admits none but consciousness; Plato and Kant make reason and conception predominate over that which can be attained by the senses or consciousness; common sense ac-

knowledges the authority of consciousness, of the senses, and of reason, at the same time. If we pursue the parallel in regard to other questions, we shall always find the same result. We hence obtain this important consequence, that if common sense does not adopt the systems of philosophers, it is not because those systems say one thing and common sense another, but because the systems say less while common sense says more. Go to the bottom of the various philosophical opinions, and you will always discover a positive element which common sense adopts, and by which they are connected with the consciousness of the human race. Skepticism itself does not escape this general law. But this element is every thing for the philosopher, while it is not every thing for common sense; and such is the true nature of the contradiction which separates them.

But if, on the one hand, all the questions which philosophy undertakes to resolve, are previously resolved at the bottom of human consciousness; and if, on the other hand, the efforts of philosophy can never reach the extent of the solutions of common sense, to what purpose are philosophical researches?

Before their accession to philosophy, philosophers, in their capacity as men, bore within them the light of common sense; they made use of it in their judgments and in their conduct; and whatever may be the result of their scientific labors, it is not perceived that they renounce common sense in the ordinary affairs of life, or that they are any more converted to their own doctrines than the great mass of mankind. They avow in practice, not only the existence, but

the superiority of the solutions of common sense. What then do they seek? What is the purpose of their endeavors? Let us attempt to explain it.

The solutions of common sense are not established in an explicit manner and in a positive form, in the human mind. Ask the first man you meet, what idea he has formed of the Good, or what he thinks concerning the nature of things, he will not know what you say; if you attempt to explain to him the meaning of those two questions, at least unless you use all the skill of Socrates, he will find it hard to comprehend you. But undertake to call in question, with the Stoics, that pleasure is a good, or to deny, with the spiritualists, the existence of matter, you will see him laugh at your folly, and exhibit the most unconquerable conviction with regard to those two points. It will be the same with every other question. Common sense, therefore, is an opinion of undoubted reality; but men are governed by it almost unconsciously; its existence is proved by the single fact that they judge and conduct as if they possessed it; taken as a whole, it is obscure; no one can give an account of it; but when a particular case occurs, it is manifested at once by a clear and positive application; it then returns into the shade; it is perceived in every judgment, in every determination; but, except in its application, it is as if it were not; and it is precisely this obscurity which makes it insufficient for thinking men. Reflection cannot be satisfied with this species of inspiration, the characteristic of which is to be ignorant of itself, and to be satisfied with this ignorance. If men are born with common sense,

they are also born with the need of comprehending themselves; one is no more natural than the other. Now, as soon as this need is developed, there is something in human consciousness beside common sense; there is a commencement of clearness, a commencement of philosophy. But from that time also there are some points more clear and some more obscure in human consciousness, a predominance of the former over the latter, and consequently an alteration in the equilibrium of common sense. Hence the germ of the spirit of system; this germ is strongly developed in vigorous intellects, which are highly exclusive, because they are highly reflective; but it is scarcely developed at all in the mass of the human race; and, for this reason, the mass is always subjected to the authority of common sense. And yet even in that, the influence of system is manifested in those oscillations which universal opinion undergoes in different ages, and which, without impairing its coherence, do not allow it to remain immovable.

Such is the origin of philosophy; but what is that of common sense? Whence comes the mysterious instruction which every body bears within himself, and which no one remembers to have acquired; so broad that it comprises even more than all philosophical doctrines, so full of authority that it judges and outlives them; and, at the same time, so obscure that humanity which possesses it is forced to learn it again? We here approach the very bottom of the question. But we do not invoke for its solution either the reminiscences of Plato, the innate ideas of Descartes, or the forms of understanding as described in

the philosophy of Kant. A very simple fact of human nature explains the whole mystery.

The difference between *seeing* and *observing* has long been noticed, since all languages have two words to express these two modes of vision. As soon as my eye is opened on the external world, all the objects which it embraces are manifested to me at the same time, and without my own coöperation. In this passive and complete view is contained all that I can know of the scene which is before my eyes; but it is contained in it obscurely and confusedly, because I have not yet observed it with attention. Now, when I observe an object, what do I do? Instead of receiving passively the manifestation of the object, I go to it, I become active, and freely active. But what is the occasion of this? If the object had not struck me in the first place, I should have had no idea of it, and I should not have thought of observing it; sight therefore necessarily precedes observation, it is the indispensable condition of it; observation therefore does not reveal to me what it seizes, it does nothing but remark what was already known. But that which it seizes was known only indistinctly, it seizes it distinctly; it illustrates therefore the knowledge which we had before, and this is the whole of its work.

But how does it illustrate? If it embraced every thing, it would distinguish nothing. It is therefore compelled to take, one after the other, all the parts of the whole, in order to understand them distinctly. Analysis is its procedure, as synthesis is that of sight.

But in thus running through the different parts of the whole, observation either omits some of them, or

spreads over those which it has seized an unequal light, which gives to some more and to others, less importance than they naturally possess; sometimes also it mutilates the picture, sometimes it impairs its truth; and most frequently does both. Sight, on the contrary, like a faithful mirror, reflects the picture as it is; comprehensiveness and fidelity are its characteristics, but it is obscure; observation is clear, but narrow; and it never fails to disfigure the object which it studies.

Now, this twofold mode of perceiving is not, as has been thought, a law of the organ of sight, which is imposed on our intelligence by the body; it is the law of intelligence itself; and this is proved by the fact that it always proceeds in the same manner, whether it takes cognizance of that which passes within us, or elevates itself to the conception of that which is invisible to our eyes, and imperceptible to our consciousness.

In other words, observation is not the commencement of intelligence, nor philosophy the commencement of the human race. Before we take possession of intelligence and voluntarily direct it to the examination of a certain portion of reality, the whole compass of reality, or at least all that man can know or conceive of it, is manifested within our minds. From our first entrance into life, our understanding is constantly acted upon by the various objects which surround us, and we have the feeling or the obscure view of every thing, of which we are permitted to take cognizance. It is thus that the True, the Beautiful, the Good, the nature of things, the whole sphere

of philosophy, are constantly and faithfully, though obscurely, revealed to humanity; and hence those vague notions, those confused but profound convictions, those indistinct but powerful sentiments with regard to the highest subjects, which silently ferment in all classes of society, and govern it at every epoch; hence, in a word, the entire province of common sense.

But the select portion of humanity is not satisfied with these obscure glimpses, these vague persuasions: it seeks to comprehend what every body believes; it wishes to obtain clear solutions of the great questions that concern man; and with it commences philosophy or science. Science is merely the successive clearing up of the different points of this immense store of ideas, which have been accumulated in intelligence by the manifestation of things; and this clearing up is produced by observation subsequent to sight, in other words, by liberty interrogating the understanding with regard to a particular question, demanding of it what it knows, and compelling it to reduce its knowledge to precise terms. To philosophize is to comprehend; to comprehend is not to know, but to verify what we knew before. How could we wish to comprehend, if we were ignorant of what we wished to comprehend?

These questions thus spontaneously and eternally proposed, and spontaneously and obscurely resolved, by reason of the single fact, that human intelligence was in the presence of things, are voluntarily proposed by philosophy and voluntarily agitated. Sight is succeeded by observation, sentiment by reflection, invo-

luntary synthesis by free analysis; and each instrument manifests its properties in the knowledge which it furnishes. The property of primitive sight is extent and obscurity; observation freely distinguishes, but is of narrow compass. Philosophy, moreover, if it perceives clearly whatever it seizes, perceives only certain points; but common sense which perceives nothing clearly, perceives every thing. Philosophy which perceives only points deprived of their natural proportions, destroys the connexion and dependence of the complete whole; common sense, which perceives every thing, leaves every thing its relations and proportions; the portions of truth, which philosophy places in a clear light, are recognised by common sense; but the moment the wearied philosopher has the presumption to announce that the portion which he has cleared up is the whole, common sense which has a dim feeling of the whole does not recognise it in this mutilated image, and disowns philosophy.

Such is the procedure of philosophy; such is the explanation of the spectacle which it has presented even to the present day. If the same questions have made their appearance at every epoch, it is because they contain under its different aspects the problem of life, and because man can be interested only in things which concern him. If the same solutions have always been reproduced, it is because they were the genuine elements of the complete solution, and because human intelligence cannot depart from the circle of reality. If these solutions have always been contradicted, while none has triumphed and none has perished, it is because all, being different elements of

truth, have recommended themselves on the same grounds to common sense, and because, as no one represents the entire truth, no one could be accepted in its place. If common sense and philosophy have been unable to agree, it is not because there are two different kinds of truth, one for philosophers and the other for the mass; but because there are two different modes of taking hold of truth; one which embraces the whole, sufficiently to recognise it when it is presented, to perceive when it is mutilated, but not sufficiently to give an account of it and to express it; while the other, which gives an account of it and expresses it, cannot seize it as a whole.

But the divorce of philosophy and common sense is not eternal in its nature. If philosophy had presented itself only for what it is, it would long since have been admitted into the rank of the rational sciences which common sense can acknowledge; but it is so young, that it is yet ignorant of itself, its end, and its destiny. Hitherto it has not defined itself to itself in a precise manner; it has rendered no account to itself of its task, its resources, and its limits. The world is waiting for it to explain itself, so that it may pass judgment upon it; for it to know itself, so that it may recognise it. The moment, in which a science, after having been for a long time debated in the cradle, after having distinguished its youthful existence by vigorous and incoherent attempts, at last arrives at the consciousness of itself, gains calmness and self-possession, fixes its end, its sphere, its method, begins to show that it comprehends and controls itself by judicious and systematic researches,—that moment, which has

almost arrived for the natural sciences, is still waited for by philosophy. Hitherto, every thing in philosophy has been spontaneous, personal; there have been philosophers, Plato, Descartes, Locke, Kant; they have, each in his own way, looked with the eye of genius, on the intellectual and moral world; but the views which they have taken still wait for a science which shall receive and class them, for philosophy is not yet.

The day, when returning upon itself and upon the history of its first attempts, it shall recognise that hitherto its boldest endeavors have succeeded only in illustrating some of the convictions of common sense; the day, when it shall find the reason of this in the fact of human nature, that it is not intelligence which discovers reality, but reality which manifests itself to intelligence, so that the most powerful genius can have no advantage over the mass but that of better comprehending certain articles of this common revelation,—that day, philosophy will recognise its destination, and will end with accepting it. To enlighten, by reflection, the obscure intuitions which every body receives in the presence of things; this is all that it can do, and consequently all that it will desire. Without knowing it, hitherto and in spite of its ambition, it has done nothing else; but it will change its method and its spirit. It will learn that as every idea in our minds is necessarily the reflection of a certain reality, every idea, in its primitive simplicity, is necessarily true; it will learn that there is nothing false but the analyses of science, and that if they are false, it is because they are incomplete; it will therefore be

less eager to declare that science is finished and the world explained; instead of making systems, it will make observations; instead of being exclusive, it will become tolerant, and, at last, will assume the characteristics of maturity; for in the life of a science, the spirit of system is a sign of youth, like a greedy disposition in the life of man.

II.

ON SKEPTICISM.

1830.

The word skepticism, which is derived from the Greek word *σκέπτομαι, I consider, I examine,* properly signifies that mental state which precedes judgment and resolution, in which the mind before adopting an opinion or a course of conduct, considers what is for and against, examines the opposing reasons, and still feels undecided as to what it is best to believe or to do. This disposition is so familiar to the human consciousness, that it is perfectly understood by us. It is peculiar to rational beings whose intelligence is limited. The Deity, and those creatures which obey only instinct, cannot experience it. In the Deity, intelligence apprehends truth at the first glance, and therefore can never hesitate ; with the animals, as there is no consideration with regard to what is true or good, every thing is decided by impulse, nothing by reason ; now, the perfect equality of two opposite instinctive impulses, is probably a mere hypothesis ; and even if this chimerical supposition should be realized, the phenomenon produced would not be doubt, but equilibrium. Doubt sometimes results from the opposite action of two rational considerations ; equilibrium never results but from the opposite action of two forces ; every thing is susceptible of equilibrium, ex-

cept reason; reason alone is capable of doubt. Thus, the Deity is above doubt, and the animals below it. Doubt is a phenomenon exhibited only in human beings; it testifies like every thing which is peculiar to man, the grandeur and the infirmity of his nature.

The idea that God cannot doubt implies not only that his intelligence is perfect, but also that there is such a thing as absolute truth; for if there were nothing absolutely true, the perfection of intelligence would serve only to give a perfect perception of this fact; and the state of doubt would be the state essentially belonging to the divine nature. But if our lips can utter this hypothesis, our intelligence cannot comprehend it. For if certain things exist, they exist in a certain manner, and there are certain relations between them; it is therefore absolutely true that they exist, that they exist in such a manner, and that there are such relations between them. But if, on the contrary, nothing exists, it is absolutely true that nothing exists. In order that absolute truth should not exist, it would therefore be necessary that certain things should exist and should not exist at the same time, that they should have and that they should not have at the same time a certain manner of existing, and that there should be and that there should not be at the same time certain relations between them; which is contradictory. If any thing exists, there is absolute truth; if nothing exists, there is still absolute truth. Whoever denies that there is such a thing as absolute truth, denies at once reality and nullity, or rather asserts the coexistence of both; even language refuses to express such an absurdity; it is forced to

ascribe *coexistence* to that which is the contrary of *existence*, that is, nullity.

There is such a thing then as absolute truth; he possesses a portion of absolute truth, who sees a portion of reality as it is; he possesses the whole of absolute truth, who sees the whole of reality as it is. This last privilege, being that of a perfect intelligence, pertains and can pertain only to God; that of possessing a portion of absolute truth is the only one, to which the human mind can pretend.

That the human mind possesses this privilege is not doubted by humanity; and this is proved by the fact that humanity believes. Every act of belief implies the conviction in him who believes that he participates, to a certain degree, in absolute truth. Thus, when I see a tree covered with leaves and fruits, if I believe that this tree really exists and that it is really covered with leaves and fruits, I tacitly admit that my intelligence sees that portion of reality as it is, and that on this point it participates in absolute truth. The case is the same, when I believe that I exist, when I believe that I experience a sensation, when I believe that every event has a cause, in a word, when my mind admits any proposition whatever. To believe, is to consider a certain idea as true; to consider a certain idea as true, is to judge that it is in conformity with reality; now every idea in conformity with reality, is a portion of absolute truth, for this conformity is precisely the constituent characteristic of absolute truth. Let it not be said that humanity is ignorant of this, that it does not go so far as to render to itself such an account of what is implied in its belief. Humanity

knows perfectly well that truth which was not absolute truth would be a false truth, that is to say, it would be no truth at all; and if humanity judged that such is the character of human truth, it would not call it truth, it would not believe in it. By the single fact, therefore, that humanity believes, it judges that it sees things as they are, or, what comes to the same thing, that it participates in absolute truth.

Now is humanity right in so judging? This is a question which it does not put. Philosophers have put it for humanity, and have been divided in opinion. Some have found that humanity was right, and have said why; others, that it was wrong, and have attempted to prove it. These last have been called Skeptics, and custom has restricted the acceptation of the word Skepticism, to designate their opinion.

The first thing which surprises us in skepticism is, that it is of human origin; for as the fact of believing implies the conviction that we have a right to believe, there is an apparent contradiction between this fact and the dogma that man has no right to believe,—which is skepticism. Now the fact of believing is essential to human nature; there is no man in whom it does not take place a hundred times a day, and skeptics do not escape this universal necessity, any more than others. Still skeptics are men, and the opinions of men can contain nothing which has not its roots in human nature. It belongs therefore to human nature at once to admit and to deny that it can gain possession of truth. How is this contradiction to be explained?

In order to find the solution of this antithesis in

human reason, we must examine, on the one hand, how and by what title it believes, and on the other hand, how and by what title, it comes to doubt its right to believe; when we understand the way in which things operate, it will be more easy to determine what is real in this apparent contradiction, and what may be legitimate in the doctrine of skepticism.

Whether we are conscious of what passes within us; whether we perceive what exists and takes place beyond us; whether we conceive of what affects neither our consciousness nor our senses; whether, finally, we remember things which we have known; in whatever manner, in a word, and by whatever process, any kind of knowledge is produced in our intelligence, it is always the case, that we form the following conception with regard to the phenomenon of its production and the conditions of its truth. Certain things exist or have existed in reality; our intelligence is capable of being informed concerning them; knowledge is this information itself. So much for the production of knowledge. This knowledge is true, if it be conformed to reality; it is false, if it be not conformed to it; such are the conditions of the truth of our knowledge.

It follows from this that the truth of knowledge depends on the constitution of our intelligence; that if human intelligence be constituted so as to faithfully reflect reality, human knowledge is true; if it be not so constituted, human knowledge is false.

Now, when we obtain any knowledge whatever, either by consciousness, perception, reason, or any other process of intelligence, we are invincibly de-

termined to believe that what we feel, what we see, what we conceive, what we remember, is in conformity with the feeling, the conception, the remembrance, and, in general, with the notion which we have of it; that is, in each of these particular applications, we believe that our intelligence is not deceptive, and that it is constituted so as to reflect things as they are.

We believe, it is true, that in all or nearly all its applications, intelligence is subject to error; but this is precisely what we should not believe, if we regarded it as naturally deceptive. In order to believe that intelligence is sometimes deceived, two things are required, namely; that we should admit its natural veracity, and be able to ascertain, by certain signs, the particular cases in which this natural veracity is abused. Now this is precisely what happens with us. We acknowledge that in every application of intelligence, certain conditions are necessary for it not to be abused; but when these conditions are complied with, we believe in the knowledge which it gives us; that is, we admit that it is naturally constituted so as to see things as they are.

This is the entire foundation of the belief of humanity; when a man holds to a proposition, if you go back to the principle of his conviction, you will always find that it rests on the testimony of one or more of his faculties; an authority which resolves itself into that of intelligence, which would be altogether without value, if intelligence were not constituted so as to reflect things as they are.

But how is it demonstrated that such is the consti-

tution of intelligence? We not only have no demonstration of this kind, but it is impossible that we should have one. In fact, we can demonstrate nothing, except with our intelligence; now, our intelligence cannot be admitted to demonstrate the veracity of our intelligence; for, in order to believe the demonstration, we must previously admit what the demonstration undertakes to prove, namely, the veracity of intelligence; which would be a vicious circle. We therefore have and can have no proof of the fact on which all our belief reposes, that is, that human intelligence is not deceptive. One of two things then was necessary; either that man should believe nothing, or that he should be invincibly determined in this primary fact, without a motive and without a proof. If then, man believes, it is on the last condition; and as he does not act, but because he believes, it may be said that every thing he does and every thing he believes rest upon the primitive belief which is blind and without a motive, to which he is irresistibly determined and compelled to submit by his nature, whether he knows it or not. An act of blind but irresistible faith is therefore the foundation of all belief. It is because this act of faith is irresistible, that all men believe, skeptics as well as others; it is because it is blind, that is to say, with no motive in the eye of human reason, that among the men whom reflection has led to this discovery, some have thought that human intelligence could legitimately believe nothing. Such are the common roots of faith and skepticism in human nature.

There is, rationally, a contradiction between faith

and skepticism; for man cannot at once possess and not possess the right to believe. Reason, moreover, declares absolutely that man believes without a motive, or, what comes to the same thing, that he has no right to believe. But, in fact, there is no contradiction between faith and skepticism; for man believes by instinct and doubts by reason. Now, between the fact of believing, determined by our constitution, and the fact that we believe without the right to believe, declared by our reason, there is no contradiction. Because our reason admits no other belief as legitimate, except that which is founded on proofs, we cannot infer that there is no other belief, but only that no other belief is legitimate.

The skeptics therefore do not fall into a contradiction when, in the practice of life, they believe in their senses, their consciousness, their memory, and act in consequence of this; they obey their instinctive nature in thus believing; and they obey their rational nature in professing that this belief is not legitimate.

Accordingly, we thus equally absolve both humanity which believes and the skeptics who doubt; but we cannot equally absolve the philosophers who have combated skepticism, by attempting to demonstrate the rational legitimacy of human belief. It may be said that humanity believes, and skeptics as well as humanity; it may be added that humanity believes it has the right to believe, that is to say, it admits that human intelligence sees things as they are; this is a fact, and skeptics do not deny it; but if, grappling with skepticism, any one pretends to demonstrate that human intelligence really sees things as they are,—this

is what I cannot comprehend. Is it not clear, that this pretension is nothing else than to demonstrate human intelligence by human intelligence; an attempt which has been, which is, and which ever will be impossible. We believe that skepticism is for ever invincible, because we regard skepticism as the last word of human reason upon itself. As to the dangers of skepticism, they are absolutely nothing; God has provided against them by compelling us to believe; and we do not see that any skeptic has suffered injury. It is indeed true, that if humanity doubted of every thing, it would cease to act rationally; there would be no longer either good or evil, society or laws; but also, if all men were to undertake to walk on their heads, every thing here below would be thrown into confusion; and yet nobody would be alarmed if some philosopher should maintain that this system of motion is the most rational. Before being frightened at a doctrine, we should first make ourselves certain whether its application be possible.

There is still another circumstance which should reassure us; and that is, if we cannot demonstrate that human intelligence sees things as they are, neither can we demonstrate the contrary. Skepticism therefore does not conduct to the negation of that which humanity believes; if it went so far as that, it would no longer be skepticism. It is possible that what humanity believes is not true, for it believes without proof; such is the only result of skepticism, the only result, at least, which reason acknowledges. If we reflect on this distinction, it will be perceived that many philosophers have been honored with the name of skeptics, who by no means deserved it.

We have said nothing of that petty skepticism which was prior to the other, and which is founded only on the apparent contradiction of human opinions. To prove that there is a contradiction, either between the results at which every separate faculty of the mind arrives, or between those which are obtained by different faculties, as the senses and reason; to show that there is the same contradiction, either between the opinions admitted by different men or different nations, or between those in which humanity has rested at different epochs; and then to conclude that human intelligence by turns regards contradictory things as true, and that consequently truth does not exist for it; such is the whole mechanism of this skepticism of the second order, in which a multitude of inferior spirits have delighted and still delight. It is a long time since this skepticism has been refuted in every point, and the unity of human truth, always admitted *a priori* by superior understandings, demonstrated. This skepticism is a theme on which many will long continue to declaim; it forms the amusement of the man of talents; but is unworthy to divert the attention of the philosopher.

III.

ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

1827.

All philosophical questions relate to the intellectual and moral world, as all questions of natural science to the physical world. If all intellectual and moral realities were entirely concealed from our observation, we could not resolve any philosophical question; just as we could not resolve any question of natural science, if the physical world were entirely invisible to our senses. Every thing that we know of the physical world is derived from what we see of it; and in like manner, every thing that we can know of the moral and intellectual world is derived from what we can observe of it. Now, intellectual and moral reality is immediately revealed to us only in ourselves; the moral and intellectual principle which we feel thinking, willing, and acting in us, is the only reality of this kind which falls under our observation. Beyond ourselves, we see only the effects of similar principles which fill the world; and these effects would never have revealed their principles to us, if we had not become acquainted in ourselves with a principle of the same nature. It is with our consciousness that we comprehend God; it is with this, that we comprehend all force, all intelligence, all will; it is, in a word, in the interior spectacle of our own nature that both the existence, and the nature,

and the laws of the moral and intellectual world are revealed to us. Every thing that we know, and that we can know concerning this world has then proceeded or should proceed from this source. In the knowledge of ourselves therefore lies the principle of all philosophical science; just as in the knowledge of that portion of the physical world which falls under our senses, lies the principle of all natural science. Every philosophical question which can be resolved, is resolved by some of the facts of consciousness; just as every question of natural science which can be resolved, is resolved by some of the physical facts which fall under our senses. Beyond the sphere of the facts of consciousness, as beyond the sphere of physical facts, that are susceptible of observation, philosophical science, like natural science, proceeds only by induction.

This being laid down, we can conceive two different modes of constructing the science of the intellectual and moral world. The first consists in starting with questions, and proceeding to investigate in consciousness the facts of human nature which relate to them, and by which alone they can be elucidated. This has been the procedure of philosophy to the present time. The second mode would consist in observing and verifying, in the first place, all the facts of human nature, without reference to any questions; then, after the completion of this preliminary task, after all the teachings which we can gain concerning the moral world should have been collected, we might pass to questions, and ascertain what answers could be given to them by science. This last method is of modern in-

vention; the idea of making the phenomena of the human mind the object of a science of regular and methodical observation, altogether independent of the solution of philosophical questions (though with an ultimate view to those questions), has been conceived only in our own day.

We have elsewhere shown[1] all the difficulties of the former method. In truth, when we have recourse to facts merely to resolve a question with which we are preoccupied, our observation is usually bad, and more usually still, we are contented with the first fact which occurs, and hasten to resolve the problem by this single fact, without suspecting that there are twenty others by which it is modified and completed. Sometimes, indeed, we do not think of recurring to the observation of the reality to which the question relates; but imagination and reasoning, inspired by certain reminiscences, take those which are present, and frame a solution. This has been the fate of philosophers; and it is this which has given philosophy to the spirit of system. The spirit of system has its principle in this method. But, on the other hand, it was not by choice that this method was adopted, and has prevailed to the present time in philosophy; for nothing takes place among men in an arbitrary manner; every thing proceeds according to the natural laws of the human mind. The first thing which strikes us in the moral order, as well as in the physical order, is that we comprehend neither the one nor the other. Hence arise questions concerning that which

[1] Preface to *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*.

we do not comprehend. The human mind torments itself for ages in resolving them, before it discovers the course which is essential to success. It is not until a late period, that by means of reflection, and above all, by the experience of its perpetual mistakes, it at length feels the need of calculation, of order, in its efforts; that it thus conceives the idea of method; that it seeks for one; and that it finds the true one. It then gives birth to the powerful and fruitful idea, that in order to resolve the questions under consideration, it must first forget them, and engage in the patient study of nature and its laws; because the knowledge of nature and of its law, contains the solution, and the only solid solution of all questions concerning nature. The natural sciences were for a long time under the dominion of questions, as well as philosophy; and for a long time, like philosophy, they presented nothing but systems, that is to say, incomplete solutions of isolated problems, which were overthrown by other solutions quite as probable, but not less incomplete. They have at length escaped from this dominion; philosophy, like them, ought to escape from it also, and like them, it will escape from it. It needs only time and examples,—and we should never be anxious in regard to these,—since the future is long and the human mind revolutionary.

We may therefore consider philosophy, to the present time, as the aggregate of systems which the imagination has produced in order to resolve philosophical questions, before the true mode of resolving them was discovered. We have therefore good reason to recommence philosophy, as a science which has hith-

erto sought, but which has not found, its true method. This is the ground taken by those who maintain that there is but one means of restoring philosophy, namely, to lay aside all questions, to verify first in ourselves the laws of moral and intellectual nature, to which all these questions relate, and without the knowledge of which they cannot be resolved; persuaded that as soon as the laws are known, the questions will resolve themselves, those at least which are not insolvable. It is certainly impossible not to recognise the justness of this view, and not to admit that philosophy can be and ought to be restored in this manner. This method is the psychological method.

In the presence of this method which has its partisans, another method is brought up, which also has its partisans, and which deserves to have them, that is, the historical method. When we think of the powerful minds, from Pythagoras to the present day, which have wrought in every part of the field of philosophy; above all, when we have run through some of the admirable monuments of their researches; we can hardly avoid the conviction, not only that all the questions of science have been proposed and agitated before the commencement of the nineteenth century, but also that all the facts of human nature which can elucidate these questions and contribute to their solution, have been perceived, noted, and described in that long and rigorous investigation; and that consequently it would be exceedingly difficult, not to say impossible, in a subject like this to fall upon a new idea, or a new fact of any importance. Now, if this conviction be well-founded, it follows that the science exists, al-

though it is unknown to our age; and that it would proceed, in a complete form, for him who knew how to discover it, from the immortal works of the philosophers who have created it. But how are these works to be found? How are they to be understood? The greater part of them are written in languages with which we are, by no means, familiar; some of them still slumber in manuscripts, in the dust of libraries; besides, each of those great men speaks a philosophical language which is peculiar to himself, and which is not the language of the age; each has considered the questions in his own point of view; and in each, the question which we wish to study occupies a different place, and is connected with others in a particular manner; so that there must be one labor to discover the question in each system, another to disengage it, another to comprehend it, another to connect the solution which it there receives, with all the different solutions which have been given to it in other systems, and another finally to obtain from the comparison of all these solutions, which each contain a portion of truth, the complete solution which is the true one.

Philosophy therefore exists; but it does not exist for the generality of men, nor even for very enlightened men, nor even for mere scholars, nor even for mere philosophers. It exists only for the small number of those, who, being at once distinguished as scholars and philosophers, have passed their life in searching out the scattered members of philosophy in the monuments which contain it. What then is wanting to give a true existence to philosophy? Only two things; that it should be known, and that it should be organ-

ized; that it should be known, that is to say, that all the great monuments which contain it should be translated and published; that it should be organized, that is to say, that the questions should be arranged in their legitimate order, with the truths discovered concerning each by the different philosophers; so that the whole should form a methodical science, in which we could perceive at a glance both what we know, and what remains to be discovered.

Now, of these tasks, the first alone is difficult to be accomplished; for if this were done, the organization of the science would take place of itself as a necessary consequence. What light, in fact, would be diffused over philosophy, if Pythagoras and his epoch, if Aristotle and the Peripatetic system, if Zeno and Stoicism, if Sextus and Skepticism, if the Alexandrines, if Descartes, if Leibnitz, if Kant were one day translated to the intelligence of common sense, as Epicureanism has been by Gassendi, and as Platonism will be in a few years, by M. Cousin! What a valuable aid for the understanding of philosophy! How would the organization of this science, now scarcely perceived, be produced of itself in presence of this spectacle! What has always been wanting to philosophy, and what is still wanting to it, is this enlarged knowledge of itself, in other words, its own history. This is the reason why it has never ceased to be recommenced, as a thing eternally new; and yet has failed, in these successive attempts to find the moment for its organization. If the fruits of the researches of all the great men who have cultivated philosophy were before our eyes, trans-

lated into the same philosophical language, this organization would then proceed from the midst of their labors, bright with its own evidence. As none of the questions of science can have escaped such a long and persevering investigation, all philosophical questions would make their appearance; and when thus brought together, they would be naturally divided into two classes, namely, questions of fact, and questions of induction; the former, capable of being resolved only by observation; the latter, only by inductions taken from observation; and in each of these classes, they would be distributed and arranged in the most natural order, that is, in the order in which they must be approached by philosophy before they can be resolved. The great outlines of the science would thus be presented; and it would only remain to arrange the discoveries of all the philosophers in those outlines,—a work which would be no less easy. In fact, if all systems are only incomplete views of reality set up for complete images of the same reality; when these different views were brought together, they would unite precisely as the facts which they represent are united in nature; whatever is incomplete, that is, whatever is false in the systems, would be manifested and set aside; and the outlines of the science would be filled up at once with whatever portion of truth concerning each question, had been seized by the genius of the different schools. The contradiction of these schools therefore would be explained and terminated; and the human mind, as well as philosophy, relieved from the eternal accusations of their common enemies, would rest in the conviction that

truth exists for man in regard to the questions in which he is most deeply interested, and that he is capable of obtaining it in spite of his weakness and his errors.

Accordingly, to make all systems known by translating them into the same philosophical language, and from the comparison of these systems to obtain the organization of the science, and the science itself which they must contain; such is the second method which has been proposed for the restoration of philosophy. We must now examine whether this historical method, more profoundly analyzed, is actually a rival of the psychological method, or if rather, in spite of their apparent diversity, they do not resolve themselves at bottom into a single complete method, of which each alone would be but an insufficient part. One thing is evident, namely, that philosophy will never be a science, so long as the facts of human nature shall not have been methodically collected and arranged; so long as the laws of human nature and of all moral nature which proceed from them shall not have been regularly deduced; and so long as the solution of philosophical questions shall not have been methodically taken from these laws. This is the edifice which it is necessary to erect. Facts are its base; for facts being ascertained, the laws follow; and the laws being determined, the questions are resolved. It is indispensable then, above every thing, and before every thing, to gain a knowledge, as complete as possible, of the facts of human nature. This is the necessary point of departure, the true foundation of all philosophical science.

Now, there is no doubt that the psychological method goes directly to the difficulty, since the first object which it proposes to itself, is to determine by observation those phenomena of our moral and intellectual nature, which are capable of being seized. Neither is there any doubt that it is able ultimately to accomplish this object, as completely as possible, since after all, we can discover those intellectual and moral phenomena only by observation; and it is precisely by observation that this method investigates them, with a determined purpose to apply it to the end, without fixing any other limit to its researches than the impossibility of continuing them.

Philosophy, on the other hand, under the long dominion of questions, has discovered almost all the facts of human nature; for, as it has been always led by the questions which it agitated to the only portion of intellectual and moral reality which could afford it light concerning these questions, there are few facts that belong to this reality, which have escaped its notice. A true psychological view, accordingly, is found at the bottom of every system. If then we should combine the true views of all systems, we should have a psychology already constructed, which would explain and reconcile all conflicting systems. But in order to ascertain the true views at the bottom of every system, the historian of philosophy must have made a study of facts. Otherwise, he cannot disengage in every system, what is true, that is to say, in conformity with facts, and what is false, that is to say, exclusive and incomplete. The history of philosophy therefore contains, actually discovered, the facts of the human

mind, the foundation of science; the historical method holds them in its hand, as well as the psychological method; but in order to recognise them in the systems, the historian must have observed them in reality; he must therefore have gone through the paths of psychology. Hence we perceive that the historical method implies and presupposes the psychological method; and that without this it cannot render,—what science demands before every thing else,—a statistical account of the phenomena of our moral and intellectual nature.

But if psychology is indispensable to the historian, is history of no utility to the psychologist? Strictly speaking, no doubt, the psychologist can collect the statistical accounts to which we have just referred without the aid of history; but he would display little judgment in imposing upon himself this pretending reserve. In fact, all the greatest men, with whom humanity has been honored, have by turns come up, and cast their eye upon this intellectual and moral nature, the knowledge of which is the object of psychology. They have interrogated this reality in the different points of view of every epoch, under the varying inspiration of every question. In what a multiplicity of aspects, must they not have seized this reality? How many facts, how many nice shades, must they not have detected? And what observer can presume to flatter himself, even under the guidance of the most ingenious method, that he will hit upon every thing which they have seen, every thing which they have felt, every thing which they have divined, that is true and real, in this field at once so obscure

and so vast? Now, their observations still exist; they are written with their own hand in the annals of philosophy. Have we not in them accordingly a rich treasure of information and instruction? Can any one justly despise it? At least, does it not present to the psychologist, the means of completing his own discoveries, of examining and of verifying their exactness? Is any observer so sure of himself as not to be delighted when he finds in a page of Aristotle or Plato, the description of a fact which he has just analyzed? Does any one possess such an infallible sagacity, as never to meet with details, in those ancient observations, which have escaped his notice, or differences which oblige him to return with profit upon their steps? If then observation, strictly speaking, can dispense with history, in the investigation of the facts and of the laws of human nature; still history can furnish such indications, so abridge the labor of research, and present such an instructive commentary, such brilliant illustrations, in regard to the facts made known by observation, that it would be altogether absurd, to reject its services in the interests of science, and to pay an exclusive attention to the psychological point of view.

We perceive then that it is by applying the torch of psychology to the monuments of philosophy, so as to collect by its light the numerous observations which they contain; and by employing, in psychology, the indications of history, so as to guide, abridge, and fructify our researches; that we shall arrive, in the most perfect and certain manner possible, at the great primary desideratum of philosophy, a complete statis-

tical account of the phenomena of our moral and intellectual nature; from which must proceed, by induction, the knowledge of the laws which govern it, and by deduction, the scientific solution of all the important questions which it involves.

If this were done, the science would be completed; for the whole science consists in this; but the history of the science would yet remain to be composed. Now it would be comparatively a small thing to organize philosophy, if its past fortunes continued to be unknown and inexplicable. It is impossible for a science to rest in this ignorance of its own history; it is impossible for the human mind to permit it. However clearly it may be demonstrated in its own eyes, a science cannot have perfect confidence in itself, unless it has obtained the secret of its errors; it cannot be sure that it has arrived at the True, except when it has explained to itself how it has passed through and how it must needs have passed through the False. The reason of this is evident. In fact, what are all those systems which we leave for the order of the day, without taking the trouble either to comprehend or to explain them? These systems are creations of the human mind. And what is the authority to which we appeal in support of our reforms, and from which we demand the sanction of our new methods? It is the authority of the human mind. Unceremoniously to break with the history of a science, at the moment of its reform, is then to deny the human mind at the same time that we appeal to it; to say to it at once that it is admirable and absurd. This is a bad way to obtain its faith; for it

believes only, because it trusts itself; and if you inspire it with distrust of itself, it can no longer believe even what appears evident to it. It knows that the path of truth has been strown with obstacles; it therefore conceives that error here below may be the necessary preliminary to truth, and that it must needs have wandered for a long time before finding the true course; but in order to be sure that it has at length arrived at the port, it must have the chart of the rocks which it has passed through. This want should not be forgotten in the reform of a science; it is as imperious as it is inevitable; and this is the reason why every reform, of this character, demands and creates, for its own advantage, the history of the reformed science.

Now the union of the historian and the psychologist is no less essential to the history of philosophy than it is to psychology itself. On the one hand, it is true that the complete observation of the phenomena of human nature must infallibly give all the facts which have served as the germ of different systems; it must therefore be adequate to the explanation and the reconcilement of all systems. But in order that the psychologist may arrive at this result, which would be so encouraging to the human mind, and which would so strongly confirm the discoveries of the new science, it is necessary that he should be acquainted with those systems; it is necessary therefore that he should have become acquainted with all the historical monuments of philosophy. But on the other hand, what would be the use of an acquaintance with those monuments, if the scholar who possesses it, did not comprehend them? And how could he comprehend

them, without the science of the moral reality, which lives within us, and of which a certain aspect is presented by every system? We cannot in fact avoid repeating, every system is but an incomplete view of this reality, and in order to determine the value of a system, we must always confront it with this reality, so as to ascertain how far it truly represents it, and how far it disfigures it. Each system is thus appreciated, according to its character; and in running through the primary ideas of all systems, we find, to our admiration, that they have all gone round this reality; each having seized one side of it, while none has embraced it entirely. This circuit of the human mind around an object too vast to be seen at the same time in all its aspects, is the spectacle presented to us by the history of philosophy. The different systems are the views from nature which it has sketched in its journey at the successive stations where it has rested. These views, always true, but always partial, have no other defect than the inscription which each philosopher has placed upon them. Instead of writing at the foot, *this is the grand Pyramid;* they should have written, *this is the Eastern side of the grand Pyramid.* It belongs to history to efface the ambitious inscription from every system, and to substitute the true one in its place. But it can do this only by going through the scenes itself, with the system in its hand, and recognising in the reality, the subject and the outlines of these partial sketches. The history of systems ought therefore to be written in the sanctuary of consciousness. Otherwise it would not be a history; but a new edition of systems; and this

new edition would be quite as useful as those beautiful engravings in the *Voyage to Egypt*, in which our artists have exquisitely sketched many thousands of hyeroglyphics, of which we have not yet obtained the key.

But it is time to bring these considerations, already too long, to a close. We perceive what is demanded at the present day by the wants of philosophy, and on what conditions it can become a science. Neither a psychology nor a history of systems is sufficient; without psychology, we could not comprehend history, and without history, we should distrust psychology. We need both. In the second place, as a means of arriving at these great results, the union of observation and erudition is always useful, and generally indispensable. The systems are full of scattered psychological facts, and psychology gives the key of the systems. Observation therefore must call erudition to its aid, in order to discover the science; and erudition must be illustrated by the lights of observation, in order to trace its history. When we shall have a psychology entirely constructed, and a complete exposition of all systems, it will be seen that philosophy is a science like every other, neither more nor less consistent; which has advanced like the natural sciences, which has the same method, the same criterion, the same certainty, which has always existed, and which in fact has made a still greater progress, in spite of appearances, but which has only more slowly succeeded in recognising its true method, and in arranging its organization.

These two great labors, a finished psychology and a

complete history of all systems, are each beyond the strength of a single individual. This is evident in regard to history; and they who are aware of the slow developement of the sciences of observation, will conceive how a good psychology can be formed only in a gradual manner, and by the successive labors of a great number of observers. Nevertheless, of these two enterprises, history is undoubtedly the one which demands the most difficult combination of qualities; for the psychologist may certainly be ignorant of the history of philosophy; while the history of philosophy, such as it should be, absolutely requires in the historian all the qualities and all the knowledge of the psychologist. The translation of the monuments of ancient philosophy alone, such as it should be, is a work of immense difficulty. In order to accomplish it, it is not enough to be a skilful philologist; a thorough understanding of philosophical questions, and an acquaintance with the history of philosophy are two conditions not less imperatively demanded. The most able Greek scholar does not understand Plato; to be convinced of this, we need only observe how philology has always recoiled before the most metaphysical dialogues of that author; to so great a degree that they are yet to be translated in the greater part of modern languages. But it is not sufficient to translate, even with a perfect understanding; translation, properly so called, only substitutes one idiom for another. A second translation is indispensable, namely, that of the philosophical language of each author; that is, after having translated the words, we should translate the ideas, or, what comes to the same

thing, expound them in the simple forms of our own day, in the forms of common sense, accessible to every body. This is what M. Cousin has done for Plato in his Arguments. We can not only read Plato in his translation, but comprehend him in his Arguments; we can assure ourselves that we comprehend him, by reperusing the text with the light of the Arguments, and by submitting the thought of the original and that of the interpretation to a severe comparison. Now, this translation of ideas, without which that of the text would lose half its value, demands not only a philosopher, but a philosopher who has no system which prevents him from yielding his mind to the genius and to the ideas of Plato, in order to comprehend him; and who, besides, has a sufficient acquaintance with all systems, and with the truth of which all systems represent a certain aspect, not to be limited to the point of view presented by Plato, and to be able to pass judgment upon him, and to contribute his share towards explaining him. This, it must be confessed, is a rare combination of qualities; and perhaps we should despair of seeing it realized, if the air which we breathe did not endow the distinguished spirits of our age, with that quality, which is more difficult to be obtained and less commonly to be met with than any other, we mean, universality.

IV.

ON THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

1828.

In the science of psychology, we designate by this term the different natural capacities of the human soul. Thus, *memory* is one of our faculties, because we have naturally the capacity of remembering; *sensibility* is another, because we have naturally also the capacity of receiving sensations.

Just as we know objects only by their *properties*, we know the soul only by its *faculties*. A complete treatise on the faculties of the soul would therefore embrace the whole of psychology; of course we can have no intention here of engaging in such a work. In the following remarks therefore we shall leave out of view the particular laws of each faculty, and confine ourselves to presenting certain considerations with regard to the common nature of our faculties, their number, and the mode of studying them. The question reduced to these limits is yet so vast, that we shall be compelled to omit all developements and attempt only the most rapid indications.

We know that the human soul possesses certain faculties, only because we see certain phenomena produced in it. Thus, because we observe that it feels, that it thinks, that it remembers, we conclude that it has the capacity of feeling, the capacity of thinking, the ca-

pacity of remembering; and it is these capacities which we call its faculties. The faculties of the human soul therefore are only the different capacities implied in the different kinds of phenomena which we see produced in it. But, in this view, every thing in the world also would have its faculties; in fact, there is nothing which does not manifest certain special phenomena which imply certain special capacities. Thus, fire produces heat, it has therefore the capacity of producing it; metals conduct electricity, they have therefore the capacity of conducting it; wood burns, it has therefore the capacity of burning. Fire, metals, wood, every thing which we are acquainted with, would therefore have faculties as well as the human soul.

Still we perceive that language refuses to accord faculties to things; it recognises in them the capacities of which we have just spoken, but it calls them by another name. We say that wood has the *property* of burning, and fire that of diffusing heat; we do not say that wood has the *faculty* of burning, and fire the *faculty* of diffusing heat. In like manner, we say that the tree has the *property* of producing fruit; we do not say that it has that *faculty*. Yet combustion, heat, the formation of fruit, are effects as well as remembrance and sensation; and these effects suppose in the wood, in the fire, in the tree, certain special capacities without which their production would be impossible. For what reason then does language establish a difference between these capacities and our own, and give the name of *properties* to the one, while it gives the name of *faculties* to the others? This

difference is so decidedly sanctioned by usage, so universally admitted in all languages, that it must proceed from an actual difference in things; and if this difference exists in things, it follows that the natural capacities of the human soul have a specific character, which distinguishes them from the natural capacities of things. Let us attempt to discover and to determine in what this character consists.

The circumstance which distinguishes one thing from another, is that it has different natural properties or capacities; as man has special capacities, he is, on this account, like all possible things, a being of a particular species, and meriting a particular name. But independently of this speciality of nature, which is common to him with all created things, since all created things have their special nature, he enjoys a privilege which is altogether peculiar, and which separates him from the multitude, namely, that of being able to command his natural capacities. He has not only special capacities, as every thing has, for instance, the capacity of thinking, of remembering, of moving; but, in addition, he governs those capacities, that is to say, he holds them in his hand, and makes use of them at will. Thus, he moves as he wills, he directs his memory, he applies his thought, according to his will; in a word, he is master of himself, and of the capacities which he possesses. Now, the case is different in regard to things; they also have natural capacities; but they have no self-acting power, which appropriates these capacities to itself, and which commands them. Thus, the tree has many natural capacities, but they are developed in it without its participation; it is not the

tree, which directs them, it is nature; they exist in it, they operate in it, but they do not appertain to it, and what they produce cannot be attributed to it.

The power which man possesses of becoming master of his natural capacities and of directing them, constitutes him a *person;* and it is because *things* do not exercise this power in themselves, that they are only things. This is the real difference which distinguishes things from persons. All possible natures are endowed with certain capacities; but some have received above the others the privilege of taking possession of them for themselves, and of governing them; these are persons. Others are destitute of this privilege, so that they have no part in what is performed in them; these are things. Their capacities are not the less developed for that; but this is accomplished exclusively, according to the laws to which God has subjected them; it is God who governs in them; he is the person of things, as the artisan is the person of the watch. In this case, the person is in a distinct sphere from the being; in the bosom of things, as in the bosom of the watch, the person is not to be found; we see nothing but a series of capacities which move blindly, while even the nature which is endowed with them is ignorant of what they do. Accordingly, we do not inquire of things concerning what is done in them; we must address ourselves to God, just as we apply to the artisan, and not to the watch, when the watch goes wrong.

The existence of personal power in man, and its absence in things, occasion a difference between the natural capacities of man and those of things. In

fact, we preside over our natural capacities and make use of them, while things have no command over their natural capacities, and do not make use of them. Language has had a perception of this difference, which it has once expressed and consecrated, by calling the natural capacities of man *faculties*, and the natural capacities of things *properties*. By virtue of the power which we exercise in ourselves, we take possession of our natural capacities, and thus our capacities become *faculties*, that is, instruments which we retain, which we put in action, which we direct, which we apply at pleasure. It is because this power does not exist in things, that their natural capacities remain simple *properties*. The capacity of walking would be only a simple property in us, like that of secreting bile, if we had not the power of walking or of not walking, of walking slow or fast, to the right or left, according to our will. But inasmuch as we have the command of this natural capacity, it becomes a faculty in our nature. This is the true sense of the word. If then, it may be remarked by the way, we were only, as is pretended by some physiologists and even by some philosophers, a kind of alembic in which ideas, images, remembrances, determinations, and actions were distilled, under the influence of external causes, we should begin with reforming our language, which, on that supposition, would sanction unmeaning distinctions between identical things. But as these distinctions are founded on facts, it may be hoped that language will hold good, and survive those learned systems, which establish a fraternity between man and the plants, so honorable for the latter.

The different applications of the word *faculty* unanimously confirm the interpretation we have given of it, and, at the same time, the reality of the characteristic, by which the capacities of man are distinguished from the capacities of things. Thus, it is not with the same confidence that we apply the term *faculty* to all the capacities of our being; we do not recognise, for example, the same propriety in the expression *faculty of feeling*, as in the expression *faculty of thinking or acting*. The reason is that, in fact, *sensibility* is less subject to our control, less in our own possession, than *intelligence* or *locomotive activity*. We perceive, in like manner, that usage extends this term to different properties of our body, over which our will has some influence, while it refuses it to all those which completely escape our authority. Usage also supposes that animals have certain faculties, and with reason; for animals also have a certain personality, and exercise an evident control over some of their natural capacities. But although the plant exhibits a multitude of effects which proceed from the capacities of its organization, these capacities, in all languages, are only *properties*, because the plant has no personal power which takes possession of these capacities and commands them. Nature governs in the plant, and not the plant itself; it is the theatre and not the principle of the phenomena which it manifests; it is a *thing*, and not a *person;* and language, of which the logic is admirable, grants it what it has, and refuses it what it has not.

We perceive that it is the same fact which constitutes *personality* in a being, and which gives the char-

acter of *faculties* to its natural capacities. This fact is liberty, or, if the expression be preferred, *personal power;* for it is of little consequence, by what name we designate that supreme capacity which gives to beings who are endowed with it the privilege of disposing of themselves. These characteristics moreover increase and decrease together. In proportion as the voluntary power is perfect in any being, the more also is that being a *person;* and, at the same time, the more truly do its capacities become *faculties.* Thus, because we possess over ourselves, or, what comes to the same thing, over our natural powers, a dominion greater than the animals, we are, to a far greater degree than they, *persons;* and, far more than theirs, are our capacities *faculties.* The more a man has dominion over himself, and powerfully commands his different faculties; the more, by that very fact, is he a *man*, the less is he a *thing;* the more also do his natural capacities belong to himself, and deserve the name of *faculties.* Man approaches to a thing, when he neglects this dominion, which it depends on him to assume; when, instead of taking possession of his faculties, he abandons them to their own operation, and continues idly slumbering in the midst of a mechanism, of which all the springs have been placed under his control.

There are accordingly natural capacities in the human soul as well as in every being; and, in addition, a personal power which governs them, and which, by governing them, converts them into personal faculties. Such is the result of what we have now said. We are, in the next place, to examine the nature, the

limits, and the consequences of this dominion; or in other words, we are to determine the condition of the natural capacities of the soul under the government of the personal power.

A preliminary fact, which deserves to be established in this investigation, is that the dominion of the personal power over our natural faculties is not exercised without interruption. As a workman takes up and lays down his instruments by turns, we are conscious that the will sometimes takes possession of the capacities of our nature, and employs them for its own purposes, and sometimes abandons them and leaves them to themselves; and it is a remarkable circumstance that in the latter case, our natural capacities still pursue their course, though they have been left by the personal power. They develope themselves without its aid, they go on very well without it; only when they go on without it, they do nothing for it; their developement, as it ceases to be under its direction, ceases to operate for the benefit of its decisions. This last fact can be easily verified. Thus, the capacity of sensation is often subject to our will; we employ it as a touchstone, to discover what properties are good or bad, useful or hurtful, beautiful or ugly, in the things which we examine; we make use of it also as an instrument of pleasure, to enjoy what is agreeable, beautiful, and good, in different objects; but, still oftener, it is free from all personal direction. When our minds, for example, are somewhat occupied, we take no notice of our sensibility which is then entirely abandoned to itself, but which yet does not cease to act. Without us, it receives sensations;

without us, it developes, in consequence of these sensations, a multitude of movements, which we have neither sought nor permitted. The case is the same with our intellectual capacities; we make use of them every moment; but every moment also we lose the reins; and then we feel that our memory, our imagination, our understanding take their course without our leave, run to the right or left like scholars at play, and bring before us, ideas, images, remembrances, which have been found without our aid, and which we have not demanded. In fine, the most obedient of all our natural capacities, that inward energy by which we put our body in motion, and which may be called the *locomotive activity*, even this energy is not destroyed when we cease to make use of it; in the bosom of the most profound repose, we feel it living within us, and acting every where on the springs of the mechanism which it animates; it is developed even then, and produces in the body a multitude of movements which we have not willed. But, whether a degree of voluntary oversight never entirely ceases to retain it, or, whether as it has to do with material organs that are difficult to be managed, it cannot move them unless all its forces are concentrated on a single point by the personal power, it does not produce any great movement by itself alone; and this is well for us; for if it were not so, it might lead us into a river, while our will was occupied with something else. Nevertheless, it continues to develope itself, like our other natural capacities, although it does not give such evident proofs of it.

As a general rule, our personal power is not with-

drawn at the same time from all our faculties; and it is almost always because it is greatly occupied with the direction of one, that it neglects the others. Thus, the locomotive activity and the sensibility are not abandoned to themselves, except in those moments when we are plunged in a profound meditation; for then the will is entirely directed towards the understanding. But it sometimes happens also that the failure is general, that is to say, the personal power entirely abdicates, and loosens the reins of all our faculties at the same time. This is what may be observed in those moments, when, the body being in a state of perfect repose, the sensibility scarcely affected by the slightest sensations, we permit also our memory, our imagination, our thoughts to wander as they please, and fall into the condition which is called reverie. Our personality is not destroyed, it still watches over the natural play of the capacities which surround it; it is conscious, that whenever it wishes, it can resume the mastery over them; but for the moment, it does not govern; it lets every thing go, it takes its repose. In this state, all our capacities act by their own movement, according to their own laws; not according to ours, nor at our impelling. The man has withdrawn, and our nature lives on like a thing; every thing which takes place in us is necessary; we have fallen under the law of fatality, which sports with us, as with the tree and the clouds. And yet we feel that we can revive, resume our place as sovereign in the domains which we have abandoned, and recover them from the empire of fatality. We never perceive more clearly than at that time the distinction between

that in us which is only ours, and that which is ourselves. Our capacities are ours, but are not ourselves; our nature is ours, but is not ourselves; that alone is ourselves which takes possession of our nature and of our capacities, and which makes them ours; we are found entirely in the power which we have of mastering ourselves; it is the action of this power which constitutes our personality; without this action, there would be nothing in us of our own, because there would be nothing in us which we could call ourselves. Every thing which was ours ceases to be so, as soon as this power ceases to act, as soon as this action is suspended; or if, during the repose of this power, during the absence of this action, we still are ourselves, and still regard as our own both this nature and these capacities which operate without us, it is only because we are conscious that this power is alive, though it sleeps, that it retains the ability to act, and thus to resume every thing which, for a moment, it has laid aside.

It is the same suspension of personality which constitutes the state of the soul during sleep. The effort, demanded by the control of our faculties, is the only thing which fatigues us; for our capacities themselves are never wearied with activity; for them, to act is to live. Nothing therefore is weary in our soul but the will or the personal energy; it alone therefore has need of repose; it alone also reposes during sleep; the capacities continue to operate, but we do not continue to direct them. They accordingly act while we do not act; because they act, we continue to feel what they do; because we do not act, we almost cease to be

conscious of ourselves; and in proportion as the consciousness of ourselves is diminished, the perception of the images, of the ideas, of the remembrances, of the sensations, of the movements, which they produce, becomes more lively; so that at last we forget ourselves, and fall under the illusion of the phantasmagoria which they exhibit before our eyes, and which, not being regulated by our will, is the strangest and most capricious thing in the world. Such is the state of dreaming, or of sleep,—for to sleep is to dream,—which is nothing but the inertness of the personal power, with all its consequences. The state of dreaming is only a more decided state of reverie. In the latter state, personality ceases to govern as well as in the former, but continues to watch; hence it is more conscious of itself, and distinguishes itself more clearly from the capacities which act independently of it; and hence moreover it is less the dupe of whatever they produce. Still, even in sleep, the suspension of personality is not complete; it preserves a kind of indistinct judgment which is revealed in a thousand ways by the phenomena peculiar to that state. But this is not the place to analyze those phenomena.

The personal power not only sometimes ceases to govern our natural capacities; but it is easy to prove that, in the first instance, they are put in motion and developed without it. In fact, we do not take possession of one of our faculties, in order to employ it, but because we know that it exists, and that it is an instrument suited to our purpose. Thus, we do not will to remember, but because we know that we can remember. Now, how could we know that we can remem-

ber, how could we know even what it is to remember, if we had not already exercised remembrance? It was necessary, therefore, that we should spontaneously remember for the first time, in order afterwards to will to remember. The same reasoning applies to all our faculties. Before it had seen, or felt, or moved, or formed an idea, the infant did not know that it could see, or feel, or act, or think. Ignorant that it possessed these capacities, it could not think of employing them, nor, consequently of taking possession of them, and directing them. These capacities therefore must needs have awakened of themselves, and have been developed at first by their own operation, without the aid of the will. Thus, personality is a fact in us subsequent to the developement of our natural capacities; in other words, before it took possession of itself, our nature was endowed with certain capacities, which at first were developed in it, precisely as properties are developed in things. It is this spontaneous developement which has given it the consciousness of the different powers, with which it is endowed; and it is only on that condition, that it has been able voluntarily to take possession of its faculties, to direct them, and to make use of them. The day in which this was done, it departed from the class of things, and the human person burst the concealment in which it had hitherto slumbered. In our present state, when we cease to govern our faculties, they return to their primitive and natural independence; that is to say, they act with their own movement and not with ours, no longer obeying the free and intelligent will of the person, but fatality, like the properties of things.

It is not impossible to observe the birth of personality in the developement of the external faculties of the infant. In the first place, it does not know how to make use of its arms, or its eyes; it is evident that it sees, before it observes, and that it moves, before it directs its motions. Soon we perceive a faint commencement of will, that is to say, of direction, in these two capacities; but this will does not become master at once; time is needed to substitute voluntary direction for spontaneous developement. A kind of struggle takes place between the two impressions; each of which is seen by turns to triumph. Finally, at length, the will subdues and disciplines these two capacities; and the eyes and the arms of the infant become what they should be, that is, submissive instruments which readily obey his desires.

It is a very remarkable circumstance, that with those individuals whose sluggish will neglects the direction of certain faculties, those faculties seem to accustom themselves to their independence, and cannot again be reduced to subjection, but after an incredible resistance. Thus, when we have formed the habit of suffering the faculty of thought to wander at pleasure, it is only with great difficulty and by constant efforts, that we can apply it and fix it upon a particular subject; it every moment escapes us, and we are obliged to pursue it, to call it back, and to press it, if I may so speak, with all the weight of our authority, in order to retain it on the subject. It is the same neglect, which deprives some persons of the ability to restrain the violence of their passions. As a general rule, our authority over ourselves is sup-

ported only by continual exercise; it is by this alone, moreover, that it can increase, and acquire facility. The measure of this authority is also the measure of the dignity of the man, because this authority in fact is the man himself.

There are three principal degrees in the establishment of this authority; and these three degrees constitute three different internal states, around which are grouped all the variations of moral dignity which are presented by the spectacle of human consciousness. Naturally, the capacities are not submissive, because the authority of the will imposes on them a direction which is contrary to their natural tendency. Now, the greater part of men leave their capacities in this state of insubordination; or at the most, they subject one or two of them, whose docile service is indispensable to the profession which they exercise. Hence it follows, that as each capacity acts at random, their whole inward nature is the image of anarchy and disorder; while man ought to rule over them, they rule over him; and he is the slave of all the sensations, all the passions, all the errors, all the imaginations, all the follies, which they produce. If an occasion be presented which demands the prompt and vigorous action of one of these faculties, the will in vain attempts to employ it; as it has not been accustomed to serve, it resists its orders, and leaves it impotent or weak, when it ought to have triumphed. The repeated experience of this inability throws man into a state of profound discouragement, and, if he does justice to his nature, produces a dissatisfaction with himself which makes him completely miserable. In most

cases, he does not find the strength to escape from this condition; terrified by the difficulties, corrupted by the habit of weakness, he abandons himself; and continuing to go down, from one degree of debasement to another, he falls at length almost to a level with things, forgets himself entirely, and presents the melancholy spectacle of a noble nature enervated and degraded by its own fault.

There is only one way to escape this deplorable fate, and that is to establish in ourselves, by the most strenuous efforts, the dominion of the will. This task is easier in some natures than in others, and it is one of the advantages of a good education, that it prepares man for it in his infancy, and makes its accomplishment far less difficult. But the most happy dispositions and the most judicious education can only mitigate the struggle, but cannot take away its necessity. There are many souls, which obedient to the noblest impulses, engage in this generous struggle, during the bright days of youth; but few which sustain it with constancy. The greater part soon yield to fatigue, and, without renouncing the combat, pass their lives in the alternations of courage and of frailty, which render them by turns happy and wretched, elated with success or dissatisfied with themselves, and which keep them at an equal distance from moral degradation and from moral perfection.

These perhaps are indebted to the shortness of life; for if their moral dignity is preserved, it is, in most cases, because they have not had time to lose it. In an affair like this, to vibrate between victory and defeat, is to be nearer to defeat than victory, for defeat

is more natural than victory. Still, this struggle, to whatever degree it be carried, is noble; but it is sublime, only when it is persevering; and it is the more sublime, in proportion as it is long and painful. It is only a persevering struggle, moreover, which can conduct man, in the brief duration of this life, to the third degree of personal dignity, which is the highest point of perfection that it is possible for him to attain.

In this third state, the characteristic of which is beauty, the capacities are so trained to obedience by the effect of a long and severe discipline, that they yield without resistance to all the commands of the will, and move under its direction with the same facility as the keys of an instrument under the touch of a skilful musician. All struggle has ceased, and the will, happy in the exercise of an easy authority, governs almost without thinking of it, and calls forth prodigies with a free and graceful unconsciousness. The sight of its dominion would lead us to believe that its authority was natural; we should say that it was the authority of an angelic spirit, which had never known the weariness of thought, the storms of the passions, and the revolts of a capricious sensibility. An ineffable harmony is manifested in whatever it does, since all its faculties, obedient to its voice, conspire to execute its slightest purposes, precisely as it wishes, and in all cases, with equal facility. Every thing which it does, moreover, is complete and finished. As all effort has disappeared, the energy of personality appears less clearly in this state than in that of struggle; it renders the character less imposing, but more lovely; less sub-

lime, but more beautiful. It is the difference between the oak, which on the summit of a rocky steep, resists the everlasting tempest which beats upon it, and in spite of the winds, puts forth its short but vigorous branches; and the majestic plane-tree, which, in the depths of a happy valley, serenely raises its head towards the sky, and spreads the riches of its foliage on every side with an harmonious luxuriance.

There are, as we perceive, infinite degrees in the authority which we can exercise over our capacities. This authority varies in different individuals, to so great a degree, that perhaps there are not two in whom it possesses the same extent. It is extremely limited in the greater number, because, as the faculties are naturally not submissive, there is required in order to subject them to the will, a vigorous action upon ourselves, of which few men are aware, or of which they are willing to take the trouble. A part only undertake the labor at all; few sustain it with perseverance; and but a very small number, in the short duration of this life, arrive at the end proposed, and obtain a complete and easy authority over themselves. Beside these differences, there are many others. We see men who have the greatest power over one of their faculties, and none, or next to none, over the others; thus, the philosopher, accustomed to reflect, controls his intellectual faculties with the greatest ease, while he often has no government over his passions; others have a great command of their passions, but cannot fix their minds on any subject of thought; we find men who have nothing in subjection but their fingers; finally, every day and almost every minute, the voluntary

power is weakened or strengthened in the same individual; sometimes puny and languid, sometimes energetic and active, it continually rises and falls, and with it, the personality, which it constitutes.

When man arrives at a great old age, he usually ends where he began, that is to say, in the impersonal life which, in the infant, precedes the birth of the will; and hence the common observation that the old man is in his second childhood. We observe, in fact, among old men, a considerable and progressive diminution of the personal power; it seems, as if the will, fatigued with the long service which it has performed, abandons its task in the evening of life, and gradually falls into repose, while waiting for the slumbers of death. Extreme old age suggests at once the idea of sleep and that of infancy; and this is because, in truth, sleep, infancy, old age, are but the same phenomenon, in three different forms, that is, the feebleness of personality, which awakes in the infant, reposes in the sleeper, and fails in the old man. The debility of the organs, which renders the exercise of the functions more painful, may indeed contribute to the discouragement of the will in the aged; but there is also no doubt, that in ceasing to make use of the faculties, the will, in its turn, contributes to their decay; for the remark deserves to be made, that the dominion of the will over our capacities, contributes to their developement; as if, by giving them a forced direction, it made them keener, more pliable, and more vigorous. Our capacities never cease to be in operation, whether we make use of them, or neglect them; but it is observed, that they are injured when we neglect them,

and strengthened when we employ them. The senses acquire a remarkable subtilty in those who are obliged to make constant use of them by their profession, or their mode of life; the case is the same with the taste for the Beautiful in those who cultivate the arts, with the faculty of thinking in philosophers, or of imagining in poets; while in persons who lead an idle or sensual life, the powers of intelligence, of imagination, and of taste, rapidly decline. The locomotive activity, in like manner, increases by exercise, and is diminished by a sedentary life, as is the case with females and clerks. Thus, we are not only disgraced, but actually degraded, when we neglect to develope in ourselves the power which distinguishes man from things, which gives him a resemblance to the Deity, and which forms his sole claim to the sovereignty of creation.

It was necessary briefly to exhibit all these facts, because they lead to important consequences, new, perhaps, and certainly very important, both for the understanding of man in general, and for that of the system of his faculties in particular. For instance, it follows from them, in regard to the study of our faculties, that there is no one which is not developed, in its turn, sometimes as a simple property of our nature, free from the yoke and the direction of the personal power, sometimes as a faculty, that is, as an instrument of this power; and hence each of our faculties has a twofold form, which the greater part of philosophers have not comprehended, and concerning which some have made the mistake of supposing them two distinct faculties. In regard to the general knowledge of man, it results, in like manner, from those facts; first, that there are

two separate elements in our constitution, although the one has its root in the other; namely, the thing on the one hand, and the person on the other; human nature with its capacities subjected to necessary laws, and the extraordinary power which this nature developes in the present life, and by means of which it takes possession of the necessity that it finds in itself, and makes use of it as an instrument. Secondly, that these two elements constitute in us two distinct modes of life, the impersonal life and the personal life. Thirdly, that we are *things* before we are *persons*, and live the life of things before living the personal life. Fourthly, that the person sometimes fails in us, and that consequently there are moments in our existence in which we return to the state of things, and live with a life which is purely impersonal. Fifthly, that the person is often extinct in us before the close of life, and that thus more than one human being ends where all human beings begin, that is, with the mode of existence which belongs to things. Sixthly, that so long as personality subsists in us, it is subject to perpetual variations, not only in different men, but at different moments in the same man; so that in the scale, which commences with things and ascends to complete personality, there is not a degree, at which man cannot rise or fall, while at the same time, neither that which is human in his nature, nor that which partakes of the nature of a thing is in the least impaired. These facts illustrate the basis of the system of our faculties, and determine the method to be followed in the study of its details.

Every faculty has two modes of developement; it

is either simply developed by virtue of the necessary laws of human nature, or it is developed under the direction of the personal power.

It follows from this fundamental fact, that, in the study of our faculties, we should not take for two distinct faculties the two modes of developement of the same faculty. Thus the faculty of *observing* is only the capacity of *seeing* directed by the will; *attention* and *reflection* are only the capacity of *knowing*, applied by the will either to external objects or to internal objects; the faculty of *tasting* is only the capacity of *perceiving* savors, applied by the will to the perception of a particular savor. The case is the same with all our other faculties; all are presented to us by turns under two forms; but under these two forms, they remain the same natural capacity.

It follows from the same fact, that every faculty should be studied in the two modes of its developement; that is to say, the observer should first ascertain how it proceeds, when it is left to itself; then what it becomes, when it is brought under the direction of the personal power.

The mode of the developement of a faculty, when it is left to itself, is the natural law of that faculty. We cannot determine the modifications which are given to the action of a faculty by the personal power, before we have established the natural law of that faculty; we must therefore commence with this investigation; and in order to determine the natural law of a faculty, we must observe it at a moment when it is abandoned by the personal power; and this can always be done without difficulty, for such moments constantly recur in the internal life.

When we clearly understand how a faculty proceeds in its free developement, it remains to observe it under the yoke of the personal power; and when we have ascertained how it is developed in this latter condition, by comparing the two modes of developement with each other, we can easily determine the nature of the modifications which are produced by the intervention of the will.

All the natural laws of our capacities being determined, we understand what our nature would be, how it would proceed, what it could do, in case that it had remained a *thing*, or if it had again become one, that is to say, if the personal power had not been born in it, or if it should disappear from it. We are thus able to comprehend the state of reverie, of sleep, of infancy, of the imbecility of old age, all of which approach, to a greater or less degree, towards the hypothetical state of which we are speaking.

All the natural laws of our capacities being determined, on the one hand, and all the modes of the developement of the same capacities under the dominion of the will being known, on the other, we may derive from these premises an exact general idea of what is produced in us by the personal power, and of the share which it has in our developement and culture. From the same premises, we may deduce the general formula of the modifications which are given by the personal power to the developement of any particular faculty. Finally, it is not impossible perhaps to deduce from them the circumstance which gives birth to the personal power; and which then determines its developement, with such different degrees of energy.

It is evident that we could not complete the task, if we wished here to present all those general results, which proceed from the thorough study of our faculties. It is enough to have pointed out the manner in which they may be derived. Still we cannot refrain from a rapid indication of the second of these results, that is, the general modification which is given by the personal power to the developement of our faculties.

Precisely as it would be a gross error to believe, either that the personal power created our different capacities, or that without it they would not be developed; so, we should be under a singular mistake, if we supposed that its influence went so far as to change the laws of their natural action. As the properties of things, although they receive no movement and obey no direction from any personal power, still develope themselves, and have their direction and their laws; so, the natural capacities of free beings, and of man in particular, have their movement and their laws, by virtue of which they would be developed without the aid of the personal power, provided that this did not intervene. When the personal power appears, it turns to its own end those forces which exist and act without it; but it does not create and cannot change their natural laws any more than the miller creates the power or changes the laws of the water-course which he employs. We make use of intelligence, of memory, of sensibility, of the locomotive capacity; but we find all these capacities within us, completely formed and subjected to their laws; and we are obliged to make use of them just as they are, and to adapt ourselves to their laws, in order to share in their ben-

efit. In a word, before it took possession of itself and assumed the control, our nature existed; it was endowed with certain capacities which would have been developed in it, as simple properties, if, becoming sovereign of itself, it had not subjected them to its authority, subordinated them to its own movement, and transformed them into instruments for the accomplishment of its purposes. Our faculties therefore are only natural forces subdued to our service.

It follows from this that our faculties and our properties are perfectly identical in themselves; and that the only difference which distinguishes them, is that the faculties are governed by the personal power of a free being, while the properties are not so governed. Suppress the personal power in free beings, and their faculties would become properties; create this power in things, and their properties would become faculties; and, in thus becoming, the former properties, and the latter faculties, neither the properties nor the faculties change their nature; they remain the same natural capacities which they were before. A single circumstance alone is changed, and this circumstance is exterior to them, namely, their being dependent or not dependent on a personal power which can make use of them, but which, in making use of them, cannot alter them.

Under the government of the personal power, our capacities therefore continue to act according to their own laws, that is to say, the memory does not remember, the understanding does not know, the sensibility does not feel, except when these faculties are developed in the manner which belongs to them.

What then is the action of the personal power on our capacities? This action may be reduced to two circumstances; it directs, and it concentrates.

When our faculties are abandoned to themselves, they are the sport of external things by which they are solicited. Thus, the memory abandoned to itself, is seized, in turn, by all the remembrances suggested by the association of ideas, and irresistibly led away by one or the other; some, of comparatively greater liveliness, arrest it for a longer time; others only touch it and pass on; but, the cause which prolongs or which abridges their duration is always in them, never in itself. The case is the same with the understanding, when it is not controlled; the internal or external phenomena which are displayed in its presence successively engage its attention, or, if they appear simultaneously, divide it between them,—the most prominent affecting it the most strongly, and the most trivial the least, without any opposing influence of its own. The sensibility, in its turn, acted upon by a thousand causes adapted to affect it, receives the thousand impressions which they produce, suffers, enjoys, is aroused and irritated, disturbed or calmed, at the pleasure of these causes, like the sea, at the pleasure of the winds. Thus, our natural capacities abandoned to themselves, are in constant action, but at the pleasure of the things which constantly solicit them; they are the sport of this eternal flux of the phenomena, into the midst of which we are plunged, and in the bosom of which we should toss, like things, without resistance and without consciousness, if the personal power did not place itself at the helm, like a

skilful pilot, and oppose its reflective will to the blind force of the current.

The work of the personal power consists in withdrawing our capacities, as far as possible from the stream of phenomena which bears them away, so as to apply them according to its will, and only according to its will. It undertakes therefore a constant struggle against external necessity, of which the prize at stake is the direction of our capacities. Personal life is nothing but this fatiguing struggle of man or liberty, against the world or necessity; and as the personal power cannot destroy the necessary current of external phenomena, nor prevent it from soliciting our faculties, it must do two things in order to govern them; that is, restrain them when they wish to obey the solicitations which address them, and fix them on the particular subject to which it attempts to apply them. Whenever we make use of one of our faculties, we are conscious of this twofold effort of resistance and application. While we hold the faculty attached to the subject which we wish, a thousand distracting influences tempt it away; it feels them all; it always makes a movement to escape which we are obliged to repress, without which it would pass from our power, and again fall under the dominion of fatality. Such is the primary action of the personal power on our faculties; it gives them a direction which is not their natural direction; this direction comes from itself; it is personal; their natural direction is given by external necessity.

The other effect of the action of the personal power on our capacities is to concentrate their force. The

world, which is variety itself, in taking possession of our faculties, disperses, so to speak, their energy. In fact, it never leaves them a moment occupied with the same object; it holds them successively by a thousand phenomena which it presents to their notice, and makes them share its infinite mobility. For this reason, they only glance at the surface of things, and their energy is expended without their developement. We are perfectly conscious of this in the state of reverie, which we have described above; we are conscious of it, whenever the external world gains a more than ordinary dominion over us, as in the beautiful days of spring, for example. Nature is then so enticing, that we have not the strength to resist her; we are drawn towards the delightful sensations, the attractive images, of which she is so profuse; we yield ourselves up to her charms; we let her do with us as she pleases. Then we feel our internal energy decomposed, as it were, and stealing away through all our senses. It seems as if the external world took possession of it and divided it into a thousand parts, and that these parts were dispersed and lost within its capacious bosom. The feeling of this state is delightful, because it is only the suspension of the painful struggle which we sustain. As the will quits the field of battle, all effort of our own ceases, but also all energy; all our faculties sport at their ease, but all are feeble; it is the action of the will which gives them strength, because, as it fixes and retains them on a single point, it concentrates all their power on this point, and, by the duration of this concentration, multiplies it. To combine all the energy of a capacity on a single point, to

retain it there for some length of time,—this is the second effect of the action of the personal power on our faculties. Hence the prodigious efficiency of a strong will; hence the miracles of attention, and the miracles of patience, which have suggested the remark that genius itself is nothing but unwearied perseverance. All these great effects are the result of the concentration of our faculties by the personal power; the authority of the personal power therefore over our faculties constitutes our efficiency as well as our dignity.

To direct and to concentrate,—such then is the twofold action of the personal power on the developement of our faculties. The means of exercising this twofold action vary with the faculties to which it is applied, as well as the extent to which it can be carried; but the formula is exact in relation to every faculty; such at least is the result which we have obtained from the comparison of the spontaneous and of the voluntary developement of our different faculties.

It now remains to say a few words on the method which we should follow, in order to determine the law of each faculty. This method is extremely simple. We know the faculties of the human soul only by means of the phenomena which they produce; we can accordingly know how a faculty operates only by observing how the phenomenon takes place which proceeds from it. The law of a faculty is nothing but the manner in which the phenomenon which proceeds from it uniformly takes place; thus, the law of memory is the aggregate of the invariable circumstances

which constitute the fact of remembrance. There is evidently but one means of discovering these constant circumstances, and that is, to observe the production of the phenomenon, in a great number of cases, to compare the circumstances of this production in the different cases, and to set aside those which are not common to all, and which accordingly are merely accidental circumstances; the others constitute the law of the faculty. This is the process by which we determine the general powers of nature, and those of the special properties of different beings; only in this case, it is the senses which observe, while in regard to the faculties of the soul, it is consciousness. This method is so simple and so necessary, that it is superfluous to prescribe it, and almost useless to indicate it.

We perceive that an object has many properties when it manifests phenomena of a different nature; every species of phenomena supposes a special faculty; and we recognise in an object as many different properties as we observe in it distinct species of phenomena. It is in the same manner, that we distinguish the different faculties of the human soul and determine their number. The whole difficulty of this investigation consists, in the first place, in avoiding to regard the complex phenomena, which result from the combined action of several faculties, as phenomena of a new species, produced by a special faculty; and, in the second place, in not being deceived by the different forms which the same phenomenon may assume in different circumstances. It is to this twofold cause of error, that we must ascribe the long list of faculties with which the human soul has been

favored in many treatises of psychology. Thus, the phenomena of imagination are only compounds of several simple phenomena, and are by no means derived from a special faculty, as has been thought; thus reasoning is only a form of judgment, which itself is only an act of the faculty of believing, in consequence of an act of the faculty of knowing; thus, attention and reflection are only forms of perception and of consciousness, which themselves are but two different applications of the faculty of knowing. For the rest, these two causes of error are found equally in the study of the powers of nature and of the properties of things. In proportion as phenomena are more correctly analyzed, we perceive the number of causes diminish; and the reason of this is evident; at the surface, every thing is diverse; at the bottom, every thing meets, and is blended together; there is great apparent reason to believe that the whole of this vast Universe is moved by a single cause which is governed by a single law.

But even if the truth of this presumption were demonstrated, it would not authorize the wish to arrive immediately at unity, nor justify those who invent it, when they fail to discover it. Unity can possess no value, unless it be true; for if it be false, instead of advancing science, it only retards it. Now, true unity exists at the centre; while we have started from the surface which is diversity itself; and it is but yesterday that we entered the path. Accordingly, we can only attempt to reduce diversity by degrees, without hoping to arrive at unity, which is still far beyond us. We may therefore regard every system as hypo-

thetical, which, at this stage of inquiry, explains all the phenomena of the Universe, by a single principle; and no investigation has yet contradicted this principle of judgment. The science of man presents more than one example of this error; but none more celebrated than the system of Condillac, which refers all internal facts to sensation, and all the faculties of the soul to sensibility. We cannot say that this opinion is false, but we can say with confidence that hitherto it is only a supposition advanced without proofs, and consequently altogether useless to science; for hitherto, of all the facts referred to sensation by Condillac, there is not one, whose identity with sensation has been demonstrated. This system therefore has left the question precisely where it found it. It is as if a natural philosopher should undertake to maintain that all the physical principles actually admitted are only different forms of electricity. If he produced no facts which demonstrated this opinion, although it might in reality be true, it would contribute nothing to the advancement of science.

In the actual state of human knowledge, the irreducible capacities of the human soul appear to me to be the following. First, *the personal faculty*, or the supreme power of taking possession of ourselves, and of our capacities, and of controlling them; this faculty is known by the name of *liberty* or *will*, which designates it but imperfectly. Secondly, *the primitive inclinations* of our nature, or that aggregate of instincts or tendencies which impel us towards certain ends and in certain directions, prior to all experience, and which at once suggest to reason the destiny of our being, and

animate our activity to pursue it. Thirdly, *the locomotive faculty*, or that energy, by means of which we move the locomotive nerves, and produce all the voluntary bodily movements. Fourthly, *the expressive faculty*, or the power of representing by external signs that which takes place within us, and of thus holding communication with our fellow men. Fifthly, *sensibility*, or the capacity of being agreeably or disagreeably affected by all external or internal causes, and of reacting in relation to them by movements of love or hatred, of desire or aversion, which are the principle of all passion. Sixthly, *the intellectual faculties*. This term comprises many distinct faculties,—which can be enumerated and described only in a treatise on *intelligence*.

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